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 ABSTRACT 
A randomized controlled trial was conducted to test the relative efficacy of a brief 
directive protocol (DP) aimed at reducing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and an 
expressive writing protocol (EW), which has more than a 30-year history (Pennebaker & Chung, 
2011) of research showing mostly positive effects. The DP included components with research 
support from studies of expressive writing, prolonged exposure, cognitive processing therapy, 
and mindfulness-based therapies.  
Participants were primarily undergraduate students at a large public university in the 
southern United States who endorsed at least one traumatic experience and who manifested a 
minimal level of PTSD symptoms. The primary outcome measure was the Modified PTSD 
Symptom Scale-Self Report (MPSS-SR; Falsetti, Resnick, Resick, & Kilpatrick, 1993) with a 
primary endpoint of 14-days post-treatment and 30-day follow-up for maintenance of symptom 
reductions. 
Multilevel mixed effects modeling was used to analyze results. Both treatment conditions 
showed statistically and clinically significant reductions in PTSD symptoms, with more robust 
effects associated with the DP condition. Additional analyses showed comparable significant 
reductions in physical illness symptoms between conditions, and significantly larger reductions 
of depressive symptoms by the DP condition. The DP condition was also significantly better at 
reducing thought suppression and rumination, and at increasing cognitive acceptance of the 
trauma. DP also showed significant reduction in alexithymia, which was not shown by EW. 
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Assessment of distress levels during the interventions suggest EW achieves reductions in PTSD 
symptoms through in-session habituation. For the DP condition, participants demonstrated in-
session habituation to explicit emotion cues but not to the trauma itself; however, other evidence 
also suggests habituation. Recommendations are offered regarding use of these protocols and 
further study of effective components. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to a recent review (Nemeroff, 2006), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
affects 7.8% of the U.S. population, with women (10.4%) twice as likely as men (5.0%) to 
develop this disorder. For women, types of trauma most associated with PTSD are sexual 
molestation and rape, physical attacks, and being threatened with a weapon. Sexual molestation 
and rape each have a reported national prevalence of slightly higher than 10% of women. For 
men, molestation, rape, and combat exposure are most associated with PTSD, though prevalence 
of combat exposure is about 5.0% and male sexual abuse or assault is less than 3.0% (although 
there may be significant underreporting). Women are more than twice as likely as men to 
develop PTSD associated with accidents and witnessing traumatic events, and exponentially 
more likely to developing PTSD after being threatened with a weapon (35% vs. 2%) or 
physically assaulted (22% vs. 2%). However, men are three times more likely than women to 
witness traumatic events (35% vs. 12%) and to experience threats with a weapon (21% vs. 7%); 
and twice as likely to experience accidents (25% vs. 12%). All of these data suggest that a 
significant number of people in the U.S. probably experience symptoms of PTSD.  
In addition to diagnosable PTSD, exposure to traumatic events, including those in early 
life, is associated with other disordered symptoms and behaviors. These include self-harm and 
suicidality, poor physical health, substance abuse, depressive and anxiety disorders, 
social/relational difficulties, and other forms of maladaptive avoidance behaviors and restricted 
life functioning (Nemeroff, 2006; Pennebaker, 1997). Thus, a significant percentage of the 
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population may be operating at impaired levels due to ignored or inadequately addressed trauma 
experiences.  
Much progress has been made in the treatment of individuals who seek therapy for PTSD 
(see Schnurr, 2008 for reviews of numerous treatment studies). Prolonged Exposure (PE), as 
described and implemented by Foa and colleagues (1991), has a very strong evidence base. 
Likewise, Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), developed by Resick and colleagues (2008), has 
also repeatedly been associated with significant improvements in patient functioning. The latter 
includes several written exercises, which overlaps with a third line of research: expressive 
writing. Expressive writing protocols, tested as interventions to reduce the impact of trauma on 
physical and mental health, have been studied for nearly three decades and have shown 
numerous beneficial outcomes (Smyth & Pennebaker, 2008).  
However, mixed findings, as described below, preclude the use of expressive writing as a 
reliable evidence-based treatment for trauma. Nevertheless, when expressive writing 
interventions have shown enduring beneficial outcomes, they have achieved these benefits with 
the entire intervention requiring as few as one to four writing sessions with durations of only two 
to twenty minutes each, and with negligible therapist training (Burton & King, 2008). Successful 
examples include use in an inpatient facility for substance use disorder patients with PTSD, 
which showed substantial reductions in PTSD symptoms, depression, and even social 
functioning (Bragdon & Lombardo, 2012). The accessibility and low patient burden of 
expressive writing stands in marked contrast to the 9-12 sessions of 60-90 minutes’ duration 
each, plus daily homework exercises, practiced in PE and CPT protocols. The latter also require 
extensive therapist training in addition to ongoing client willingness and commitment. These 
demands and the likelihood of client dropout suggest a need for additional research on the 
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effective components of trauma therapies and testing of whether substantial results could be 
obtained with less client burden and minimal therapist training such as is found with expressive 
writing protocols. 
For many combat veterans, sexual assault victims, and survivors of natural and man-
made disasters, 9-12 weeks of treatment may seem a negligible ‘cost’ compared to the benefits of 
achieving functionality in life that has been severely restricted for long periods of time. Yet in 
many other situations, individuals may not be aware of the impact of past trauma on current 
problems and limitations, or their circumstances may make comprehensive treatment unlikely. 
Consider facilities such as inpatient crisis stabilization centers or hospitals where patients are 
briefly committed after a suicide attempt, other self-harm, or due to excessive substance abuse. 
Manualized multi-session therapies might be of little use in these environments due to the limited 
time clients spend in these environments, typically  transferring to a longer-term inpatient facility 
or returning home after their symptoms are stabilized, typically with medications. Similarly, in 
facilities such as high schools and colleges, opportunities exist to identify trauma victims but the 
demands of current manualized therapies make their application unlikely. Thus, the abundant 
trauma exposure occurring in the U.S. and abroad, and its costly impact on academic and 
employment-related performance as well as overall social functioning, suggests a need for 
effective interventions which are brief in nature. 
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, it reviews the strengths and limitations of 
expressive writing studies and two highly researched trauma treatments (i.e., prolonged exposure 
and cognitive processing therapy) and identifies components which appear to be contributing to 
symptom reduction and improved functioning. Second, it introduces and tests a brief paper-and-
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pencil protocol, based on several likely efficacious components, for the treatment of trauma-
related symptoms.  
Mixed Results of Expressive Writing Studies  
 Writing instructions. Expressive writing protocols generally consist of three or four 
writing sessions of 20 minutes’ duration on consecutive days. The experimental condition 
generally has a variation of the following instructions (Pennebaker & Chung, 2011, p. 419):  
For the next three days, I would like you to write about your very deepest 
thoughts and feelings about the most traumatic experience of your entire life. In 
your writing, I’d like you to really let go and explore your very deepest emotions 
and thoughts. You might tie this trauma to your childhood, your relationships with 
others, including parents, lovers, friends, or relatives. You may also link this 
event to your past, your present or your future; or to who you have been, who you 
would like to be, or who you are now. You may write about the same general 
issues or experiences on all days of writing or on different topics each day. Not 
everyone has had a single trauma but all of us have had major conflicts or 
stressors – and you can write about these as well. All of your writing will be 
completely confidential. Don’t worry about spelling, sentence structure, or 
grammar. The only rule is that once you begin writing, continue to do so until 
your time is up. 
 
Control participants are typically asked to write about ‘neutral topics’ such as weekend plans or 
to describe places or objects such as their room or their shoes for the same amount of time and 
number of sessions (Baike & Wilhelm, 2004). Individual differences due to sex, age, anxiety, 
negative affectivity, and inhibition/constraint have been examined, but none have been found to 
be associated with better or worse outcomes in expressive writing studies (Epstein, Sloan, & 
Marx, 2005; Pennebaker, 1997). 
 Positive findings. A meta-analysis of 13 studies using non-clinical participants showed 
that the outcomes of expressive writing for healthy populations are positive, superior to controls, 
and on par with those obtained in more complex and time-consuming forms of therapy. Specific 
improvements were reported in health, general functioning, physiological functioning, and 
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psychological well-being (Smyth, 1998). More specifically, health outcomes have included 
reductions in blood pressure, stress-related doctor visits, and hospital stays; and improved 
functioning in the immune system, liver, and lungs. Psychologically, participants have reported 
improvements in affect and reductions in depressive symptoms and trauma-related intrusive 
thoughts and avoidance behaviors. Other benefits have included improvements in working 
memory, academic grades, sports performance, job attendance, and re-employment after 
unemployment (Pennebaker, 1997). 
A meta-analysis by Frisina, Borod, and Lepore (2004) also found positive effects for 
expressive writing among clinical populations; they were superior to neutral writing conditions 
but benefits were not as robust as with non-clinical populations. Specifically, while patients 
under treatment for asthma, arthritis, and cancer showed statistically significant improvements in 
physical health; and small improvements on measures of depression, mood, anxiety, and sleep 
quality though they did not reach statistical significance. These findings suggests that individuals 
coping with chronic and potentially fatal diseases may derive physical benefits as well as modest 
psychological benefits from expressive writing. Of course, it may be that simply being part of a 
study generates benefits for trauma victims. 
Positive effects regardless of writing condition. Comparable improvements under 
expressive and neutral writing conditions have been reported among women with body image 
concerns (Earnhardt et al., 2002); children of substance abusers (Gallant & Lafreniere, 2003); 
people giving care to chronically ill children (Schwartz & Drotar, 2004); suicidal students 
(Kovac & Range, 2002); people grieving the death of a loved one (Range et al., 2000; O’Connor 
et al., 2003); victims of attempted or completed rape (Kearns, Edwards, Calhoun, & Gidycz, 
2010); and college students who met criteria for PTSD associated with sexual or physical assault, 
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a car accident, war experience, or witnessing a murder (Sloan, Marx, & Greenberg, 2011). These 
findings suggest that improvements among those writing about their trauma or about a neutral 
topic may be due to factors such as repeated self-identification as the victim of a trauma and 
completion of numerous related assessment instruments before and after the writing exercises. 
However, not all studies have shown positive effects.  
Detrimental effects. Detrimental effects of expressive writing have been reported in four 
studies. Participants included eight traffic accident survivors diagnosed with PTSD who showed 
increases in healthcare visits and physical and psychological symptoms (Gidron, Peri, 
Connonlly, & Shalev, 1996); 32 adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse who showed increases 
in physical symptoms (Batten, Follette, Hall, & Palm, 2002); three college students who showed 
significant increases in medical visits (Honos-Webb, Harrick, Stiles, & Park, 2000); and college 
students who showed increases in psychological distress and health center visits (Rogers, 
Wilson, Gohm, & Merwin, 2007). These results are difficult to interpret. For example, in the 
Gidron et al. and the Rogers et al. studies, victims may have been avoiding needed treatment and 
the increase in hospital visits may have been a positive outcome of participation in the study. Yet 
these consequences may be indicative of behaviors these participants engaged in that were 
unhelpful. The overall lack of direction provided by the writing instructions may be allowing for 
unhelpful behaviors such as rumination, which will be discussed below. In addition, some 
differences have been found based on populations sampled. 
Population differences. According to Frisina et al. (2004), psychiatric patients show less 
benefit from expressive writing than do physically ill patients. This finding may be due to 
uncontrolled confounds with medications and other forms of therapy that may be administered 
concurrently in psychiatric samples. It may also suggest that expressive writing is simply less 
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effective for those with severe psychological conditions. Similarly, a meta-analysis of 30 studies 
(Harris, 2006) found that while writing about stressful experiences helped healthy individuals to 
reduce healthcare utilization, it did not show the same benefit for those with either medical or 
psychological diagnoses. Thus, expressive writing as it is currently implemented may work best 
with generally healthy people, and lead to greater reduction of physical rather than psychological 
symptoms, but such a conclusion is still premature.  
Practices Associated with Successful Expressive Writing Outcomes 
Given the record of mixed findings, it remains largely unclear whether and when to 
advise clients to explore their trauma histories via writing or journaling. However, expressive 
writing researchers have found support for several factors that may help explain aspects of 
expressive writing that contribute to positive outcomes.  
Making conscious associations between the events of the trauma and one’s emotions 
contributes to symptom improvement. A seminal study by Pennebaker and Beall (1986) showed 
that for victims of trauma, writing about emotions alone was inferior to writing about emotions 
plus the actual events related to a trauma. Similarly, in a study that isolated ‘narrative coherence’ 
as a condition, Graybeal, Sexton, and Pennebaker (2002) found that, by itself, coherence alone 
about one’s trauma story was not associated with better health outcomes.  
Further debate about emotional and cognitive factors led Sloan, Marx, Epstein, and 
Lexington (2007) to include details of the events but to compare groups based on emotional 
expression (“write about the most traumatic experience [of your life] with as much emotion and 
feeling as possible”) versus insight and cognitive assimilation (“focus on what the event has 
meant” and “how the event has changed [your life]”). They found that only the emotional 
expression condition showed significant improvements in psychological and physical health as 
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compared to the insight and traditional control groups. Thus, emotional expression linked to a 
particular trauma does appear to contribute to positive effects. 
Actual expression of trauma narratives is more important than the format of expression. 
Pennebaker’s review (1997) found that improvements in physical, behavioral, and psychological 
markers associated with writing were not superior to talking aloud, and that improvements 
associated with talking to a therapist or a tape recorder about a trauma were comparable to those 
associated with writing about it. The important factor appears to be the expression of a traumatic 
event, not the form of that expression.  
More recently, Resick and colleagues (2008) conducted a dismantling study which 
isolated the writing tasks from the rest of Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT). Participants were 
women with a history of physical and/or sexual assault in childhood or adulthood who met 
criteria for PTSD. Results showed that all three conditions (writing alone, CPT without writing, 
and full CPT) achieved substantial but comparable improvements in PTSD and depression 
symptoms. One particularly unexpected finding was that CPT without the writing component 
achieved the best results in terms of PTSD and depressive symptom reduction, suggesting that 
the addition of writing adds nothing to the success of that protocol on PTSD. However, it should 
be noted that all three conditions involved psychoeducation and 12 hours of active interaction 
with a therapist and all showed significant symptom improvement during the course of therapy 
and results were comparable at 6-month follow-up. These findings suggest that creating a 
narrative is not the effective component; rather, processes that occur during each of these 
treatment conditions may be responsible for symptom improvement.  
Symptom reduction is associated with habituation. In his earliest expressive writing 
study, Pennebaker (1984) based his theory on reports in the 1960s and 1970s that individuals 
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classified as a ‘repressor’ or ‘nonconfider’ of thoughts and feelings showed higher blood 
pressure, greater rates of physical disease, and higher cancer mortality rates than confiders or 
non-repressors (Blackburn, 1965; Davies, 1970; Derogatis, Abeloff, & Mehsaratos, 1979; 
Kissen, 1966). However, exposure alone, or overcoming inhibition, does not appear to account 
for improvements. Greenberg and Stone (1992) found no difference in beneficial outcomes 
between those who wrote about an undisclosed trauma and those who wrote about one they had 
already disclosed to others, suggesting that the ‘removal of inhibition’ and achieving expression 
is not sufficient for improved functioning.  
Looking specifically at habituation in expressive writing, Sloan, Marx, and Epstein 
(2005) measured heart rate reactivity during writing sessions. They found that participants who 
wrote about the same topic across three sessions showed steady decreases in arousal levels, as 
well as improvements in physical and psychological symptoms. This was in contrast to 
participants who wrote about a different trauma each time, and those who wrote about neutral 
topics. Those who wrote about a different trauma each time showed higher arousals during 
sessions two and three, suggesting lack of habituation; they also showed less reduction in 
symptoms. This Sloan et al. study offers what may be the best evidence for an association 
between beneficial outcomes and exposure-that-achieves-habituation. It may be the case that the 
expressive writing studies which showed detrimental outcomes did so because of exposure that 
led to a reinforcement of avoidance rather than achieve habituation. If that were the case, then 
improving client attitudes toward their traumatic memories (i.e., willingness to experience rather 
than avoid them) may be a helpful target for effective interventions.   
The Sloan et al. (2005) finding is consistent with the outcomes of prolonged exposure 
protocols described by Foa, Rothbaum, Riggs, and Murdock (1991), and with the evidence-based 
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treatment of numerous anxiety disorders. In these treatments, exposure is always administered 
under conditions such that maladaptive avoidance or escape are prevented in order to avoid 
negative reinforcement of those behaviors and to achieve reductions in the arousal elicited by the 
presence of that stimulus. Treatments often begin with more tolerable stimuli first and 
subsequent sessions introduce increasingly fear-arousing stimuli from a list arranged along a 
hierarchy until habituation is achieved at each stage (Barlow, 2008).  
Of course, in writing studies, habituation to trauma memories and cues may not 
necessarily be occurring only during the writing sessions but may be occurring between sessions 
or simply during the time a participant is engaged in a trauma-related study. Sloan et al. (2011) 
found no differences between participants assigned to write about a trauma with as much 
emotion as possible and controls who were told to describe their typical day with no emotion or 
opinions. Participants in both conditions showed significant improvements in PTSD symptoms. 
Similarly, other studies (Earnhardt et al., 2002; Gallant & Lafreniere, 2003; Kearns et al., 2010; 
Kovac & Range, 2002; O’Connor et al., 2003; Range et al., 2000; Schwartz & Drotar, 2004) 
have shown comparable beneficial results between experimental and control participants. 
Symptom amelioration may be due to testing effects whereby the completion of numerous pre- 
and post-assessments in the context of self-identifying as a trauma survivor may be serving as 
exposure to trauma memories in a safe setting and thereby facilitating habituation. 
Health improvements are usually associated with increasingly coherent, insightful, and 
balanced narratives across sessions. Pennebaker and colleagues (1993, 1997, 2001) have shown 
that those who benefit from expressive writing show a shift from negativity and confusion to 
positivity and insight in their writing across sessions. To assess these changes Pennebaker and 
colleagues developed text analysis software called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC; 
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Pennebaker & Francis, 1999). The LIWC program categorizes thousands of words into 82 
categories such as negative emotion, positive emotion, causation, and insight. They found that 
for participants who improve, later sessions show three patterns: increasing use of causal and 
insight words (e.g., because, reason, understand, and realize); an overall higher use of positive 
emotion words; and a moderate overall use of negative emotion words. Extremes of very many 
or very few negative emotion words are both associated with worse outcomes.  
Building on those findings, Burton and King (2004, 2008, 2009) and Smyth and 
Pennebaker (2008) have further demonstrated that writing about the positive gains following a 
traumatic experience is associated with beneficial effects, and other researchers have eliminated 
negative writing entirely. Ashley, O’Connor, and Jones (2010) showed that writing about 
positive themes benefitted caretakers of the chronically ill, while those who wrote about negative 
themes did not improve. This suggests that identifying positive aspects of traumatic experiences 
assists with reducing the subsequent impact of those events.  
However, two exceptions to these findings have been reported. Batten et al. (2002) found 
that increases in insight, causation, and positive emotion words were associated with worse 
symptomatology at follow-up, and that number of negative emotion words was not significantly 
related to outcomes. Likewise, Rogers et al. (2007) found that increases in insight were 
associated with more health center visits and psychological distress. This may serve to caution 
researchers and therapists that exposure alone is not sufficient if it fails to achieve habituation. 
However, it should also be noted that number of visits to a health care facility may be indicative 
of addressing a problem rather than further ignoring or avoiding it, suggesting it as a marker of a 
positive outcome. Regardless, it appears that insight and a shift from negative to positive 
expression may be beneficial but are insufficient to achieve positive outcomes.  
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Understanding Processes Associated with PE and CPT 
Common factors in PE and CPT. Thus far, the above findings regarding beneficial 
expressive writing treatments could be said to support processes that occur through Prolonged 
Exposure (PE; Foa et al., 2005) and Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT; Resick et al., 2008; see 
Rothbaum & Foa, 1999 and Schnurr, 2008 for excellent summaries of numerous treatment 
studies). During successful administrations of PE and CPT, clients are helped to express and re-
experience their stories and related emotions; they experience emotional arousal and dissipation 
or habituation to negative emotions; and their stories become less fragmented and more coherent. 
Given these commonalities of effective trauma treatments, one reason expressive writing 
studies show inconsistent results may be due to failure of participants to experience actual or 
imaginal exposure since there is no therapist to prompt and direct them toward these experiences 
after the initial instructions. In PE and CPT, trauma victims are repeatedly prompted to describe 
their perceptual experiences as they recall or write about scenes of their trauma (with instructions 
to use the present tense), and they are frequently prompted to feel their feelings (Lauterbach & 
Reiland, 2007). Absence of such prompting may result in omission and avoidance of these 
experiences for some participants of expressive writing studies, while others may be 
experiencing them and achieving the positive results.  
Re-experiencing or recalling the details of a trauma may be important for at least two 
reasons. First, these activities may serve to cue further recollections and help make the 
experience more clear and comprehensive. By instructing the client to describe what they see, 
hear, or smell, they may begin to notice other things previously omitted and fill gaps in their 
memories. Second, perceptual details may consciously or unconsciously serve as triggers for 
flashbacks and sudden mood changes. Unconscious cues can include a particular smell, the flash 
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of a steel bumper, a loud sound, and many other sensory perceptions that have become 
associated with the event. Recalling them repeatedly can initiate the process of habituation. In 
PE, victims are also prompted to list feared and avoided activities and situations so they can be 
targeted for exposure exercises. The process of identifying cues and avoided activities also 
begins the work of exposure, which may not occur with the largely undirected expressive writing 
protocol.    
Divergence between PE and CPT. In addition to those largely common elements, debate 
between PE and CPT researchers focuses on whether, in the treatment of PTSD, there is any 
need for ‘cognitive restructuring’ (CR), a term used to describe the explicit targeting of 
catastrophic and unrealistic interpretations and ‘meanings’ of traumatic experiences and 
predictions related to future well-being (Bryant et al., 2003). PE as delivered by Foa and 
colleagues ignores the content of cognitions, while CPT specifically identifies and addresses the 
contents of thoughts. 
 During CPT, participant cognitions are identified, challenged, and altered numerous 
times, orally as well as in writing. After an introductory psychoeducation session about the 
treatment, which includes a discussion of the relationship between situations, thoughts, and 
feelings, and the advisability of allowing natural feelings to occur rather than be suppressed or 
avoided, clients are asked to write a sentence about what their traumatic event ‘means’ to them. 
During the subsequent two sessions, this statement is challenged and used to illustrate the 
relationships between events, thoughts, and emotions. The client is then asked to write a 
narrative at home, in the present tense, allowing themselves to re-experience the emotions. They 
are to read this account aloud daily until the next session, and then read it to their therapist. 
Using Socratic questions, the therapist demonstrates the CR skill of identifying and challenging 
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cognitive distortions such as unreasonable self-blame. The client then goes home and revises the 
account and more Socratic questioning helps them to achieve reductions in PTSD and other 
symptoms. Furthermore, throughout the sessions, victims are taught to identify thinking errors 
such as overestimation of danger, and are taught to challenge their cognitions and develop more 
balanced ones, without any explicitly named ‘exposure’ exercises or homework (Resick et al., 
2008). Cognitive restructuring is the central component of CPT, and CPT has been shown to 
effectively reduce PTSD symptoms and depression (Schnurr, 2008).  
Several dismantling studies have attempted to resolve this debate. Foa and colleagues 
(2003, 2005) have repeatedly suggested there is no need for CR in treating PTSD as evidenced 
by robust efficacious and effective outcomes with PE. However, Bryant et al. (2003) compared 
the use of imaginal exposure (IE) alone with the addition of CR to it (i.e., IE/CR). This required 
removing potentially cognitive strategies from PE to achieve an IE treatment without CR. They 
found that the combined condition of IE/CR was more effective than IE alone. Both conditions 
were also more effective than supportive counseling alone, adding support to the belief that 
exposure-with-habituation is the critical component rather than simple therapeutic attention. 
Subsequently, Foa et al. (2005) added a CR component to prolonged exposure and 
reported that it added nothing to the successful effects of PE alone. However, two differences in 
methodology may account for these contradictory findings. First, a confound exists in the nature 
and amount of psychoeducation and guidance provided by Foa and colleagues. Unlike strict 
behavioral trials, the first two or three sessions in PE involve discussion of reactions to trauma, 
the purpose and types of exposure, and the developing of fear hierarchies for in vivo exposures. 
These discussions undoubtedly serve a cognitive purpose; at a minimum the act of developing an 
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exposure hierarchy list elicits cognitive re-appraisal of feared stimuli (i.e., as less threatening and 
more approachable).  
Second, the Foa et al. treatment conditions included in vivo as well as imaginal exposure 
as homework. The inclusion of in vivo exposure ignores a confound explicitly cited and 
controlled for by Bryant et al. (2003), namely that in vivo exposure in home assignments often 
includes the patient using cognitive coping skills such as self-talk. Thus, it appears undeniable 
that PE involves a certain degree of CR, albeit not proposed to clients as an explicit strategy or 
with a set of cognitive skills to be acquired.  
Additional Contributions of Expressive Writing Studies to Understanding Trauma Treatment 
 While current expressive writing protocols may not offer dependable PTSD treatment 
(although this is challenged by results from Bragdon and Lombardo, 2012), the wealth of 
expressive writing studies offer several contributions to the area of trauma treatment that exceed 
the research and evidence provided by PE and CPT studies. 
 Trauma treatment may not require multiple long sessions or continuity across months.  
Given that habituation occurs over time and is measured by changes in arousal across trials, it 
has been theorized that the success of PE and CPT is due, at least in part, to these treatments 
being time-intensive. Both involve 9-12 sessions of 60-90 minutes’ duration as well as the 
completion of assignments at home. In contrast, expressive writing studies have demonstrated 
success with administrations as brief as one session and rarely more than four sessions, with 
session durations rarely longer than 20 minutes, and usually on consecutive days (i.e., within a 
single week), with no follow-up other than symptom and attitude assessment.  
 Some researchers have suggested that this brevity is potentially harmful to participants. 
Specifically, three studies with detrimental results have led researchers to conclude that 
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expressive writing should not be used in treating PTSD (Gidron et al., 1996), should only used 
with the expectation that some participants will need supportive therapy afterwards (Honos-
Webb at al., 2000), and that more time is required for habituation to occur (Batten et al., 2002). 
In support of the latter, Pennebaker’s (1997) review found that including more days and spacing 
them apart was superior to writing more often in fewer days; and that length of writing sessions 
did not significantly alter outcomes. Similarly, Frattaroli’s (2006) meta-analysis found that 
protocols with at least three sessions were more effective than those with fewer than three 
sessions; and that protocols involving sessions longer than 15 minutes were more effective than 
those lasting less than 15 minutes, suggesting that longer exposure is better.  
In contrast with findings that more and longer writing sessions produces better results, 
subsequent studies have found enduring positive physical health effects associated with writing 
three times within a single hour (Chung & Pennebaker, 2008); writing for only two minutes on 
two days (Burton & King, 2008); and from a single writing session (Greenberg et al., 1996). 
Burton and King (2008) speculate that brief writing sessions may be enough to initiate the 
Zeigarnik effect, allowing processing that has been avoided until then.  
Zeigarnik (1938) found that memory for incomplete or interrupted tasks is more intrusive 
than for completed tasks, meaning that the mind will continue to process information that is 
incomplete. It may be the case that trauma memories lose their intrusiveness when engaged and 
fully explored (i.e., when their processing is completed) as opposed to when reminders trigger 
avoidance and efforts to distract oneself. Thus, it may be sufficient for therapists and researchers 
to train clients to have skills which allow healthy engagement with disturbing memories rather 
than repeatedly participate in the client’s processing of their trauma. Given the evidence 
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regarding brevity of intervention, it appears that how time is used may be more important than 
mere quantity of time spent on the formal intervention.  
Clients may benefit by eliminating a delay between informed consent and start of 
exposure. A potential argument against brief exposure protocols stems from a belief that clients 
need ‘time’ to understand the proposed intervention, grant their informed consent, and consider 
treatment alternatives. Giving clients ‘time’ is generally interpreted to mean that actual treatment 
must wait until one or more initial informational sessions have occurred. This makes it likely that 
trauma treatment will be omitted in settings in which clients may not return, despite their having 
been identified as suffering from PTSD symptoms. It also provides an opportunity for increased 
avoidance, and reinforcement of that avoidance, which is not in the best interest of the client. In 
contrast, the immediate provision of exposure experiences may facilitate recovery and 
demonstrate the potential effectiveness of the treatment. Regardless of one’s beliefs and 
speculations, 30 years of expressive writing studies offer evidence of the willingness of 
participants to arrive at a study site and engage their worst trauma memories after only a brief 
introduction and consent process. This normalization of engagement with such memories is 
consistent with exposure theory and practice (Barlow, 2008) but delay and treating victims as 
excessively fragile may reinforce maladaptive cognitions regarding trauma and danger cues. 
Eliciting emotional arousal can be achieved quickly, particularly with therapist warmth. 
It might seem that brevity of intervention sessions could obstruct achieving the high emotional 
arousal necessary for habituation to occur. However, studies by Pennebaker and colleagues 
(1986, 2002) and Sloan and colleagues (2005, 2008, 2011) suggest that participants do not 
require previous in-person contact with researchers in order to reach elevated arousal in the first 
and subsequent sessions. Researcher warmth specifically has been shown to promote emotional 
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engagement. Rogers et al. (2007) found that participants who interacted with a “warm” 
researcher showed significantly more emotional engagement and greater insight than those who 
interacted with a “cold, distant” researcher. In fact, those who interacted with a cold 
experimenter showed no significant increases in insight, nor significant changes in symptoms or 
healthcare visits, suggesting that researcher coldness may block the emotional engagement that 
appears to be necessary for arousal and habituation to occur. 
Detrimental effects of expressive writing may be more attributable to maladaptive 
cognitions and behaviors than to brevity of intervention time. When Gidron et al. (1996) found 
that their eight experimental participants showed increases in negative affect, healthcare visits, 
and avoidance symptoms, they explicitly recommended that expressive writing not be used to 
treat PTSD (note: participants were primarily survivors of traffic accidents). However, the 
authors included the caveat that training participants in coping skills might have improved their 
results and they did not cite lack of time as a problem. Their protocol consisted of 20-minute 
writing sessions on three consecutive days plus the addition of a spoken narrative about the most 
salient aspect of the traumatic experience (total of four sessions). As evidenced by Sloan and 
colleagues (2004, 2005) who achieved habituation in three 20-minute sessions, four exposure 
sessions could have offered sufficient time for habituation, suggesting that something other than 
lack of time (i.e., lack of coping skills) may have prevented better outcomes. 
Honos-Webb and colleagues (2000) reported that several expressive writing participants 
experienced worse outcomes, and looking closely at these participants sheds light on the nature 
of the problems. For one participant, writings showed explicit avoidance of writing about the 
trauma until the last day, which created an artificially short exposure. The increase in healthcare 
visits could be regarded as a normal outcome of an exposure that fails to lead to habituation. This 
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situation is akin to having a dentist poke and prod but not conduct a necessary root canal, and a 
brief poking and prodding some time later will have the same detrimental effect of inflicting pain 
with no benefit.  
The other two participants (Honos-Webb et al., 2000), who also showed increases in 
healthcare visits, implied in their narratives that they had achieved resolution or peace with their 
trauma but the authors suggest the participant had simply “sugarcoated” them. This expression 
reflects what Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1987) termed maladaptive cognitive strategies such 
as ‘denial’ or ‘minimization’ and shows another form of avoidance. It is unlikely that giving 
these participants more time to engage in such behaviors would have helped achieve habituation 
or resolution. The authors recommended that expressive writing participants be followed closely 
and that some participants might require supportive therapy, not simply more time writing.  
The Rogers et al. (2007) study also showed that expressive writing participants reported 
increased healthcare visits and experienced more distress at 1-week follow-up. They also 
demonstrated more ‘thought suppression’ or tendency to avoid undesired thoughts and memories 
(assessed by the White Bear Suppression Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), and reported not 
telling friends what they had written about. However, as with the Honos-Webb et al. (2002) 
study, exposure to traumatic memories that results in seeking out health services might be 
considered a positive result by many clinicians. Regardless, these studies underscore the notion 
that exposure without sufficient skills or guidance can, in fact, be detrimental or at least will 
require subsequent attention. 
Lastly, Batten et al. (2002) found that even with demonstrated increases in insight and 
positive emotion words, participants in the experimental condition showed increases in physical 
symptoms and no changes psychological distress, while control participants showed reductions 
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in both. Researchers theorized that four days of writing for 20 minutes per session was simply 
insufficient time for habituation to occur in victims of “complex trauma” (the sample was 32 
survivors of child sexual abuse). However, all of the above researchers acknowledged that other 
factors may have interfered with habituation. Specifically, working with Vietnam veterans, 
Pitman et al. (1991) had found that guilt, blame, and anger (which are also common among 
sexual abuse survivors) are associated with less benefit from exposure therapies. Thus, failures 
associated with expressive writing may not be due to limitations in time but neglect of cognitive 
and behavioral issues that may arise during recall and narration of events, such as shame and 
avoidance. Fortunately, several studies have examined cognitive barriers to symptom reduction. 
To test whether actively targeting ‘irrational’ beliefs would improve the effectiveness of 
expressive writing as a treatment for depression, Kallay, Vaida, Borla, and Opre (2008) 
compared a traditional writing condition to another that included training in Rational Emotive 
Behavioral Therapy (REBT; Ellis & Dryden, 1997) principles. The latter was administered as 
four days of 20-minute writing sessions, each preceded by 10 minutes of psychoeducation on 
REBT. Both conditions showed reductions in depression symptoms, suggesting that, for mild 
depression, standard expressive writing instructions are sufficient. However, on a measure of 
mood states, the REBT condition showed significantly greater reductions in ‘confusion’ and 
‘hostility’ suggesting greater psychological benefits from explicitly targeting cognitions. A 
similar study has not yet been conducted with a sample experiencing major depressive disorder 
or PTSD, but this finding suggests the advisability of enhancing expressive writing with the 
addition of cognitive skills training.   
Cognitive skills training is advisable because research has also demonstrated 
relationships between rumination, worry, anxiety, and depression in clinical and non-clinical 
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samples (Beck et al., 1987; de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Ellis & Dryden, 1997; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994). Rumination researchers contrast a positive and negative 
type of turning inward and thinking about problems. Definitions of negative rumination include a 
focus on depressive symptoms and their implications (Just & Alloy, 1997), and when described 
with ‘worry’ they are said to be, “cognitive processes characterized by thinking in an elaborate, 
repetitive way about personal concerns with difficulties terminating these chains of thoughts” (de 
Jong-Meyer et al., 2009). Examples of ruminative behavior include expressing to others how 
poorly one is feeling, wondering why they feel that way, and worrying about what may come of 
it (Just & Alloy, 1997; Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006). Similarly, negative ruminators have 
been shown to repeatedly engage in trying to answer questions that can rarely be resolved, such 
as asking ‘why’ questions about feelings, events, and perceived mistakes (Watkins, & Baracaia, 
2001, 2002). It may be that minimally guided expressive writing promotes negative rumination 
in some participants while others are more intuitively able to focus on ‘positive rumination’. 
Examples of the latter would be ‘lessons learned’ or recognizing that a trauma could have been 
worse (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Williams et al., 2002). Differences in 
rumination may help explain why some people benefit from expressive writing while others do 
not; this has been tested using the Ruminative Response Scale. 
The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS), developed by Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-
Hoeksema (2003) contains an overall measure of rumination, as well as a negative subscale the 
authors termed ‘brooding’ and a positive subscale called ‘reflection’. The latter is characterized 
by an orientation of problem-solving when turning inward to examine depressive content. Over a 
1-year period they found stability in rumination styles and that negative rumination was 
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positively and strongly associated with higher depression at both the beginning of the study and a 
year later. In contrast, positive rumination was only weakly associated with depression at either 
time point. Gortner, Rude, and Pennebaker (2002) applied the RSS to an expressive writing 
study and showed that ‘brooding’ mediated the effects of expressive writing; participants who 
showed a decreased post treatment score on the ‘brooding’ subscale also showed a decrease in 
depression after expressive writing, while those whose depression did not decrease also showed 
stable higher brooding.  
These findings have led the present author to question whether expressive writing which 
does not yield positive outcomes may be hampered by negative rumination. This would also be 
congruent with the finding that victims of trauma often experience disturbing cognitions 
regarding the past, present, and future as all unalterable (Chard, Resick, Monson, & Kattar, 
2014), which is consistent with Beck’s depressogenic schemas about the self, the world, and the 
future (Beck et al., 1987). These findings may also explain the null results found with expressive 
writing among caretakers of the chronically ill (Ashley et al., 2010) since circumstances for those 
participants are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.  
Despite the close association between negative rumination and depression, it should be 
noted that Gortner et al. (2002) did not find that higher scores in ‘reflection’ predicted better 
health. This lack of effect from a seemingly positive activity is consistent with the finding that 
insight, coherence, and positivity about the events may not be sufficient to bring about 
improvements in health (Batten et al., 2002; Honos-Webb et al., 2000). Yet the success of CBT 
for depression (Beck et al., 1987), and the success of CPT for PTSD (Schnurr, 2008) suggest that 
some clients may benefit from activities that reduce brooding and challenge cognitive distortions 
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associated with their trauma. Furthermore, in contrast to 12 weeks of CPT, Kallay et al. (2007) 
demonstrated the ability to benefit from challenging cognitions via a brief intervention. 
Alexithymia may interfere with obtaining benefits. The impact of alexithymia (i.e., 
difficulty identifying and describing emotions) on expressive writing outcomes has shown mixed 
results. Frattaroli’s meta-analysis (2006) found that alexithymia was unrelated to outcomes. 
However, Ashley, O’Connor, and Jones (2010) found that low alexithymia was predictive of 
improvements in depression and anxiety after EW, while high alexithymia was unrelated to 
outcomes. In contrast, studies by Baikie (2008), Paez, Velasco, and Gonzalez (1999), and 
Solano, Donati, Pecci, Persichetti, and Colaci (2003) reported that participants with higher 
alexithymia benefitted more from EW than those low in that trait. Baikie concluded that offering 
encouragement and motivation to explore emotional experiences may have helped alexithymics 
to overcome that deficit. These mixed findings suggest that alexithymia may moderate the 
impact of expressing a trauma narrative; they also suggest that addressing alexithymia could be 
helpful for some victims of trauma. In addition to identifying potential obstacles and beneficial 
practices and processes for the treatment of trauma symptoms, many of which could be 
combined in a comprehensive yet brief treatment, research from other areas may offer 
contributions as well.  
Insights from Other Lines of Research 
While anger, shame, and guilt have not been explicitly studied with expressive writing, 
Pitman et al.’s (1991) finding that these emotions were obstacles to achieving habituation in 
exposure therapy suggests the importance of exploring and addressing them in trauma treatment. 
They are also specifically targeted in CPT (Chard et al., 2014). As specific forms of rumination, 
anger, shame, blame, and guilt often involve difficulty ‘forgiving’ or ‘letting go’ of an 
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association between a trauma and specific persons or causes. Forgiveness researchers have found 
psychological and functional benefits associated with achieving forgiveness and reductions in 
blame, usually facilitated by increases in understanding, compassion, and acceptance of human 
limitations. Samples have included victims of childhood sexual abuse and other victimization 
experiences considered very difficult to forgive (Enright, 2001; Fitzgibbons, 1986; Freedman & 
Enright, 1996; King & Miner, 2002).  
While CPT dedicates entire sessions to themes that may not be relevant to all victims 
(i.e., safety, trust, power/control, esteem, and intimacy; Chard et al., 2014), perhaps a brief, 
directive protocol could include a brief assessment of specific maladaptive cognitions regarding 
anger, shame, blame, esteem, control, intimacy, and guilt and then target only those that are 
necessary. Similar practices are also found within Dialectical Behavior Therapy. 
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan and Dexter-Mazza, 2008), which has a 
strong evidence base for the treatment of borderline personality disorder and reduction of self-
harm behaviors, targets self-blame and stigmatization when traumatic event histories are 
considered. Through exposure and cognitive techniques, patients are helped to recall and accept 
their traumatic events, and to reduce denial and ambivalence about the events and the people 
involved. DBT normalizes the experience of seemingly contradictory emotions, such as dread 
and excitement, and promotes dialectical thinking which reduces black-and-white analyses of 
events. In addition, DBT prepares people for this work by promoting mindfulness and 
acceptance, and addressing deficits in emotion regulation skills. Some of these practices have 
also been developed into stand-alone therapy programs with increasing evidence bases for 
treating a variety of disorders. Some of these will now be described. 
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Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Ma & Teasdale, 2004) and Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) are two “third wave” 
cognitive-based therapies, among others, that treat mindfulness and acceptance as interventions 
in and of themselves. By ‘acceptance’ researchers mean a willingness to allow an exposure to 
occur and continue without enacting avoidance and escape behaviors. Clients are taught to ‘turn 
toward’, ‘make room for’, ‘approach’, and ‘sit with’ noxious stimuli. In this process clients are 
often invited to practice ‘mindfulness’, which may be likened to a scientist simply observing and 
describing or taking notes of phenomena. It is characterized by simply ‘noticing’ or making 
observations about one’s own breathing, feeling, thinking, or other experiences while 
‘withholding judgment’ (e.g., good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant). Mindfulness is theorized to 
increase flexibility in responding to stimuli since emphasis is placed on awareness of one’s 
cognitions and physiological responding and withholding or reconsidering judgments. 
Mindfulness practices can be applied in reference to intruding external stimuli, such as 
unwanted noises, as well as to private, internal stimuli such as unwanted traumatic memories. In 
DBT these techniques assist with ‘emotional regulation’ during emotionally volatile moments 
since mindfulness and acceptance generally result in lowering arousal and allowing 
considerations for making less impulsive decisions and which are more in line with one’s values 
(Linehan & Dexter-Mazza, 2008). Mindfulness and acceptance have also been incorporated into 
various transdiagnostic treatment protocols by Barlow and colleagues (2010). Acceptance and 
mindfulness therapies have demonstrated success in treating many types of disorders including 
suicidality, substance abuse, anxiety disorders, and depression (Hayes et al., 2004).  
In acceptance and mindfulness therapies, experience, judgments, and behaviors are often 
explored as potentially rigidly associated or automatic, much like physiological reflexes. This 
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rigidity is often expressed in cognitions that equate the self with a judgment (e.g., “I am a 
failure” and, “I am depressed”), which is described as ‘fusion’ by ACT theorists. Similar to 
Beck’s (1991) concept of maladaptive schemas, rigidity may be found in often unstated but 
deeply held ‘rules’ about living that contribute to distress (e.g., “I must not be depressed”, “I 
cannot live my life until I overcome anxiety”). These rigid reflex-like cognitions are identified 
by acceptance- and mindfulness-based therapies and targeted for intervention. The goal is to 
promote flexibility marked by noticing, consideration, and choice among various potential 
responses rather than being subject to rigid reflexive responding.  
In addition to merely serving an approach-and-remain-amidst-unpleasant-stimuli 
function, the term ‘acceptance’ is also used in therapy literature to describe a kind of peace or 
resolution regarding events (Hayes et al., 1999; Linehan & Dexter-Mazza, 2008; Williams, 
Davis, & Millsap, 2002). Williams and colleagues (2002) specifically studied successful coping 
with trauma and found five categories of behaviors associated with coping: denial, regret, 
acceptance/resolution, seeking positive aspects of the experience, and acknowledging situations 
that would be worse. These five behaviors can be categorized into two responses to traumatic 
events. The first group appears to involve rejection and non-accommodation while the latter 
group could be said to involve approach and accommodation. As suggested by the numerous 
studies reviewed above, it may be that emphasizing denial and regret positively reinforces 
avoidance of trauma-related stimuli and prevents habituation. In contrast, emphasizing 
acceptance/resolution, seeking positive aspects of the experience, and comparing one’s situations 
to worse ones may be promoting habituation and subsequent improvements in health. In short, it 
can be theorized that continued cognitive rejection prevents habituation while decreasing 
rejection and increasing forms of acceptance may be beneficial for trauma victims.  
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Targets for intervention regarding rejection could include manifestations of denial; 
suppression; minimization; regret; intentional neglect; avoidance; escape; and even lack of 
registration (i.e., dissociation). This list of types of rejection is not comprehensive and may not 
necessarily fit along continuums of incremental degrees. However, all share a kind of non-
engagement, withdrawal, or even an effort to push away stimuli.  
Given the impact of third-wave therapies on other disorders, they may have much to offer 
trauma treatment. Furthermore, some of the skills may be applicable in a short form. Intervention 
targets for increasing acceptance of a trauma could include promoting: resignation to the 
presence of related memories and stimuli, acceptance or ‘making room’ for them, treating them 
as welcome or desired, and even actively looking for them rather than awaiting their intrusions.  
Exploring these differing degrees of acceptance could also help clients acknowledge and 
validate the ambivalence that often accompanies traumatic events (Linehan, 1993). For example, 
a female rape victim who conceives and gives birth to a child may have difficulty ‘holding’ 
acceptance and rejection simultaneously; her rejection of the rape may be in ongoing tension 
with accepting and loving the child. Treatment can help her acknowledge this tension, validate it, 
and reduce ‘all-or-none thinking’ (Beck et al., 1987) and help her grow in her ability to maintain 
differing responses toward the rape and the child. A new protocol could specifically assess for 
these potentially unaddressed tensions and work to increase dialectical thinking. 
In addition to rumination, alexithymia, and unresolved cognitions that maintain non-
acceptance, anger, shame, blame, and guilt, another reason expressive writing studies show 
mixed results may be that they do not address the negative impact of the trauma on social 
functioning. PTSD often involves difficulty connecting with others, social withdrawal, and 
interpersonal conflict (APA, 2013, 2000). Of the many studies cited above, few even mention 
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social functioning. One exception is a new PTSD treatment specifically targeted to couples and 
families (Cukor, Spitalnick, Difede, Rizzo, & Rothbaum, 2009). Social maladjustment can be 
operationally defined as the subjective experience of lack of social support or, simply, loneliness. 
The assessment of loneliness has an advanced research literature unto itself (Cramer & Barry, 
1999), and the comorbidity of loneliness with physical and mental health pathologies and 
maladaptive behaviors are very well established (Lasgaard, Goossens, Bramsen, Trillingsgaard, 
& Elklit, 2011; Masi, Chen, Hawkley, & Cacioppo, 2011; May & Klonsky, 2011; Theeke, 2010; 
Vajda & Steinbeck, 2000; also see Cacioppo et al. 2006 for an excellent review and evidence for 
changes associated with changes in loneliness). In contrast, social support, defined as having 
family, friends, and significant others with whom one shares private knowledge and to whom 
one can turn in time of need, has been associated with better physical and psychological well-
being, higher life satisfaction, and more resilience to adverse life events (Bruwer, Emsley, Kidd, 
Lochner, & Seedat, 2008; Miller & Lefcourt, 1983; Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, & Farley, 1988). 
New treatments for PTSD may show better outcomes if they include steps to assess and improve 
individuals’ particular obstacles to social functioning.  
Purpose of the Current Study 
Given the above findings from expressive writing, PE, CPT, CBT, and third-wave 
therapies, this study will test the effectiveness of a new, highly directive protocol aimed at 
promoting the processes identified above which appear to contribute to trauma recovery. This 
protocol was developed, tested, and adjusted during 2013 and resulted in its current form of 17 
exercises distributed across 12 worksheets. Development and pilot testing of the experimental 
protocol are described further below. 
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Hypotheses 
Primary hypothesis. Participants who complete the proposed directive protocol (DP) in 
three 25-minute sessions will report greater reduction in PTSD symptom scores than will those 
who are asked to write about a traumatic experience or a neutral topic using standard expressive 
writing (EW) instructions in three 25-minute sessions.  
Secondary hypotheses. While high levels of depression and physical illness symptoms are 
not part of the inclusion criteria, it is hypothesized that participants in the DP condition will 
report greater reduction in these scores than those in the EW condition.  
Additional hypotheses. It is further hypothesized that as a group, participants in the DP 
condition will report greater reductions in the following variables than those in the EW 
condition: use or endorsement of negative emotion words; scores on measures of alexithymia, 
negative rumination, thought suppression/avoidance, and denial regarding the trauma. Similarly, 
greater increases in positive emotion words and in positive cognitive acceptance of the trauma 
are expected to be manifested by those in the DP condition than those in the EW condition. 
Lastly, given the importance of social withdrawal and isolation regarding trauma, the DP 
includes a section to promote problem-solving to increase social contact. It is predicted that 
greater decreases in loneliness will be reported by those in the DP as compared to those in the 
EW condition.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
Undergraduates at a large public university in the southern United States, and local 
community members, who self-identified as having experienced a traumatic event, were 
recruited for this study. Regarding undergraduates, screening to identify potential participants 
was accomplished by a prescreening battery administered to all students registered in psychology 
courses who signed up for study credits that fulfilled research requirements in their psychology 
courses.  
To determine a sample size (N) that would yield sufficient power to demonstrate and 
compare the effects of the interventions on PTSD symptoms, an a priori power analysis was 
conducted. According to Cohen (1988), sample size is calculated as a function of Type I error 
probability (significance criterion α), Type II error probability (β), the anticipated effect size 
(ES), and the desired power (1-β) to detect an effect. The software program G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used for the calculations. To balance the Type I and 
Type II error rates, that is, to reduce the probabilities of falsely attributing an effect when it is 
only due to chance, and to reduce the probability of missing an effect that is in fact present, α 
was set to 0.05 and β was set to 0.20. That is, it was determined that the following were 
appropriate levels of risk: a 5% chance that the analysis will falsely suggest the presence of an 
effect, and a 20% chance that an actually present effect will fail to be detected. This results in a 
power (1-β) of 0.80 or an 80% chance that an actually present effect will be detected by this 
study.  
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To estimate the expected effect size (ES), the most comprehensive meta-analysis was 
reviewed, which consisted of 146 studies (Frattaroli, 2006). Isolating college samples with 
trauma, under the variable of ‘psychological symptoms’, effect sizes ranged from small negative 
effects (r = -.15) to small (r = .17), medium (r = .25), and very large (r = .60) positive effects. 
For this reason, small-to-moderate (f = 0.15; Cohen, 1988) and moderate (f = 0.25; Cohen, 1988) 
effect sizes were entered into the calculation of a 2 (treatment conditions) X 4 (time 
measurements) repeated measures ANOVA with PTSD symptoms as the outcome variable. The 
small ES resulted in a total sample size of 62 (or 31 per treatment condition); the moderate ES 
suggested a sample size of 24 (or 12 per group). For these reasons, and to reduce the impact of 
attrition, a total of 80-90 participants will be recruited with the intention of retaining 31 per 
treatment condition through final data collection at 30-days post-treatment.  
Measures 
Identification of victims of trauma. To identify victims of trauma, the Life Events 
Checklist (LEC; Blake et al., 1990) was administered in the prescreen battery. This measure lists 
17 types of traumatic event and asks whether they witnessed or experienced each. The LEC 
converges with other measures of psychopathology associated with trauma exposure (Gray, Litz, 
Hsu, & Lombardo, 2004). To assess level of severity of symptoms, the PTSD Checklist Stressor 
Specific Version (PCL-S; Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996; Weathers et 
al., 1993) was included in the prescreener as well. The 17 items were derived from the 17 PTSD 
symptoms listed in the DSM-IV. They are rated from 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 (“Extremely”), with a 
range of 17-85. The PCL has been demonstrated to achieve a .93 correlation with the Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blanchard et al., 1996). Individuals with a minimum score of 
30 were invited to participate to ensure a sufficient baseline of distress (30 is suggested as the 
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minimum cut-off score for general population samples; a change of 5 points is considered a 
reliable response to treatment and a change of 10 points is considered clinically meaningful; U.S. 
Department for Veteran Affairs’ National Center for PTSD (2010) for civilian primary care 
PTSD screening).  
PTSD symptoms. To confirm the inclusion criterion of minimal PTSD symptoms, and to 
assess changes in PTSD symptoms, the Modified PTSD Symptoms Scale-Self Report (MPSS-
SR) was administered. This instrument was adapted from an earlier instrument by Foa et al. 
(1993) by Falsetti, Resnick, Resick, and Kilpatrick (1993) to distinguish between frequency and 
intensity of symptoms. The 17 items assess the 17 symptoms of PTSD in the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2000; e.g., “Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated 
with the event?” and, “Have you been jumpier, more easily startled, since the event?”). 
Frequency of each item is scored from 0 (not at all) to 3 (5 or more times per week/ very much/ 
almost always). Intensity of each item is scored from 0 (not at all distressing) to 4 (extremely 
distressing). Internal consistency of .96 and good concurrent validity with the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) have been reported (Falsetti et al., 1993). In the present study, a 
minimum of 12 points at pre-test was required for inclusion, and Cronbach alphas ranged from 
.89 to .93 for both subscales at all four assessment periods. 
Physical health symptoms. Changes in physical complaints were assessed with the 
Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness (PILL; Pennebaker, 1982). This contains 54 items 
with physical health complaints (e.g., “headaches,” “congested nose,” “coughing”) rated from 0 
(have never or almost never experienced the symptom) to 4 (more than once every week). 
Internal reliability has been reported with Cronbach alpha coefficients ranging from .88 to .91. 
Test-retest reliability has been assessed at two months with correlations ranging from .79 to .83 
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(Kearns et al., 2010). In the present study Cronbach alphas ranged from .95 to .96 for the four 
assessment periods. 
Depression and anxiety symptoms. To assess improvements in levels of reported 
depression and anxiety, the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS-21) was administered. 
This measure was developed first as a 42-item measure, then reduced to 21 items by Lovibond 
and Lovibond (1995). The initial 42-item measure showed internal consistencies of .84 to .91 for 
the three subscales. A study by Antony et al. (1998) showed alphas ranging from .92 to .97 for 
the 42-item version, and .87 to .94 for the DASS-21. Exploratory factor analysis with principal 
components and oblimin rotation showed a 3-factor solution that accounted for 67% of the 
variance (eigenvalues 9.07, 2.89, and 1.23). Correlations between factors were .48 for stress and 
depression, .52 for stress and anxiety, and only .28 for anxiety and depression. When compared 
to the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the depression subscale showed a .79 correlation. The 
anxiety subscale showed a .85 correlation with the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI), and a .55 
correlation with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version (STAI-T). Others have also 
reported strong psychometric support (Crawford & Henry, 2003; Henry & Crawford, 2005; Ng 
et al., 2007). In the present study Cronbach alphas ranged from .83 to .93 for the four assessment 
periods. 
Healthy behaviors. To assess changes in healthy behaviors, the following items were 
assessed by single item self-reports: missed days of school in the past month; missed days of 
work in the past month; number of times receiving services at the campus health clinic, 
counseling center, psychological services center, and from a religious figure in the past two 
weeks. In addition, single items assessed these for use as covariates: number of times they had 
written/journaled/blogged about troubling events in the past and this event in the last two weeks; 
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number of times they discussed this event with a professional (therapist); number of times they 
had discussed this event with a friend or family member; and whether other disturbing/traumatic 
events had occurred since their in-person session. 
Thought suppression/avoidance. Changes in efforts to avoid unwanted thoughts were 
assessed with the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). This 
15-item measure rates statements such as, “There are things I prefer not to think about” and, “I 
always try to put problems out of mind” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). Reliability has been demonstrated with Cronbach alphas ranging from .87 to .89, and re-
test correlations have been .92 at one week and .69 at three months. Correlations with 
instruments for depression, anxiety, and symptoms of obsessive compulsion disorder support the 
validity of the WBSI for assessing avoidance of noxious thoughts. In the present study Cronbach 
alphas ranged from .91 to .94 for the four assessment periods. 
Rumination. Rumination was assessed with the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Instructions are to rate what one generally does when 
feeling down, sad, or depressed. The full 22-item measure yields a total Rumination score and 
three subscales determined by factor analysis assess: ‘brooding’ (e.g., “Think, What am I doing 
to deserve this?”), ‘depressive rumination’ (e.g., “Think about all your shortcomings, failings, 
faults, mistakes”) and ‘reflection’ (“Go someplace alone to think about your feelings”). Items are 
scored from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always). The overall scale has demonstrated internal 
consistency alphas of .89 and .90, with subscale alphas between .72 and .77. Test-retest 
reliability has been reported as .67. Convergent validity with other measures of ruminative 
responding has been reported as r =.62 (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Treynor et al., 
2003). In the present study Cronbach alphas for the full scale ranged from .94 to .95 for the four 
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assessment periods. Internal consistencies ranged from .79 to .87 for the Brooding subscale; .81 
to .83 for the reflection subscale; and .92 to .93 for the depressive rumination subscale. 
Alexithymia. The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Taylor & Parker, 
1994; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003) was used to assess difficulty identifying and describing 
feelings. This is a widely used instrument to assess the construct of alexithymia. Confirmatory 
factor analyses have repeatedly demonstrated three factors or subscales assessing, 1) difficulty 
identifying feelings (DIF; e.g., ‘‘I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling’’); 2) 
difficulty describing feelings (DDF; e.g., “It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost feelings, 
even to close friends’’); and, 3) a thinking style that is externally oriented (EOT; e.g., “Looking 
for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts from their enjoyment”). Items are rated from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Total scale internal consistency has been demonstrated 
as Cronbach’s alpha = .81 and 3-week stability of r=.77 (Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994).  
A study with U.S., German, and Canadian samples demonstrated reliabilities ranging 
from Cronbach alphas of .74 to .84. Subscales showed Cronbach alphas ranging from .60 to .83. 
Factors were correlated within each sample, particularly between the ability to recognize one’s 
own feelings and communicate about them to others (r’s ranging from .59 to .71). External 
orientation was also related to difficulty describing feelings (r’s ranging from .39 to .46; Parker, 
Bagby, Taylor, Endler, & Schmitz, 1993). A more recent study with a community sample 
yielded a full scale internal reliability of Cronbach’s alpha = .86, with subscale reliabilities 
ranging from .71 to .80 (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003). In the present study Cronbach alphas 
for the full scale ranged from .80 to .87 for the four assessment periods. Internal consistencies 
ranged from .84 to .89 for the Difficulty Identifying Feelings subscale; .59 to .84 for the 
Difficulty Describing Feelings subscale; and .52 to .67 for the External Orientation subscale. 
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Given the lower reliabilities of two of the subscales, only the full-scale TAS score was used in 
analyses. 
Social functioning. To assess whether the experimental protocol would be associated with 
improvements in social functioning, changes in self-reported loneliness were assessed with the 
15-item Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults-Short Version (SELSA-S; 
DiTommaso, Brannen, & Best, 2004). A 37-item predecessor (DiTommaso & Spinner, 1993, 
1997) was developed to improve upon previous loneliness measures which were unidimensional. 
This scale distinguishes between loneliness with respect to family of origin, with peers, and with 
romantic relationships. The short form was validated using four samples (N = 1,572) comprised 
of university students, spouses of armed forces personnel, and a clinical sample at a psychiatric 
setting. Cronbach alphas ranged from .87 to .90. As with the 37-item version, confirmatory 
factor analysis found that a three-factor structure (Social, Family, and Romantic loneliness) 
provided the best fit (DiTommaso et al., 2004). This scale has also been found to have strong 
convergent validity with other measures of loneliness (e.g., UCLA v.3; Russell, 1996). Divergent 
validity has also been demonstrated by weak correlations between the subscales and by expected 
relationships with measures of secure and insecure attachment (DiTommaso et al., 2004). 
Items are rated from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (strongly agree); three items from each 
scale are reverse-coded. Sample items on the ‘family loneliness’ subscale are, “I feel alone when 
I am with my family” and, “There is no one in my family I can depend on for support and 
encouragement but I wish there was.” Items on the ‘social loneliness’ subscale include, “I do not 
have any friends who understand me, but I wish I did” and, “I am able to depend on my friends 
for help.” Sample items on the ‘romantic loneliness’ subscale are, “I wish I had a more satisfying 
romantic relationship” and, “I have a romantic partner with whom I share my most intimate 
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thoughts and feelings.” Each subscale yields a mean score with means greater than 4.0 
suggesting loneliness in that domain (DiTommaso et al., 2004). In the present study Cronbach 
alphas ranged from .83 to .87 for the peer/social loneliness subscale; .87 to .90 for the family 
loneliness subscale; and .85 to .88 for the romantic loneliness subscale.  
Changes in cognitive processing. To assess changes in positive and negative cognitive 
coping related to the trauma, the Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (CPOTS; Williams, 
Davis, & Millsap, 2002) was used. Scale development and validation included several stages of 
item composition, administration, factor analyses, reduction and expansion of items, and 
retesting. The final version consists of 17 items supported by confirmatory factor analysis which 
demonstrated a 5-factor model with at least three items each as the best fit. Two subscales assess 
maladaptive cognitions and three assess positive cognitive coping. Sample items are, “I wish I 
could have handled this differently” (Regret); “I pretend this didn’t really happen” (Denial); “I 
have come to terms with this experience” (Resolution); “I am able to find positive aspects of this 
experience” (Positive Cognitive Restructuring); and, “My situation is not so bad compared to 
other peoples’ situations” (Downward Comparison). Internal reliability has been reported with 
alphas ranging from .72 to .89 (Currier et al., 2013) and test–retest correlations at 4 weeks 
ranging from .70 to .85 (Williams, Davis, & Millsap, 2002). Divergent and construct validity 
were demonstrated by inverse relationships between denial and regret with the three subscales 
that suggest effective cognitive processing (i.e., positive cognitive restructuring, resolution, and 
downward comparison), and by significant relationships with related subscales tapping stress-
related growth, denial, and regret (Impact of Events Scale; Horowitz, Milner, & Alverez, 1979). 
In the present study Cronbach alphas at the four assessment intervals ranged from .69 to .82 for 
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the denial subscale; .77 to .82 for regret; .74 to .89 for positive cognitive restructuring; .87 to .89 
for acceptance; and .83 to .90 for downward comparison. 
Changes in negativity and positivity. Lastly, changes in negativity and positivity were 
assessed differently depending on the treatment condition. For the expressive writing 
participants, the LIWC software program (Pennebaker & Francis, 1999) was used to count 
percentages of positive and negative emotion words used during each writing session. For the 
experimental protocol, positive and negative words endorsed at Steps 2 and 3 were counted and 
percentages compared to those endorsed at Steps 10 and 11. 
Subjective units of distress (SUDS). Throughout the interventions, researchers also 
recorded participant subjective ratings of feelings of distress from 0 to 100. In the EW condition, 
ratings were obtained at the beginning and end of each intervention period, and approximately 
every 7 minutes. The ratings at the beginning of writing sessions were requested as the current 
feeling; subsequent ratings asked for the highest level since the prior rating. This resulted in 15 
SUDS ratings for the EW condition. For the DP condition, each “Step” had a beginning SUDS 
phrased as current feeling, and a final SUDS phrased as the “highest level reached” during that 
Step. This resulted in 24 SUDS ratings for the DP condition.  
Procedure  
The first informed consent was obtained prior to participants completing the general 
university screening instrument, which includes the Life Events Checklist (LEC) and the PTSD 
Checklist (PCL-S). Students who self-identified on these measures as having experienced a 
traumatic event, and who endorsed symptomatology on the PCL-S of 30 points or higher, were 
contacted by e-mail and invited to participate in the present study. This study was described in an 
email as an investigation of coping with difficult life experiences and included a link to an 
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informed consent page and pretest measures. Pre-test battery assessed students’ current level of 
PTSD symptoms, physical health symptoms, healthcare visits, anxiety and depression symptoms, 
healthy behaviors, level of thought suppression/avoidance, rumination, alexithymia, and 
loneliness, and levels of positive and negative cognitive processing of their traumatic experience. 
After completing pre-test measures online, participants were scheduled and individually 
attended an in-person session in an office furnished with a chair, desk, and computer with 
internet access. Randomization to one of two treatment conditions occurred when participants 
arrived for the in-person session by means of flipping a coin. Heads indicated the expressive 
writing condition (A) and tails indicated the experimental protocol (B).  
After obtaining signed informed consent, the participant received her assigned treatment 
(see Appendices A and B for each condition). The interventions were administered in three 30-
35 minute sessions within a single in-person meeting divided by two 5-minute breaks. After she 
completed her treatment, she was asked how she was feeling. If any participant appeared or 
reported being distressed she was invited to either: 1) be escorted to the University Counseling 
Center or the Psychological Services Center on campus, 2) be helped to schedule an appointment 
at one of the facilities on the list, or 3) call a relative or good friend. Once any safety concerns 
were abated, she was thanked and given a list of local therapy resources in case she felt troubled 
by emotions and memories brought up by the study. The project supervisor (Karen A. Christoff) 
was also available by phone to guide therapist-researchers in helping any distressed participants. 
Out of 88 administrations, two situations required researchers to consult supervisors. The first 
concerned possible mandatory reporting of an abuser but was deemed unnecessary due to a 
traumatic brain injury that had incapacitated the abuser seven years prior to this study. The other 
concern regarded participant reports of suicidal ideation. The intervention was terminated, the 
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participant was assessed for suicidality, and he was periodically contacted to monitor well-being. 
This adverse incident was reported to the Institutional Review Board (IRB), which oversaw the 
study. 
As follow-ups, participants were e-mailed links to complete post-test measures online 
within 24 hours, at 14 days, and at 30 days. An added incentive was offered for completing these 
final post assessments; completers were entered in two drawings to win $50 gift cards to a 
vendor of their choice. 
Researcher training, competence, and treatment adherence. Reliability and validity of 
research on interventions can be compromised by differences associated with researcher 
competence, adherence to treatment protocols, and consistency of treatment delivery (Bellg et 
al., 2004). According to a comprehensive review of best practices, researchers conducting 
intervention studies are encouraged to take steps to ensure that all participants receive equivalent 
“dosages” within and between treatment conditions. Dosages are generally understood as 
providing a fixed number and duration of intervention contacts, a fixed amount of information 
conveyed, and consistency in protocol delivery. This requires training administrators and 
evaluating their performance in a number of areas (Bellg et al., 2004).  
However, given that the experimental protocol was testing the deliverability of a very 
high dose of information and therapeutic experience in a brief amount of time, the amount of 
fixed information delivered across conditions was not expected to be the same. Instead, 
equivalence between conditions was established by providing comparable levels of experimenter 
warmth (itemized in Appendix E); administration of the intervention in three consecutive 
sessions of 30-35 minutes each separated by 5-minute breaks; the use of a written protocol in 
each condition (Appendices A and B); and the use of checklists regarding procedures 
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(Appendices F and G). Sessions were videotaped and coders (undergraduates) were trained to 
achieve 90% agreement on the instrument that will be used to assess experimenter warmth, 
competent administration and handling of questions, and participant reception (Appendix E). 
Three coders were recruited and trained, with two coders rating 45 (52%) of the sessions.  
Protocol administrators were graduate students in a doctoral clinical psychology program. 
Protocol administration training consisted of the principal investigator leading other 
administrators through the scripts and protocols, implementing role-plays, observing pilot 
administrations, and giving feedback until they achieved perfect administration per the 
administration checklists, protocols, and warmth ratings. Periodic meetings provided booster 
sessions to reduce drift among administrators as well as coders. Coders were blind to study 
hypotheses. 
Development of the Experimental Protocol 
The DP (Appendix B) was developed to direct participants toward behaviors and 
processes associated with improved outcomes. It used a paper-and-pencil worksheet format to 
elicit active cognitive engagement by the participant and a clear sequential curriculum for 
administrators. Given the aversiveness of traumatic memories and related emotions, early steps 
in the experimental protocol provided psychoeducation and exercises to prepare and motivate the 
individual to fully engage with her trauma memories and related emotions. This approach was 
modeled after PE (Foa et al., 2005) and CPT (Resick et al., 2008), both of which explicitly 
dedicate initial work to introducing the concepts behind PTSD treatment and normalizing the 
experiencing and processing of emotions. The DP also incorporated mindfulness exercises to 
assist with reducing efforts to avoid unpleasant emotions and memories. In addition, as is 
common with exposure therapies, each step began with an assessment of Subjective Units of 
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Distress (SUDS), rated on a scale from 0 to 100, and ended with a rating of the highest SUDS 
level experienced during that worksheet. The following describe each step of the protocol. 
Step 1A: Psychoeducation to normalize physiological reactivity. The introduction 
acquainted participants with the concept of ‘autonomic’ responses to physical exercise (such as 
increased heart rate, breathing, and sweating). Attention was drawn to how well the body 
generally regulates itself without conscious commands. It was suggested that interfering with 
that process (e.g., trying not to sweat) would be unnatural and unhelpful. An image of a large 
dam helped illustrate tense unnatural obstruction, and a silhouette of a jogger symbolized the 
normality of autonomic functioning in response to stressful activity.  
Step 1B: Experiential practice. Participants were then invited to observe the relationship 
between their own cognitions and physiological responses using exercises like those found in 
Barlow et al. (2010), and Hayes et al. (1999). The first example used the mental image of a 
lemon and the tendency to salivate when vividly imagining tasting a slice. Another invited 
participants to imagine jogging and observe changes in their breathing and perception of warmth. 
The last exercise demonstrated increasing levels of awareness about tension in one’s shoulders 
and the ability to consciously influence relaxing them further and further despite thinking one 
had already fully relaxed them. At the conclusion of Step 1, it was suggested that, as experienced 
in the exercises above, our somatic (i.e., conscious, voluntary) system can sometimes be ahead of 
or lag behind our autonomic system. 
Step 2: Prolonged emotional exposure. After the introductory practice, which did not 
mention traumatic memories, the second step began by suggesting that the individual probably 
spent some effort avoiding unpleasant thoughts and feelings (Hayes et al., 2004). This 
acknowledgement was followed by inviting her to notice the safety of her current situation and to 
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relax (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Resick et al., 2008). Further psychoeducation was provided to 
suggest that autonomic regulation sometimes respond to memories, ideas, and dreams in a way 
that is indistinguishable from responses to current externally present threats, and that as one 
maintains conscious awareness of current safety, the perception of threat subsides as does related 
arousal.  
This psychoeducation was then followed by an invitation to endorse emotions (from a 
list) that were associated with the participant’s most disturbing or traumatic experience. 
Participants were asked to try to feel those emotions, “ride them out”, and “hold nothing back”. 
The image of the jogger was repeated to recall the expectation of bodily reactions to cognitions. 
The goal was to elicit arousal and facilitate prolonged exposure to specific emotions (Sloan et al., 
2005, 2007), and to help overcome potential difficulty identifying or describing them (i.e., 
alexithymia; Ashley et al., 2010; Baikie, 2008; Paez et al., 1999; Solano et al., 2003). Choice of 
words for this list was based on research findings described below. 
Step 3: Endorsement of positive emotions. A list of positive emotion words was also 
considered to introduce the potential of positive outcomes from the trauma. This list also allowed  
assessment of a baseline that could demonstrate change by the end of the protocol. This activity 
also served to identify early “sugarcoating” (see Honos-Webb et al., 2000), denial of impact, or 
non-engagement with the trauma and allowed the protocol administrator to address potential 
barriers before continuing. 
Development of emotion lists. The lists of negative and positive emotion words were 
generated from a longer list of nearly 14,000 words gathered and tested among thousands of 
participants by Warriner, Kuperman, and Brysbaert (2013) and their research predecessors 
(Bradley & Lang, 1999). Their published list includes only the “highest-frequency” words 
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known to at least 70% of participants from a longer list of 30,000 words. Words were rated by 
that study’s participants from 1 to 9 on three dimensions: ‘valence’ (from happy to unhappy), 
‘arousal’ (from excited to calm), and ‘dominance’ (from feeling controlled to feeling in control).  
In selecting words for inclusion in the DP protocol, a first sort procedure by this author 
was based on ‘valence’. This led to marking negatively valenced words in red and positively 
valenced words in blue from the highest and lowest valenced 3000 words (1500 in each 
direction). They were marked if they could ‘reasonably’ be used as an expression of feeling 
about a situation.  
Next, two other lists of negative words (from the principal researcher’s worksheets used 
with crisis center patients and distressed couples) were compared to the new list and all were 
found to be included in the 3000 words. Words were then eliminated from the list if they were 
redundant with other words on the list or did not express an emotion (e.g., [feeling] sad), a 
potential metaphor or actual experience (e.g., [feeling] beaten, cheated), a related way of 
expressing feelings (e.g., [feeling] neglected), or a resulting attitude (e.g., [feeling] cynical, 
distrusting). That stage reduced the lists to 317 negative and 286 positive words. Sorting by 
valence then showed that a majority of the words represented fairly extreme feelings; some 
middle-valenced words were retained for their ability to express unique concepts (e.g., [feeling] 
inexperienced, hardened, fated, abnormal, disposable, absolved, relentless, rugged, rebounding, 
transcending).  
Words were then grouped according to themes and some additional redundancies were 
eliminated; however, many redundancies at this stage were preserved for the purpose of 
increasing arousal and prolonging exposure to the aroused feelings. A pragmatic concern of 
limiting words to single worksheets resulted in 187 negative and 212 positive words. Pilot testing 
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and feedback (see below) concerning confusion about definitions reduced these to 171 negative 
and 110 positive words.  
Step 4. Identifying brooding-style rumination. This step was designed to raise awareness 
of unhelpful thoughts and negative predictions and to normalize them as common thinking traps. 
Sentence stems were provided and required completion by the participant (e.g., “If only…”). 
Stems were derived from the depression, rumination, and coping literature cited above. 
Step 5A. Answering maladaptive cognitions. The next stage used traditional CBT prompts 
to identify 3 negative thoughts or predictions, and taught participants to challenge them by 
comparing evidence for and against the accuracy or likelihood of those cognitions and 
predictions (Beck et al., 1987).  
Step 5B. Promoting problem-solving to decrease isolation. In addition to learning to 
question maladaptive cognitions, participants were next challenged to identify three things they 
could do to feel less isolated and develop closer friendships. This section Socratically invited 
participants to consider contextual differences that could facilitate disclosure of the trauma to 
potentially close others (e.g., alone rather than in a group, in a place or activity that offers 
abundant time, and preparing the listener to make appropriate responses). 
Step 6: Reducing anger and emphasis on blame. Psychoeducation explained that full 
responsibility is rarely found in a single person or cause (Enright, 2001; Fitzgibbons, 1986; 
Freedman & Enright, 1996; King & Miner, 2002). There are often circumstances that mitigate 
responsibility, and that would reduce the mystery behind behaviors that caused great harm. The 
example was offered of whether the participant would remain angry at an aggressive driver if he 
found out the driver had been rushing to the emergency room. This was followed by a list of 
circumstances that might apply to the participant’s case, from which he could endorse any that 
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were applicable. He was also asked to imagine three discoveries of new information about the 
person they blame for the event that would greatly reduce the level of anger they felt toward that 
individual. The goal was to dissipate highly focused anger, blame, shame, and guilt. 
Step 7. Recalling details of the trauma. Based on the research regarding the importance of 
memory cues (Foa & Kozak, 1986) and increasing coherence of fragmented memories 
(Pennebaker, 1997), this step asked participants to list sounds, smells, tastes, and visual and 
tactile perceptions associated with their traumatic event. It began with psychoeducation on 
behavioral theory that avoidance of trauma cues is reinforcing, and that failure to encounter such 
cues in a variety of contexts likely prevents generalization and habituation to them. In contrast, 
recalling such cues in a safe context may initiate habituation and also facilitate the development 
of a complete and coherent account of the trauma.  
Step 8. Promoting acceptance and positive coping. To further elicit and shape positive 
cognitions (King and Miner, 2000; Williams et al., 2002), this step began with an invitation to 
identify three things learned as a result of the traumatic experience. This was followed by 
introducing the possibility of having different responses to memories of the trauma in the future. 
Specifically, it invited them to imagine a time in the distant future in which they might feel less 
disturbed by the trauma, with a list of possible future reactions presented for consideration and 
endorsement. Participants were challenged to consider (yes/no/maybe) whether feeling better 
would likely involve behaviors such as continued denial and avoidance, acceptance and 
willingness to discuss the event, allowing themselves to “ride out” negative emotions, and/or 
positive views about broader challenges and uncertainty in life.  
Step 9. Cognitive integration. In this step, participants were asked to write or narrate a 
comprehensive account of the event. They were prompted to include contextual factors (i.e., age, 
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setting, who was involved or absent), emotions, sensations, actions, and reactions; words and 
phrases from previous exercises can also be incorporated. They were asked to “tell it like a 
movie,” “as if it is happening right now”, and to end it with lessons learned or positive aspects of 
the experience. Actual writing was not required, although writing of emotion words and 
reminders/sensory cues was encouraged for additional exposure and habituation. 
Step 10. Emotional integration (negative). Participants were then presented with the same 
negatively valenced words as in Step 2, with instructions to endorse only those that currently still 
feel relevant. This exercise provided an opportunity to experience (Foa & Kozak, 1986; 
Pennebaker, 1997) and consciously acknowledge (Williams et al., 2002) reductions in negativity. 
Step 11. Emotional integration (positive). In this step, participants were asked to endorse 
current positive feelings regarding their traumatic experience using a list of positive words from 
Step 3. The aim of this step was to strengthen the association between the disturbing event and 
positive cognitions and feelings about it (Williams et al., 2002). 
Step 12. Recap and building hope. This final step reviewed the principles and practices 
explained and experienced during the protocol, such as allowing emotions, practicing 
acceptance/reducing avoidance, and allowing habituation to occur. The protocol ended with an 
invitation to identify areas of increased hope, which also allowed the therapist-researcher a 
further opportunity to assess the degree to which the participant has been helped by the protocol.  
Pilot Testing of the Experimental Protocol 
 After obtaining approval by the University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), a previous 9-step experimental protocol was administered to five participants identified 
on the prescreen instrument as having at least moderate PTSD symptoms in relation to a 
disturbing event. Traumatic experiences ranged from the death of grandparent, to the unexpected 
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murder of a loved one, to a sexual assault (“date rape”). Based on participant feedback about 
instructions and words that were unclear or needed clarifying, and the noted presence of anger 
and blame that were not sufficiently addressed, the instrument was revised and expanded to its 
current form. Throughout, participants reported encouraging reductions in symptoms of PTSD 
and depression, as well as in the hypothesized behaviors and attitudes such as thought avoidance, 
rumination, alexithymia, and the use of denial or minimization as a coping strategy (Alessandri 
& Christoff, 2014).  
Specifically, the following were added based on areas needing more attention: a more 
explicit task to identify and challenge negative cognitions about the meaning of the trauma; a 
problem-solving task of identifying actions that could be taken to achieve better social 
connectivity and feeling understood by others; and the final step of reviewing the principles and 
practices as well as identifying reasons for hope. In addition, the presentation of the positive 
emotion words was duplicated to include their endorsement at the beginning rather than only at 
the end. In addition, the role of anger had initially been underestimated, leading to augmentation 
of the sections on reducing anger/blame and increasing acceptance. Several word changes were 
also made to improve task instructions and explanations. 
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RESULTS 
Data preparation and reliability.  
Participants. Of the 212 people who completed the screener survey, 84 did not meet 
inclusion criteria. A total of 128 were invited to participate in an intervention condition 
(including two who should not have been invited due to PTSD symptom scores that did not meet 
inclusion criteria). A Consort-compliant diagram is provided in Figure 1. Of those invited, 40 
declined to participate. In total, 88 individuals received an intervention. However, the two who 
did not meet inclusion criteria were dropped from the analyses. In addition, two participants 
require special mention. One refused her randomly assigned treatment condition (A) and was 
administered Condition B. The other expressed suicidal ideations that concerned the researcher 
who then deviated from protocol and terminated the experimental administration. These two 
cases were included in the intent-to-treat analyses, in their randomized condition. In sum, 86 
participants met inclusion criteria; 85 accepted randomization to a condition; and 85 received the 
full dosage of their intervention condition. All 86 were included in the analyses; 44 were in the A 
condition and 42 in the B condition. Missing assessment patterns requires its own extensive 
discussion (below).  
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Figure 1. Flow of Participants Through the Trial. 
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♦!!!Declined to participate (n= 40  ) 
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♦!Excluded from analysis (n= 1; did not meet 
inclusion criteria)!
A. Missing no posts (n= 32) 
B. Missing all posts (n= 0) 
C. Lost after immediate post (n= 3) 
D. Lost after 14-day post (n= 6) 
E. Missed intermediate but completed 30-day 
posts (n= 4) 
 
 
 
Allocated to intervention A (n= 45 ) 
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Missing data. The planned strategy for the main analysis was to compare the pre-
assessment score for PTSD symptoms against a final post-assessment score. However, not 
everyone completed the 30-day post, and other patterns emerged such as 14-day posts that were 
completed at four weeks, suggesting the advisability of moving data to their best matching 
temporal position; these preparatory steps are discussed in detail below. However, prior steps 
were necessary to prepare the data for missingness analyses.  
Careless responding. To assess for unreliable responding, raw data for all scales were 
examined by calculating standard deviations on responding for each case, per scale. Three cases 
(i.e., 2, 30, and 35, all in Condition B) showed zero variation in responding on four or more 
scales or subscales at 30-day post; their entire 30-day posts were deleted and treated as missing. 
For cases #30 and #35, the same occurred with 14-day post scores, which were deleted as well. 
For case #30, immediate follow-up scores were also considered unreliable and deleted. Three 
other cases required closer review based on a criteria of three or more scales with zero variation 
in responding: Case 41 at immediate post; Case 82 at 14-day post; and Case 1 at 30-day post. 
However, the variability on surrounding scales suggested overall attentive responding and thus 
these post-assessments were retained.   
Accurate follow-up periods. A next step was to examine actual days lapsed from 
treatment to post-assessments. For this study, tracking treatment effects with consistent time 
periods was an important aspect of follow-up. Four cases (#23, #45, #71 in the A condition, #46 
in the B Condition) showed 14-day posts completed at between 28 and 31 days and had no 30-
day follow-up scores; the 14-day scores were moved to the 30-day post positions. Next, the 
decision was made to limit 30-day posts to a maximum of 42 days (6 weeks) to limit the 
variability in time-since-treatment; this required deletion of final post scores for five cases which 
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ranged from 44 to 56 days (#21, #32, #55, and #78 in the A Condition and #6 in the B 
Condition). An additional case (#85) in the B condition had the 30-day follow-up at 146 days 
and was deleted; likewise, her 14-day follow-up was at 40 days so these scores were moved to 
the 30-day post. Lastly, case #86 completed the immediate post and the 14-day post at 15 days. 
Only the latter was retained. 
Internal consistency of scales. Scales used in the study were analyzed for internal 
consistency for every assessment time point using SPSS. Table 1 summarizes Cronbach alphas 
for the pre-test and three post assessments. Since two subscales of the TAS-20 showed 
questionable reliability only the full scale TAS score was used in the secondary analyses. In 
addition, the pre-test use of the Denial subscale of the CPOTS was less reliable than anticipated 
but nevertheless within acceptable limits. All other scales showed high internal consistency. 
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Table 1. Internal Consistency of Each Scale and/or Subscale for Each Assessment Period. 
 Pre-Test Immediate Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Post 
PTSD Symptom   
    Frequency (MPSS-SR) .87 .90 .89 .93 
PTSD Symptom  
    Severity (MPSS-SR) .90 .92 .92 .93 
Physical Symptoms  
    (PILL) .96 .96 .96 .95 
Thought Suppression/  
    Avoidance (WBSI) .92 .94 .94 .91 
Depression (DASS-21) .92 .91 .91 .93 
Anxiety (DASS-21) .84 .86 .83 .85 
Stress (DASS-21) .83 .86 .87 .87 
Alexithymia (TAS-20) .80 .81 .85 .87 
    Difficulty Identifying    
    Feelings (DIF) .86 .84 .87 .89 
    Difficulty Describing    
    Feelings (DDF) .59 .78 .79 .84 
    External Orientation    
   (EO) .52 .55 .60 .67 
Rumination (RRS) .94 .94 .94 .95 
   Brooding .79 .82 .85 .87 
   Reflection .81 .80 .81 .83 
   Ruminative Depression .93 .92 .93 .93 
Loneliness (SELSA-S)     
    Toward Family .87 .90 .89 .88 
    Toward Peers .83 .87 .86 .86 
    Toward Romantic .85 .86 .87 .88 
Cognitive Processing of 
Trauma Scale (CPOTS)     
    Denial .69 .77 .79 .82 
    Regret .82 .77 .79 .82 
    Positive Cognitive  
    Restructuring .74 .76 .89 .89 
    Acceptance .87 .88 .89 .89 
    Downward Comparison .83 .83 .84 .90 
 
Outliers. Given that planned analyses were based on assumptions of normal distribution, 
univariate outliers were explored at all assessment periods. This was done by calculating 
distances of observed scores from the group mean, per treatment condition. Distances were 
measured in standard deviations and as recommended by researchers (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 
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2001); scores above Z = 3.29 (i.e., three standard deviations) were replaced with a score one unit 
above or below their nearest neighbor that was within three standard deviations. In Condition A, 
no case at pre-test had outliers; at the immediate post-assessment, case #3 had a very low thought 
avoidance score (i.e., WBSI = 15) which was increased to 47. There were no outliers at the final 
two post-assessments in Condition A. In Condition B case #69 had an extreme pre-test PILL 
score of 241, which was reduced to 205. At 14-day-post case #86 had an extreme depression 
subscale score (DASS Depression = 21) which was reduced to 15. No other outliers were found 
in Condition B. 
Data transformations. Data were further screened for skew and kurtosis using SPSS 
EXPLORE. Criteria for regarding skew and kurtosis as excessive (i.e., distributions breaking the 
assumption of normality) were ratios (i.e., proportion of skew or kurtosis to their standard error) 
in excess of +/- 2.0 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Others (see Kline, 2011) have suggested a skew 
ratio of  >3.0 as extreme, and a kurtosis ratio of > 8.0. For the variable examined in the main 
analysis assessing total PTSD symptoms (i.e., MPSS-SR) excessive positive skew was found at 
pre-test for Condition A (3.51) although not for Condition B (1.84). A square root transformation 
was applied (after adding 1.0 to ensure a non-zero score) which brought the skew ratio for each 
condition within acceptable limits (1.70 and 0.78, respectively). The same transformations were 
conducted for all post assessments and no ratios remained exceeding 2.0. Kurtosis ratios were 
also within acceptable limits after the transformations (1.49 was the highest). 
Data used in secondary analyses were also explored and transformed for all assessment 
periods when a variable showed skew in either condition and at any assessment period. At pre-
test, the MPSS-SR subscale assessing frequency of PTSD symptoms showed a skew ratio of 3.33 
in the A Condition and 2.45 in the B Condition. A square root transformation (after adding 1.0 to 
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ensure a non-zero score) improved these to 1.35 and 1.42, respectively. Skew ratios for all post 
assessments were also effectively brought below 2.0. Comparable improvements in skew ratios 
were also seen with PTSD symptom severity. A pre-test skew ratio of 3.05 in Condition A was 
reduced to 0.77. At immediate post, skew ratios of 2.17 and 2.82 were reduced to 0.0 and 0.49. 
Similar improvements were seen for 14- and 30-day post scores.  
DASS-21 depression subscale scores were skewed at pre-test for Condition B (2.85). This 
was improved to 1.24 by a square root transformation (after adding 1.0 to ensure a non-zero 
score). However, at the 14-day post the transformed variable was still outside the desired skew 
ratio yet less than when untransformed (Condition B improved from 3.63 to 2.19). Ratios at all 
other time points were below 2.0 after transformation. 
At pre-test, the DASS-21 anxiety subscale in both A and B conditions (2.91 and 3.54, 
respectively) exceeded the desired skew ratio. Square root transformations (after adding 1.0 to 
ensure a non-zero score) brought these scores within acceptable limits (0.41, 1.39), as well as at 
all post assessments. 
At the 14-day post the DASS-21 stress subscale was positively skewed for condition B 
(2.45). This improved with a square root transformation (after adding 1.0 to ensure a non-zero 
score) to 0.66 without adversely affecting other scores when applied to them as well. 
At pre-test thought avoidance/suppression (WBSI) was skewed for Condition A (-3.23) 
but acceptable for Condition B (-0.44). Due to negative skew, the best transformation first 
reversed the scores (i.e., 76 minus each observed score) and then calculated the square root of 
each. While this reduce skew at pre-test to 0.27 for Condition A, it increased skew for Condition 
B to -1.67, which was still within acceptable limits. At immediate post the Condition A skew 
ratio was still beyond desirable limits (-2.68) but this was less skewed than when untransformed. 
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At pre-test the “downward comparison” subscale of the CPOTS was negatively skewed 
under both conditions (A=-3.30, B=-2.32). Scores were first reversed (i.e., 8 minus each 
observed score) and then transformed by square root and brought within acceptable limits 
(A=2.10, B=1.08). At immediate post a ratio of -4.27 in the A condition improved to 2.40, and 
from -2.68 to 1.50 in the B condition. Skews from the 14- and 30-day posts were also improved.  
At pre-test, physical illness symptom scores (PILL) were skewed (ratios of A=2.45, 
B=2.54) and a square root transformation (after adding 1.0 to ensure a non-zero score) brought 
ratios within acceptable limits (A=1.42, B= 1.67). Similar improvements were seen with the 
immediate post. Post scores for Condition B improved from a ratio of 3.17 to 2.39 at 14-days 
post, and from 3.43 to 2.75 at 30-days post. 
Loneliness regarding family (SELSA-S) was skewed for both conditions at pre-test 
(A=2.44, B=2.87). Square root transformations (after adding 1.0 to ensure a non-zero score) 
brought these within more acceptable limits (A=1.86, B=2.02). At 14-days a skew ratio of 2.83 
was reduced to 2.21 in Condition B.  
Scales used to assess alexithymia (TAS-20), rumination (RRS), denial (CPOTS), 
acceptance (CPOTS), positive cognitive restructuring (CPOTS), regret (CPOTS), and social and 
romantic loneliness (SELSA-S) were found to be within acceptable limits at all time points. 
However, they were transformed by square root to facilitate the use of similar metrics to the 
other scales.  
Impact of missing data on choosing analyses. After preparing data based on reliability 
and moving scores to appropriate time points (e.g. a 14-day post completed at 25 days was 
moved to the 30-day post position), the resulting pattern of missing data was such that two cases 
(#30 and #56, both in Condition B) were missing all post assessments; one (#86, in Condition B) 
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was missing the immediate post; another (#57, in Condition B) was missing the immediate and 
14-day post; five were missing both the 14- and 30-day posts (#31, 38, and 65 in Condition A, 
and #35 and #83 in Condition B); eight were missing the 14-day post alone (#23, 45, 71, and 85 
in the A Condition; #46, 50, 51, and 81 in the B Condition); and 11 were missing a 30-day post 
alone (#21, 24, 32, 48, 55, and 78 in Condition A; #2, 4, 6, 34, and 82 in Condition B). In 
addition, one case (#51) was missing 10 out of 25 scales and subscales at 30-day post. The 
possibility of having to drop 18 cases due to lack of a reliable 30-day post led to various 
considerations.  
One potential approach to ensuring a complete pre- and final post assessment was simply 
to carry forward the last reported score forward, as has been done in many longitudinal studies. 
However, this procedure has at least two arguments against it. First, it ignores the richness of 
data collected between those extremes, which may not actually be linear if there is an interaction 
with a variable such as time. Given that PTSD symptoms involve reactions to intrusive 
memories, it was anticipated that scores immediately following the intervention might show 
increases due to intensive contact with such memories, and then be followed by symptom 
reduction (possibly due to habituation) even with the intrusion of e-mail prompts to complete the 
14- and 30-day post assessments. Second, collapsing the data and ignoring potential causes of 
missingness could result in biasing findings toward completers which would limit their 
generalizability. Thus, methodologists regard exploring data for indicators of missingness 
mechanisms, and incorporating techniques that minimize resulting biases (Enders, 2010, 2011).  
Causes of missingness. Researchers distinguish between data that is “missing completely 
at random” (MCAR) from missing data patterns that are associated with scores on the outcome 
variable itself (called “missing not completely at random”; MNAR) or with some other variable 
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which may or may not have been measured (called “missing at random” or MAR; see Enders, 
2010 for a comprehensive summary of missing data theory and analyses).  
Regarding item-level missingness in the present study, there was an insignificant number 
of items (less than 10) lacking data. As a conservative strategy, the few item omissions were 
replaced with the same score in the previous available assessment, and many showed the same 
score for that item at the subsequent assessment as well. Two cases lacked SES scores and these 
were imputed with the sample median (i.e., 7). Among those who completed each assessment 
period, only two cases failed to complete all the scales. Missing scores for these scales were 
treated like other missing scores, discussed below.  
Regarding scale-level missingness patterns, these were explored in several ways. First, 
the SPSS Missing Values Analyses (MVA) was conducted with scale score variables entered. 
This analysis produced a Little’s MCAR test which was not significant (χ2 (394) = 377.06, p = 
.722). This test compares subgroups with the same missing patterns for mean differences; if these 
fall beyond the sampling error of the grand means there would be evidence against MCAR (i.e., 
it would suggest a non-random missing pattern). The weighted sums of the standardized 
differences between the subgroup and grand means are distributed as a chi-square statistic, which 
if significant suggests non-MCAR. However, this is not entirely reliable since MAR and MNAR 
mechanisms can still produce subgroup means that do not deviate from the grand mean (Enders, 
2010) and so further tests should be conducted.   
The SPSS MVA also produces a table of t-test comparisons which, while not controlled 
for Type I error, provide a first glimpse of variables that might be associated with missingness. 
These may be useful because methodologists recommend including variables in estimation 
techniques which are highly related to missingness itself or to outcome variables in analyses 
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(e.g., if thought suppression scores are highly correlated with PTSD symptoms, they should be 
used in estimating the missing PTSD symptom scores). At the first stage of missingness in the 
present study (i.e., immediate post), no significant mean differences were found for any variable 
between those who completed or missed the immediate-post; this suggests an MCAR mechanism 
for the four participants who missed that assessment. Similarly, those who completed and missed 
the 14- and 30-day posts could not be distinguished by their PTSD scores at pre-test or at 
immediate-post; this suggests an MNAR mechanism is unlikely.  
However, subgroups based on missingness at the two final posts did differ on other 
variables. Table 2 summarizes significant t-test results for variables found to differ according to 
whether participants completed or missed the post-assessments at 14-days and 30-days. Those 
who missed the 14-day post showed significantly higher distress at immediate-post in terms of 
depression, stress, and a tendency to brood (ruminate) than those who completed the 14-day post; 
they also showed significantly less cognitive acceptance of their trauma. This suggests an 
influence of these variables on missingness according to a MAR mechanism. The eight people 
who missed the 14-day post but completed the 30-day post also showed significantly higher 
rumination at final post than those who did not miss the 14-day assessment. This finding 
suggests those who missed the 14-day post but returned for the 30-day omitted the 14-day post 
because they were feeling worse, also a potential MAR pattern. 
Regarding those who missed only the 30-day assessment, a different phenomenon 
occurred. Attriters at that point reported significantly lower distress at the 14-day assessment 
than those who remained in the study. Specifically, at 14 days, subsequent attriters showed 
clinically and statistically relevant lower distress in terms of severity of PTSD symptoms, 
physical symptoms, thought avoidance, overall rumination, and the two subscales of reflection 
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and ruminative depression. This suggests that those who left the study after the 14-day post did 
so for different reasons (i.e., they were feeling better) than those who completed the final post. 
While not conclusive evidence of MAR mechanisms, the findings in Table 2 regarding 
differences in related variables support the presence of such mechanisms, and operating in 
differing directions (i.e., some participants missing assessments due to negative thoughts about it 
and others due to feeling better and perhaps thinking further involvement unnecessary). 
Table 2. Differences in Symptom and Attitude Scores (Untransformed) Based on Missingness 
Patterns at 14- and 30-Day Posts. 
  
Differences in Those who 
Completed and Missed the 14-
Day Post PTSD Assessment 
Differences in Those who 
Completed and Missed the 30-
Day Post PTSD Assessment 
  Completers (N = 69) 
Missing 
(N = 13) p    
Depression 4.53 8.76 .001 n/a missing n/a 
Stress 6.41 9.78 .006 n/a missing n/a 
Acceptance 4.40 3.20 .001 n/a missing n/a 
Scores at 
Immediate 
Post 
Brooding 11.44 13.86 .034 n/a missing n/a 
     Completers (N = 59) 
Missing 
(N = 11) p 
PTSD 
Severity n/a missing n/a 11.81 4.96 .014 
Thought 
Avoidance n/a missing n/a 53.75 43.72 .036 
Physical 
Symptoms n/a missing n/a 108.81 81.45 .005 
Rumination n/a missing n/a 49.36 35.92 .003 
Reflection n/a missing n/a 10.58 8.21 .006 
Scores at  
14-Day 
Post 
Depressive 
Rumination n/a missing n/a 27.42 18.74 .001 
  Completers (N = 59) 
Missing 
(N = 8) p    
Scores at 
30-Day 
Post 
Brooding 10.76 13.89 .011 n/a n/a n/a 
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The SPSS MVA also produced a table of correlated variables. Methodologists 
recommend including variables that are highly correlated (at least .40) with the outcome measure 
in analyses that include missing data. Simulation and data studies have shown that these 
variables can improve estimation techniques without an increase in bias (Collins, Schafer, & 
Kim, 2001 as cited in Enders, 2010). However, including them requires acknowledgement of 
changing the model (i.e., adding more predictors), which can create other biases (Wang & Hall, 
2008). Table 3 summarizes correlations between PTSD symptoms at the four assessment periods 
and the other variables assessed in the present study. As expected with repeated-measures 
studies, strong correlations were found between PTSD symptom scores at proximate assessment 
intervals. In addition, as expected from the secondary hypotheses, strong associations were found 
between PTSD symptom scores and the measures of thought suppression, depression, anxiety, 
stress, (non)acceptance, physical symptoms, alexithymia, and rumination. Additional variables 
with weaker associations are omitted from the table. 
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Table 3. Correlations Between Total PTSD Symptoms and Other Variables, at Each Assessment. 
  TOTAL PTSD SYMPTOMS (MPSS-SR) 
  Pre-Test Immediate Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Post 
Pre-Test 1.00    
Immediate Post 0.62 1.00   
14-Day Post 0.49 0.59 1.00  
Total PTSD 
Symptoms 
(MPSS-SR) 
30-Day Post 0.52 0.46 0.72 1.00 
Pre-Test 0.47 0.37 0.30 0.32 
Immediate Post 0.53 0.68 0.50 0.43 
14-Day Post 0.28 0.52 0.62 0.40 
Thought 
Avoidance/ 
Suppression 
(WBSI) 30-Day Post 0.36 0.49 0.67 0.60 
Pre-Test 0.54 0.37 0.32 0.42 
Immediate Post 0.45 0.55 0.42 0.39 
14-Day Post 0.41 0.52 0.54 0.45 
Depression 
(DASS-21) 
30-Day Post 0.21 0.12 0.35 0.52 
Pre-Test 0.51 0.48 0.36 0.43 
Immediate Post 0.51 0.68 0.35 0.35 
14-Day Post 0.46 0.52 0.54 0.40 
Anxiety 
(DASS-21) 
30-Day Post 0.34 0.35 0.39 0.46 
Pre-Test 0.53 0.36 0.39 0.30 
Immediate Post 0.43 0.63 0.42 0.23 
14-Day Post 0.36 0.52 0.65 0.33 
Stress 
(DASS-21) 
30-Day Post 0.27 0.36 0.42 0.36 
Pre-Test -0.27 -0.21 -0.19 -0.30 
Immediate Post -0.23 -0.30 -0.38 -0.46 
14-Day Post -0.17 -0.14 -0.41 -0.55 
Acceptance 
(CPOTS) 
30-Day Post -0.08 -0.11 -0.37 -0.49 
Pre-Test 0.37 0.32 0.27 0.15 
Immediate Post 0.45 0.57 0.31 0.17 
14-Day Post 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.19 
Physical 
Symptoms 
(PILL) 
30-Day Post 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.21 
Pre-Test 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.29 
Immediate Post 0.35 0.56 0.49 0.36 
14-Day Post 0.25 0.40 0.49 0.37 
Alexithymia 
(TAS-20) 
30-Day Post 0.21 0.29 0.54 0.45 
Pre-Test 0.56 0.49 0.29 0.32 
Immediate Post 0.61 0.65 0.45 0.36 
14-Day Post 0.46 0.55 0.48 0.34 
Rumination 
(RRS) 
30-Day Post 0.34 0.33 0.41 0.44 
 
Correlations were generated as part of the MVA analysis, which uses an expectation 
maximization (EM) algorithm to address missing data. This test produced no P values. However, 
when independently analyzed for bivariate correlations with pairwise deletion, all correlations 
were significant at the .05 level or lower. Yellow indicates a moderate correlation (.30 to .39); 
blue indicates correlations approaching strong (.40 to .49); and orange indicates a strong or very 
strong correlation (.50 to .72). 
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 Other missingness analyses. Going beyond the SPSS MVA procedure, five patterns of 
missingness were logically identified and compared: those who completed all assessments 
(Pattern A, N = 59); those who dropped from the study after the intervention (Pattern B, N = 2); 
those who dropped after the immediate post-assessment (Pattern C; N = 5); those who dropped 
after the 14-day post (Pattern D; N = 11); and those who missed the immediate and/or 14-day 
post but returned for the 30-day post (Pattern E; N = 9). One case missed the two middle 
assessments (#57) and was grouped with Pattern E since they returned for the final assessment. 
To further explore the possibility of MCAR, MAR, and MNAR, these five patterns were 
compared for significant differences on the other variables measured in the assessments. 
Categorical variables and missingness. Chi-squares were estimated to determine whether 
treatment condition, researcher, sex, or ethnic majority/minority status were significantly 
associated with a missingness pattern. Table 4 summarizes number of cases and percentages of 
participants per categorical variable that fit the assessment-level missingness patterns. Chi-
square analyses suggest that none of the missingness patterns significantly differed based on any 
value of the categorical variables. 
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Table 4. Cases in Each Missing Pattern, with Chi-Squares Regarding Values of Binary 
Variables. 
 
No 
Missing 
Posts 
Missing 
Immed. 
Post 
Missing 
after 
Immediate 
Post 
Missing 
after 14-
Day Post 
Some 
Missing but 
Returned for 
30-Day 
Pearson χ2  
(N = 86,  
df = 4) 
P 
Expressive 
Writing 
31 
(36%) 0 
3  
(4%) 
6  
(7%) 
4  
(5%) 
Directive 
Protocol 
28 
(33%) 
2  
(2%) 
2  
(2%) 
5  
(6%) 
5  
(6%) 
2.51 .643 
Female 45 (52%) 2 (2%) 
4  
(5%) 
8  
(9%) 
9  
(11%) 
Male 14 (16%) 0 
1  
(1%) 
3  
(4%) 0  
3.46 .484 
Racial 
Minority 
15 
(17%) 0 
2  
(2%) 
3  
(4%) 
1  
(1%) 
Racial 
Majority 
44 
(51%) 
2  
(2%) 
3  
(4%) 
8  
(9%) 
8  
(9%) 
2.25 .690 
Primary 
Investigator 
44 
(51%) 
1  
(1%) 
4  
(5%) 
9  
(11%) 
4  
(5%) 
Research 
Assistant 
15 
(17%) 
1  
(1%) 
1  
(1%) 
2 
(2%) 
5  
(6%) 
4.76 .313 
 
Continuous variables and missingness. To examine differences between missingness 
patterns based on continuous variables, ANOVAs were implemented. Due to unavoidable 
pairwise exclusions in SPSS, ANOVAs had to be run per assessment period (i.e., pre-test, 
immediate-post, etc.) to reduce exclusions. Regarding scores at pre-test, alexithymia (TAS-20) 
scores violated the assumption of homogeneity of variances but mean differences on this variable 
were not significant. The other variables met the assumption of homogeneous variance at pre-
test, and all variables met this assumption on all post-tests; Tukey HSD post hoc procedures were 
implemented for these. Results are summarized in Table 5, with a graphical representation 
provided in Figure 2. In effect, the ANOVAs are an additional effort to determine whether the 
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patterns in missingness illustrated in Figure 2 are due to an MNAR mechanism; if not then 
estimates for missing data could be imputed from the non-missing scores.	  
 
Figure 2. Mean Observed PTSD Symptom Scores (Transformed) per Missingness Pattern. 
 
 
 
	  66  
Table 5. Differences and Standard Deviations (Untransformed) Based on Missingness Patterns. 
 (A) No 
missing 
posts  
(n = 59) 
(B) 
Missing all 
posts 
(n = 2) 
(C) 
Missing 
both final 
posts  
(n = 5) 
(D) 
Missing 
final post 
(n = 11) 
(E) 
Missing 
14-day 
post 
(n = 9) 
Difference in 
Means p 
Untransformed Pre-Test Scores 
C - A = 33.74 .016 
C - D = 45.38 .001 
PTSD 
Total  
40.01 
(22.53) 
31.66 
(16.54) 
73.75 
(36.21) 
28.37 
(15.29) 
32.24 
(13.23) 
C - E = 41.51 .008 
C - A = 20.89 .027 
C - D = 27.98 .003 PTSD Severity 
21.52 
(14.78) 
21.00 
(19.27) 
42.40 
(20.60) 
14.43 
(11.66) 
17.79 
(6.55) 
C - E = 24.62 .023 
Thought 
Avoidance 
59.37 
(15.27) 
66.28  
(8.17) 
68.04 
(6.67) 
52.86 
(20.50) 
60.58 
(13.01) C - D = 15.18 .038 
Depression 5.31  (5.45) 
10.23  
(5.50) 
9.54 
(10.60) 
3.66  
(6.14) 
6.00  
(5.33)  n.s. 
Phys.Symp 122 130 135 101 129  n.s. 
Rumination  52.08 (15.45)  
62.98  
(2.86) 
66.56 
(15.57) 
44.09 
(14.44) 
51.41 
(14.74) C - D = 22.20 .045 
Untransformed Immediate Post Scores 
PTSD 
Total 
36.46 
(23.98) n/a 
52.63 
(42.71) 
20.90 
(21.03) 
32.66 
(14.22) C - D = 31.73 .031 
PTSD 
Severity 
19.70 
(14.01) n/a 
30.94 
(24.94) 
10.92 
(11.38) 
17.74 
(8.93) C - D = 20.02 .017 
Thought 
Avoidance 
57.08 
(17.59) n/a 
65.66 
(8.51) 
52.31 
(21.55) 
59.04 
(16.49) C - D = 13.35 .037 
Depression 4.92  (5.42) n/a 
10.25 
(6.25) 
2.68  
(4.98) 
7.89  
(3.37) C - D = 7.57 .023 
Rumination 50.45 (15.33) n/a 
63.02 
(14.31) 
40.62 
(14.03)  
52.14 
(9.83) C - D = 22.40 .021 
14-Day Post Scores 
PTSD 
Total 
23.18 
(24.06) n/a n/a 
12.27 
(15.64) n/a F(1, 68) = 3.81 .055 
PTSD 
Severity 
11.81 
(13.82) n/a n/a 
4.96 
(7.31) n/a F(1, 68) = 5.12 .027 
Thought 
Avoidance 
53.75 
(20.48) n/a n/a 
43.72 
(30.70) n/a F(1, 68) = 4.97 .029 
Phys.Symp  108 (35) n/a n/a 71 (23) n/a F(1, 68) = 7.33 .009 
Rumination 49.36 (15.54) n/a n/a 
35.92 
(10.42) n/a F(1, 68) = 8.24 .005 
30-Day Post Scores 
PTSD 
Total 
22.44 
(26.60) n/a n/a n/a 
25.83 
(11.77) F(1, 66) = .198 .658 
PTSD 
Severity 
11.71 
(14.44) n/a n/a n/a 
13.52 
(6.11) F(1, 66) = .193 .703 
Thought 
Avoidance 
53.05 
(21.56) n/a n/a n/a 
56.69 
(18.28) F(1, 66) = .913 .343 
Phys. 
Symp 111 (32) n/a n/a n/a 121 (20) F(1, 66) = 1.00 .321 
Rumination 47.83 (15.55) n/a n/a n/a 
56.76 
(12.00 )  F(1, 66) = 2.36 .129 
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At pre-test, Pattern C showed significantly greater PTSD symptoms than A, D, and E, 
suggesting a potential MNAR or MAR mechanism for Pattern C. Pattern C also showed 
significantly higher scores than D in thought avoidance and rumination, also suggesting a MAR 
mechanism.  
Regarding scores at the immediate-post assessment, Pattern C showed significantly 
higher PTSD than Pattern D (suggesting MNAR or MAR), and significantly higher thought 
avoidance, depression, stress, and rumination as well (suggesting MAR). However, the sizable 
reduction in PTSD symptoms experienced by group C may also have contributed to their dropout 
(MNAR, due to feeling better). These findings in contradictory directions (dropping out due to 
feeling better or feeling worse) illustrate a significant problem in the treatment of missing data: 
choosing unknowable assumptions regarding the cause(s) of missingness. In this case, the fact 
that PTSD scores for Pattern C were still high (52 is above the recommended PTSD cutoff 
criteria of 46) at immediate-post despite their substantial decrease will be taken to suggest that 
group C dropped after immediate-post due to continued distress, as indicated by other variables: 
nearly severe depression, high thought suppression, and high rumination. It should be recalled 
that lack of perceived improvement is an expected cause of dropout from clinical trials (Enders, 
2010).  
Scores at 14-day posts distinguished those who completed the entire study (Pattern A) 
from those who dropped out after the 14-day assessment (Pattern D). Specifically, those who 
omitted the final assessment (Pattern D) showed significantly lower PTSD symptoms, 
depression, stress, thought avoidance, rumination, and physical symptoms than group A at 14 
days. This suggests these attriters (Pattern D) left the study due to feeling better, which is also an 
expected pattern in treatment studies. Once again, a decision must be made of whether to 
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estimate the missing PTSD scores using MNAR assumptions (as suggested by the finding that 
their PTSD symptoms improved to a significantly greater degree than group A) or to estimate 
them based on a method appropriate to the associated variables that suggest a MAR pattern.  
Lastly, scores on all variables at 30-day post were not significantly different between the 
two groups who completed them (Patterns A and E). This supports the assumption that the 
missing 14-day scores for Pattern E may have been MCAR (not systemically dependent on other 
variables) since no significant distinguishing associations were found with those in Pattern A.  
Estimating missing data. Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Given the above findings, the 
next question to be answered considered appropriate methods of imputing or estimating missing 
data from the scores of non-missing data. For missing data that fit an MAR or MCAR pattern, 
methodologists (see Enders, 2010) recommend the use of maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE). MLE uses properties of the normal curve to estimate not specific missing scores but a 
series of possible combinations of scores which ‘compete’ until the most likely combination is 
achieved (requiring a number of iterations).  
This technique was developed to capitalize on the fact that the area around the mean of a 
normal distribution is the tallest and densest part of the curve, such that there is a greater 
likelihood of randomly obtaining a score (from a normally distributed population) that is closer 
to the mean than one which is several standard deviations away from the mean (where density of 
scores is lower). Consider, for example, that the likelihood of meeting a random individual with 
an IQ of 100 is higher than meeting one with an IQ of 145. Yet without reference to a population 
distribution, such as the probability of drawing any particular card from a full deck, the 
probability is always the same (1/52 or .02). Using the normal distribution, mathematicians have 
studied the density of scores around the mean to create a “probability density function” that 
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allows estimation of probabilities of any given value and combination of values. To distinguish 
these normal-distribution-dependent probabilities from other probabilities they are generally 
called “likelihoods” (Enders, 2010). 
 When a sample of data is collected and normally distributed, MLE can be used to 
estimate population parameters that have the highest probability of producing the collected 
sample. Unlike imputing individual scores, MLE is concerned with the combined likelihoods of 
scores, which is a product of the individual likelihoods of each score (much like .02 x .02 = 
.0004 is the probability of drawing a king of spades twice from a deck of playing cards if the 
card is put back after each draw). Combinations of likelihoods can be estimated and tested 
against each other over a series of iterations until the one with the least error is found (i.e., best 
fitting a normal distribution).  
Thus normality of distribution (and reduction of skew and kurtosis, as conducted above) 
is essential for using this technique. The distinguishing features of a normal distribution are its 
height and the shape of its curve (i.e., steepness of slopes), which are determined by the mean 
and standard deviation. When these are known, the estimation procedure proposes numerous 
value-estimates which are then combined and compared to the sample mean and variance until 
the best-fitting combination of estimates is achieved. This “best fit” is characterized by having a 
smaller rather than larger standard deviation (i.e., the least error) and with neither a skewed or 
leptokurtic shape.  
 Unfortunately, rarely is a population mean known a priori, nor its variance. Using sample 
data, MLE procedures can be used to estimate them, and thus provide estimates for missing data. 
This is possible because along the normal curve there is a point at which the slope is zero; this 
indicates the location of the mean and can be solved for mathematically. A second step is also 
	  70  
necessary since various distributions can have the same mean. The other slopes must also be 
calculated in a way that configures to a normal distribution, which is estimated for the population 
based on the error (i.e., variance) found in the observed sample and estimates that produce a best 
fit within a population assumed to have a normal distribution.  
For the purpose of this study, MLE was implemented due to its less stringent dependence 
on the assumption of missing data mechanisms than other forms of estimation. After several 
consultations with a missing data methodologist, the evidence collected in the present study was 
not deemed sufficient to establish an MNAR mechanism (Enders, personal communication, 
3/4/15). In addition, the auxiliary variables identified above were included as covariates, 
although only from pre-test since the other time periods follow the same missing data pattern as 
the main outcome variable.  
As an aside, when calculated in multivariate space, instead of a single mean and variance 
being estimated, values and variances are estimated in vectors and matrices (Enders, p. 73). The 
structure of the matrices then becomes another aspect of data interpretation, and ‘best fit’ 
involves comparing results obtained from various potential structures. The standard test used to 
assess the best-fitting structure is called the Likelihood Ratio Test, which is a chi-square test that 
compares models based on whether improvement in the model (i.e., reduction of error) achieves 
statistical significance. Significance is determined using the number of additional parameters in a 
subsequent model as the degrees of freedom in examining whether the size of the difference 
meets or exceeds the critical value on a chi-square distribution table. The difference value 
examined for this test is simply the difference in error between the models. Due to mathematical 
properties, error variances are converted to natural logs for greater accuracy, and in comparing 
models for significant improvement the natural log value produced by one model is subtracted 
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from the natural log yielded by the previous model. SPSS procedures yield the natural log values 
of each model but their comparison must be conducted by hand. These techniques were used in 
the present study to increase the generalizability of findings. In particular, removing the 
constraint that intercepts and slopes be set as fixed rather than allowed to vary per participant and 
over assessment intervals was examined as possibly better fitting models. (For complete 
explanations for comparing models see Enders, 2010; Hayes, 2006; Kline, 2011.) 
Linearity. The final data preparation step was to ensure that linear modeling methods 
would be appropriate. Figure 3 illustrates observed scores (transformed) for total PTSD 
symptoms at pre-test, immediate post, 14-day post, and 30-day post. As can be seen, for both 
treatment groups a cubic model (i.e., curved line with two turning points) produced a better 
fitting model (R2 = .08 for the Expressive Writing condition, R2 = .18 for the Directive Protocol) 
than a linear (R2 = .06 and R2 = .15, respectively) or quadratic (R2 = .06 and R2 = .16, 
respectively) model. 
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Figure 3. Linear, Quadratic, and Cubic Models of Observed (Transformed) PTSD Scores at Pre- 
and Three Posts. 
 
 
PTSD_TOTAL_XFM = the transformed observed scores for total PTSD symptoms using the 
MPSS-SR. Time = pre-test, immediate post, 14-day post, and 30-day post. This graph only 
utilizes observed scores per assessment period with no estimation for missing scores. 
 
However, to compare whether the improvement of a cubic model over a linear model was 
significant, a hierarchical regression was run using the original assessment interval as the 
predictor at Step 1 and the assessment interval cubed as the predictor at Step 2. Table 6 
summarizes the results for model significance as well as significance of the change at Step 2. 
Both models were significant for each condition, but the improvements in variance explained 
(i.e., R-square change) were not significant at Step 2. In other words, the cubic model did not 
significantly improve upon the linear model for either condition.  
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Table 6. Significance of Linear and Cubic Models Predicting PTSD Symptom Scores Across 
Time Intervals, Based on Treatment Condition. 
  df F P R-Square 
F 
Change 
Signif F 
Change 
Step 1 1, 155 10.00 .002 .06 10.00 .002 Expressive 
Writing Step 2 2, 154 5.36 .006 .07 0.72 .398 
Step 1 1, 147 95.07 < .001 .15 26.66 < .001 Directive 
Protocol Step 2 2, 146 13.95 < .001 .16 1.20 .275 
 
When the variable entry-order was reversed, the cubic model alone explained less 
variance than the linear model alone (5% and 12% of the variances in PTSD symptoms, for EW 
and DP, respectively). Entering the linear term at Step 2 improved the cubic model by a 
marginally significant 2% for the EW condition (p = .077) and by a significant 4% (p = .009) for 
the DP condition. Thus, analyses that assume linearity are most appropriate. [In anticipation of 
further analyses, note that the difference in effect size is quite notable (R = .24, d = 0.49) for EW, 
R = .39, d = 0.85 for DP). However, these results are biased toward study completers since MLE 
was not yet implemented; nor do these regression analyses control for correlations between 
repeated measures.] 
Treatment delivery, consistency, and fidelity.  
Several strategies were used to increase the likelihood that participants received their 
treatment interventions in the same manner and dosage regardless of experimenter or other 
variables such as drift from protocol. First, both conditions used scripted protocols that were 
literally read to participants. These were not only read aloud by the researcher but the participant 
was asked to read along on a copy given to them (which was collected at the end to avoid them 
sharing the protocol with other potential participants). In addition, researchers followed a 
detailed procedural checklist to ensure they greeted participants with warmth (including eye 
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contact); delivered the protocols consistently; and recorded the session durations, break 
durations, and the SUDS scores throughout. There was variability in timing of SUDS requests 
(with a mean of every 7 minutes) but no missing data.  
Sessions were videotaped and 45 (52%; 27 in the A condition and 18 in the B condition) 
of them were reviewed by three trained raters (two independently rating each tape) who were 
blind to the study hypotheses. Possible scores were 0 (Not at all/No), 1 (Somewhat), or 2 (Very 
much/Yes) in the three domains of experimenter warmth, clarity of delivery, and understanding 
by participants. Experimenter warmth was rated six times (i.e., three at the beginning [including 
eye contact and readiness to begin], once after each break, and one at the end); clarity of 
experimenter instruction was rated three times (i.e., during instructions at the beginning of each 
intervention period); and participant reception/understanding was rated at three times (i.e., in 
response to instructions at the beginning of each intervention period).  
Rater agreement was 100% for all clarity and reception/understanding scores, with the 
highest possible ratings (6 out of 6) scored for each domain for each administration. In eight 
cases raters disagreed by 1 or 2 points on the sum of warmth scores (82% agreement); 
nevertheless, warmth scores were never less than 9 out of the possible 12, and thus total coding 
scores were no less than 21 out of 24. Thus raters overwhelmingly agreed that researchers 
provided administrations with similarly high degrees of warmth, clarity, and receptivity. There 
was no significant difference in coders’ mean ratings by condition (see Table 7 which 
summarizes sample characteristics). 
Researchers reported deviations from protocol on the protocol checklists. In Condition A 
there was only one deviation; a participant becoming nauseous during her first writing period 
resulting in an early break; this was offset by a longer middle writing period to ensure 
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comparable overall treatment duration. In Condition B, one administration was terminated (and 
other assessments provided) due to the participant discussing severe suicidal ideation; despite the 
lack of full treatment dosage administered, this case was retained in the intent-to-treat analyses. 
In one other case a participant from the community refused to receive her randomized condition 
(A) and was administered Condition B; this case was retained as randomized of the intent-to-
treat analyses.  
Given the nature of the treatment, administrations of Condition B varied abundantly from 
Condition A because of the application of the worksheets to each particular case, which involved 
discussion, feedback, and some clinical judgment; in Condition A the researcher did not read, 
discuss, or provide feedback regarding what participants wrote. This difference was planned as it 
was the goal of this study to test whether participants would benefit more from a novice therapist 
armed with highly directive worksheets than they would from the sparsely instructed written 
narration of their traumatic event. The potential variability in Condition B resulted in 
administration times ranging from as few as 84 minutes to as many as 115, which was seen in the 
first five administrations of condition B. This variability created a potential confound (i.e., 
treatment duration) regarding comparability between conditions. For this reason the PI decided 
to extend writing periods in Condition A from 25 minutes to between 30-35 minutes, resulting in 
total durations of 90-105 minutes for Condition A.  
Overall, the mean duration for Condition A was 97.16 minutes (SD = 6.81 min). For 
Condition B, mean duration was 97.29 minutes but with a much larger variance (SD = 18.43 
min). An independent samples t-test showed a significant difference in variance (Levene’s test; F 
= 22.87, p < .001); thus degrees of freedom were adjusted from 84 to 51.56 and equal variances 
not assumed. With equal variances not assumed, the mean difference in treatment duration 
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between conditions was not significant (t(51.56) = -0.04, p = .967). Given the comparable and 
high fidelity ratings by trained video coders blind to the study hypotheses, the use of written 
instructions for every exercise, the completion of detailed procedural checklists, and the 
comparable treatment durations, this evidence suggests that participants in each condition 
received comparable and faithful administrations of their treatment conditions.  
Sample characteristics. The resulting sample was primarily drawn from undergraduates 
in psychology courses during the spring, summer, or fall of 2014. It consisted of 18 men and 68 
women; 94% described themselves as heterosexual. Regarding race/ethnicity, 75% self-
identified as White/Caucasian, 15% as Black/African, 5% as Latino/Hispanic, and the remainder 
as Asian, Multiracial, or Other. Three participants were older than 40, with 67% aged 18 or 19, 
and 31% aged 20-24. Ninety-three percent endorsed being single/never married, with the 
remaining being married (1), living with a romantic partner (2), divorced (2), or preferring not to 
say (1). Regarding religious background, 8 said atheist or “none”, 1 wrote in Hindu, the 
remaining wrote in a form of Christianity. Sixty percent endorsed religious activity at least once 
per week, and 17% said “never”. Using number of rooms in their parents’ home as a proxy for 
socioeconomic status, the mean number reported was 6.86 (median = 7). According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau (2000), the median for that region of the U.S. is 5.3 rooms, suggesting this 
sample was above the median in SES. Regarding parental education, 60% said their mother had 
at least a bachelor’s degree; 57% said the same of their father (although men had more doctorates 
(10% v. 3%). Of the 50% who endorsed employment-related activity, 22% said they were 
working part-time and 28% said they were looking for work. Forty-eight percent said they were 
part of a fraternity or sorority.   
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Table 7 summarizes sample characteristics by treatment condition. All but three 
participants were aged 18-24; one reported age 42 (Condition A), another 55 (Condition A for 
the intent-to-treat analysis, but received the Condition B treatment); and the third was 62 
(Condition B). SES as determined by housing size differed by condition; it was significantly 
higher in Condition B.  
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Table 7. Sample Characteristics per Treatment Condition, with Significance Tests. 
  
Condition A 
Expressive 
Writing 
Condition B 
Directive 
Protocol 
Chi-Square  
or t-statistic P 
Female 35 (41%) 33 (38%) Sex Male 9 (10%) 9 (10%) 
χ2(1, N = 86) = 
0.91 
.561 
Median 19 19   Age 
Mean 20.48 (6.47) 20.40 (6.73) t(84) = 0.05 .959 
Heterosexual 40 (47%) 41 (48%) 
LGBT 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 
Not Sure 3 (4%) 0 (0%) 
Sexual 
Orientation 
Rather Not Say 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
χ2(3, N = 86) = 
4.97 .174 
Single/Never 
Married 40 (47%) 39 (45%) 
Married 2 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Single/Living 
with Partner 0 (0%) 2 (2%) 
Divorced 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 
Marital Status 
Prefer not to say 1 (2%) 0 (0%) 
χ2(4, N = 86) = 
4.97 .291 
Black/African 6 (7%) 6 (7%) 
White/Caucasian 32 (37%) 33 (38%) 
Latino/Hispanic 3 (4%) 1 (1%) 
Multiracial 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 
Other  2 (2%) 1 (2%) 
χ2(5, N = 86) = 
3.97 .554 
Racial/Ethnic 
Background 
Minority Total 12 (28%) 9 (21%) 
Compared to 
Majority 
χ2(1, N = 86) = 
0.53 
.353 
Mean/Median 
Bedrooms + 
Bathrooms 
6.36 / 6 7.38 / 7 t(84) = -2.21 .030 
Mother with 
Min. Bachelor’s 
Degree  
23 (27%) 29 (34%) χ
2(8, N = 86) = 
8.28 .407 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Father with Min. 
Bachelor’s 
Degree  
35 (30%) 25 (29%) χ
2(8, N = 86) = 
8.28 .506 
 Mean 
Treatment 
Duration 
(in minutes) 97.16 97.29 t(51.56) = -0.04 .967 
Principal 
Investigator 32 (37%) 30 (35%) Researcher Research 
Assistant 12 (14%) 12 (14%) 
χ2(1, N = 86) = 
.018 .893 
Fidelity 
Ratings 
Mean between 2 
Raters (SD) 
23.74  
(0.56) 
23.60 
(0.72) t(39) = 0.69 .496 
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Table 8 summarizes PTSD symptomatology at each assessment interval, and types of 
trauma reported. The two groups did not significantly differ in their level of PTSD symptoms at 
pre-test or immediate post. Significant differences were evident, however, at the 14- and 30-day 
follow-ups (among completers). Regarding types of trauma experienced, the groups were evenly 
represented. When reduced to more general categories than those of the Life Events Checklist, 
participants could be grouped into those who had suffered an unwanted sexual experience (EW = 
15, DP = 14); the death of a close loved one (EW = 10, DP = 8); a life-changing illness or injury 
of someone close or oneself (EW = 9, DP = 10); and physical violence or non-sexual abuse (EW 
= 10, DP = 10). PTSD diagnosis was not assessed or required for inclusion in the study. 
Nevertheless, when the MPSS-SR cut-off score of 46 was applied to pre-test scores (Falsetti et 
al., 1993), more than a third in each condition met criteria [EW = 17 (39%), DP = 14 (33%)]. At 
final post 10 people per group no longer met criteria although one person in the EW condition 
who had not met criteria at pre-test did at final post [EW = 8 (18%), DP = 4 (10%)]. 
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Table 8. Sample Characteristics per Treatment Condition, with Significance Tests, for Observed 
PTSD Symptom Scores and Trauma Types. 
  
Condition A 
Expressive 
Writing 
Condition B 
Directive 
Protocol 
Chi-Square  
or t-statistic P 
Pre-Test (SD) 43.39 (23.93) 
39.74  
(19.90) t(84) = 0.77 .445 
Immediate Post (SD) 40.91 (21.98) 
34.37 
(21.77) t(80) = 1.35 .181 
14-Day Post (SD) 29.76 (20.30) 
20.30 
(17.45) t(68) = 2.04 .046 
Mean PTSD 
Symptom 
Scores at each 
Assessment 
Interval 
(MPSS-SR) 
30-Day Post (SD) 31.57 (21.10) 
22.70 
(18.03) t(66) = 1.86 .067 
Sexual Assault or 
Attempt 
8 
(4, 2) 
9 
(5, 2)   
Death of Someone 
Close 
9 
(4, 1) 
8 
(3, 1)   
Other Unwanted 
Sexual Experience 
5 
(2, 0) 
3 
(3, 1)   
Life Changed by 
Injury or Illness 
4 
(1, 1) 
5 
(1, 0)   
Domestic Violence 1 (0, 0) 
1 
(0, 0)   
Abusive Father 6 (0, 0) 
5 
(1, 0)   
Natural Disaster 0 1 (0, 0)   
Motor Accident 1 (1, 0) 
1 
(0, 0)   
Physical Assault 1 (0, 0) 
3 
(0, 0)   
Combat Exposure 1 (1, 1) 0   
Severe Suffering or 
Violent Death 
2 
(2, 1) 0   
Other Stressful 
Experience 
6 
(2, 2*) 
6 
(1, 0)   
Trauma 
Categories 
(Met PTSD  
Cut-Off at  
Pre-Test, Post) 
TOTAL 44 42   
 
* One individual whose mother had abandoned the family went from not meeting criteria for 
PTSD to meeting it at final follow-up; one of the two who originally met criteria no longer did so 
at follow-up. 
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Covariates. Given the significant difference in SES between conditions, this variable was 
entered as a covariate in analyses. As discussed above, the auxiliary variables found to be 
associated with missingness groups were also included to improve the MLE process. They were 
the measures of thought suppression (WBSI), depression, anxiety, stress (DASS-21), physical 
symptoms (PILL), rumination (RRS), and alexithymia (TAS-20). Treatment duration was also 
considered a potential source of differences between the conditions and so it was included as 
well. Each of these covariates was first “centered” around its mean so that interpretation would 
be straightforward as scores moved away from the mean, as recommended by methodologists 
(Enders, 2010; Hayes, 2006).   
It was also hypothesized that other factors could influence results such as new traumatic 
events since involvement in the study; increases in talking about the event with others or writing 
about it; and participation in therapy/counseling. Each of these were assessed at each time point. 
However, when explored for correlations with symptoms at pre- and post, none of these variables 
showed any significant associations and thus were omitted as covariates.  
Primary intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis. The main hypothesis for this study was that the 
directive protocol (DP) condition would show significantly greater reduction in PTSD symptoms 
(assessed by the MPSS-SR) than the EW condition. This analysis was conducted using the 
MIXED procedure in SPSS (v. 20). This procedure was chosen primarily to avoid the pairwise 
deletion of cases with missing data, which occurs automatically with ANOVA. In addition, this 
procedure improves accuracy over ANOVA because it allows for the separation and analyses of 
fixed and random effects. Fixed effects are variables whose values are known or assigned such as 
treatment condition and assessment intervals. Random (or simply unconstrained) effects quantify 
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unknown effects such as variance within and between participants, researchers, time intervals, 
and treatment location (Littell, Pendergast, & Natarajan, 2000).  
The dependent variable was total PTSD symptoms (MPSS-SR, transformed as explained 
above). Fixed effects entered into the analysis were the treatment condition (i.e., EW or DP), and 
the assessment intervals (Time 1, 2, 3, 4; i.e., pre-test, immediate post, 14-day post, and 30-day 
follow-up). In addition, as a covariate SES was entered as a fixed (i.e., unchanging) effect due to 
its significant mean difference between treatment groups. As discussed above, it was first mean-
centered, a technique by which the mean is subtracted from each score so that the mean takes on 
a zero value and addition or subtraction from the mean is more easily interpreted (Hayes, 2006). 
Treatment duration was also entered as a covariate due to potential influence on outcomes. 
Lastly, the auxiliary variables discussed above were also entered as covariates after mean-
centering (i.e., pre-test [transformed] scores for thought suppression, depression, anxiety, stress, 
physical symptoms, rumination, and alexithymia). All of the above fixed effect variables 
constituted Model 1; random effect variables were entered as subsequent models and compared 
with the previous model to determine significant improvement. Specifically, Model 2 allowed for 
varied intercepts based on unique participant differences, and Model 3 allowed for random 
slopes (i.e., rate of symptom change across time) in addition to random intercepts.  
Identifying the best-fitting model. Rather than report the numerous results generated, 
results have been limited to the best-fitting model. To determine whether Model 2 (i.e., 
incorporating fixed and random effects) was significantly better-fitting than Model 1 (i.e., fixed 
effects only model), methodologists recommend using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. This test 
compares the total variance unexplained in each model (i.e., error), which is quantified by the 
“information criteria” (IC) generated by the MLE process; this quantifying of variance is akin to 
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summing the Ordinary Least Square distances as calculated in ANOVAs. Bozgodan’s 
Information Criterion (CAIC) is recommended for small sample sizes to adjust for related error. 
In the LR test, CAICs are compared from one model to another by their chi-square distributions, 
with degrees of freedom determined by the number of parameters added to the original model. 
The null hypothesis is that the less constrained model (i.e., Model 2 in the present study) will not 
differ from the constrained model (i.e., Model 1; Kline, 2011).  
In the present study, the CAIC for Model 1 was 1259.77, with 19 parameters entered in 
the model. The CAIC for Model 2 was 1195.56, with 20 parameters in the model. The difference 
of 64.21 was well beyond the critical value (10.83; p < .001) for a chi-square analysis with a 
difference of one degree of freedom. This suggests allowing for the random intercept provides a 
better-fitting model. Next, Model 3 was considered in which the slope (rate of change over time 
per participant) was also allowed to vary. This showed a CAIC value of 1202.28 with 21 
parameters. The difference of increasing the amount of unaccounted error by 6.72 (compared to 
the previous model) suggests that Model 2 provided a better fit than Model 3.  
Significance test results for the fixed effects entered into Models 1 and 2 are summarized 
in Table 9. Four covariates (i.e., thought suppression, anxiety, acceptance, and rumination) were 
significant predictors of PTSD symptoms in Model 1, but their effects were reduced to non-
significant levels when intercepts were allowed to vary between participants (Model 2). In 
addition, Model 2 showed significant effects for time and treatment condition, and the interaction 
of time and treatment condition approached significance. 
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Table 9. Significance of Fixed Effects in Models 1 and 2 in Predicting PTSD Symptoms. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable df F p df F  p 
Covariates       
   SES 1, 306 0.01 .953 1, 90.31 0.07 .793 
   Thought 
Suppression 1, 306 4.35 .038 1, 88.21 1.77 .186 
   Depression 1, 306 2.33 .128 1, 87.21 0.82 .367 
   Anxiety 1, 306 4.49 .035 1, 89.25 2.50 .118 
   Stress 1, 306 0.08 .774 1, 88.06 0.02 .889 
   Acceptance 1, 306 4.92 .027 1, 93.38 2.95 .089 
   Physical Symptoms 1, 306 0.04 .844 1, 84.86 0.01 .950 
   Alexithymia 1, 306 0.07 .793 1, 91.56 0.01 .944 
   Rumination 1, 306 4.35 .038 1, 88.35 2.19 .143 
Treatment Duration 1, 306 0.01 .935 1, 89.36 0.51 .477 
Assessment Intervals 
(Time) 3, 306 19.61 < .001 3, 227.01 35.95 < .001 
Condition 1, 306 19.99 < .001 1, 86.84 9.60 .003 
Time x Condition 3, 306 1.03 .378 3, 226.93 2.45 .064 
 
Figure 4 depicts trajectories of PTSD symptom changes, with marginal means, effect sizes, and 
statistical tests summarized in Table 11. 
Figure 4. Estimated Trajectories of the PTSD Symptom Scores as a Function of Treatment Group 
in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed). 
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Table 10. Estimated PTSD Symptom (MPSS-SR) Outcomes as a Function of Treatment Group in 
the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed). 
 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
41.03 
(3.10) 
35.23 to 
47.26 
36.37 
(3.03) 
30.74 to 
42.45 
41.03 
(3.10) 
35.23 to 
47.26 
36.37 
(3.03) 
30.74 to 
42.45 
41.03 
(3.10) 
35.23 to 
47.26 
36.37 
(3.03) 
30.74 to 
42.45 
PTSD 
Symptoms 
(MPSS-
SR) Post (SE) 
95% CI 
38.49 
(3.01) 
32.88 to 
44.54 
30.57 
(2.88) 
25.26 to 
36.37 
27.42 
(2.73) 
22.42 to 
32.91 
16.55 
(2.27) 
12.48 to 
21.16 
28.38 
(2.82) 
23.20 to 
34.05 
16.41 
(2.26) 
12.35 to 
20.99 
d -0.27 -0.58 -1.46 -2.12 -1.31 -2.12 Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = -2.58 
t117 = -0.88, 
P = .382 
B = -5.95 
t109 = -1.86, 
P = .066 
B = -13.81 
t119 = -4.78, 
P < .001 
B = -19.99 
t110 = -6.78, 
P < .001 
B = -12.76 
t119 = -4.30, 
P < .001 
B = -20.01 
t110 = -6.80, 
P < .001 
d 0.18 0.45 0.51 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx Groups LMM 
B = 3.71 
t224 = 0.84, 
P = .402 
B =10.07 
t228 = 2.08, 
P = .038 
B = 11.54 
t228 = 2.35, 
P = .020 
 
Marginal mean scores are the estimated means adjusted by the covariates of SES, thought 
suppression, anxiety, rumination, acceptance, depression, stress, physical symptoms, and 
duration of treatment; these and between group effects were calculated with the entire sample. 
Within-Group effect sizes were then generated separately per condition. 
 
As can be seen, the DP condition showed marginally significant reductions in PTSD 
symptoms at immediate post; and both conditions showed statistically and clinically significant 
reductions in PTSD symptoms at 14-days post which were largely maintained at 30-day follow-
up. Overall, these findings suggest that participants in both conditions benefitted considerably 
from the intervention they received, and that those in the DP condition benefitted significantly 
more than those in the EW condition. Table 11 summarizes the fixed effect estimates. 
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Table 11. Fixed Effect Estimates and Tests of Significance Under Model 2 for PTSD Symptoms.  
 
Unstan-
dardized 
Estimate  
(b) 
SE 95% CI df t p 
Intercepta 36.65 3.02 31.01 42.73 193.16 25.39 < .001 
Covariates        
   Mean SES -0.21 0.80 -7.26 7.57 90.31 -0.26 .793 
   Thought  
   Suppression 2.32 1.79 -0.15 4.87 88.21 1.33 .186 
   Depression 2.99 3.43 -8.77 16.75 87.21 0.91 .367 
   Anxiety 5.27 3.51 -6.82 19.36 89.25 1.58 .118 
   Stress -0.50 3.63 -12.25 13.48 88.06 -0.14 .889 
   Acceptance -7.37 4.19 -10.11 -4.49 93.38 -1.72 .089 
   Physical  
   Symptoms -0.09 1.52 -8.41 9.26 84.86 -0.06 .950 
   Alexithymia 0.22 3.15 -10.83 13.17 91.56 0.07 .944 
   Rumination 3.61 2.54 -6.73 15.44 88.35 1.48 .143 
   Treatment  
   Duration 0.02 0.12 -5.83 6.36 89.13 0.14 .891 
Assessment 
Intervalb        
  Immediate Post -5.82 2.95 -15.93 6.21 226.42 -1.93 .055 
  14-Day Post -19.91 2.33 -27.37 -10.43 229.35 -7.17 < .001 
  30-Day Post -20.05 2.32 -27.47 -10.61 229.48 -7.24 < .001 
EW Conditiona  4.68 4.61 -9.03 21.07 187.42 1.07 .284 
EW x Intervalc        
 EW Immed. Postc 3.71 4.65 -9.97 20.13 224.45 0.84 .402 
 EW 14-Day Postc  10.07 5.25 -5.15 28.19 227.95 2.08 .038 
 EW 30-Day Postc  11.54 5.38 -4.00 30.03 228.11 2.35 .020 
 
 aThe intercept represents the baseline (pre-test) score for the DP condition. To calculate the 
intercept for the EW condition, simply add the beta coefficient for the EW Condition (i.e., 36.65 
+ 4.68 = 41.33). bPer-assessment interval coefficients can be added to the intercept to calculate 
values for the DP condition at each interval. cThese values represent the difference in EW effect 
sizes for that assessment interval as compared to the DP condition at the same interval.  
 
In terms of effect size reported in confidence intervals, from pre-test to 30-day follow-up, 
these results suggest with 95% confidence that participants in the DP condition saw reductions in 
PTSD symptoms of between 11 and 27 points (b = -20.05). In contrast, for the EW condition we 
can be 95% confident that changes ranged from improving by 30 points less and up to 4 points 
more than participants in the DP condition (bdifference = 11.54 fewer points of symptom reduction). 
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Again, this difference was significant (p = .020). These differences in confidence interval can be 
difficult to interpret. When the EW condition was coded as the base group, the 95% CI for 
improvements at 30 days ranged from 1 to 22 points (b = -12.71) of symptom reduction. In 
contrast, the DP condition showed an average of 10.65 more points of symptom reduction (p = 
.020), with a 95% CI ranging from 22.73 points of more symptom reduction to 4.32 points of 
less symptom reduction than the EW condition.  
In addition to the fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant differences were 
significant (as shown by the likelihood ratio test discussed above which suggested Model 2 
significantly improves upon Model 1 in fitting the data). The estimate of the error variance per 
person combines unique per-individual variance around their individual intercept (b = 10.07; SE 
= 2.36; 95% CI = 23.07 to 32.52) as well as around their individual best-fit line (b = 12.38; SE = 
1.34; 95% CI = 26.65 to 31.91). Since variance is the square of the standard deviation, the square 
root of 10.07 (i.e., 3.17) represents the standard deviation. This indicates that with 68% 
confidence that individual intercepts fell within 3.17 points of the intercept, or 95% confidence 
that they fell within an interval of +/- 6.34 points. In addition, individual variation around the 
best-fit line (i.e., around scores at the various assessment points) varied by 2 standard deviations 
(for 95% confidence) of the residual variance (2 x the square root of 12.38), or +/-7.04 points. 
These individual-based differences overlapped with the variations in thought suppression, 
depression, anxiety, rumination, and acceptance. 
 Repeated measures (non-ITT) analysis. For comparison, the primary outcome was also 
conducted using a repeated measures ANOVA with only the pre-test and one post-test score 
entered. To reduce the number of cases excluded, the latter was calculated as the mean of the 14- 
and 30-day posts. The person who did not accept randomization was grouped with her actual 
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treatment group (i.e., DP), and the participant who only received an incomplete administration 
was dropped from the analysis. These preparatory steps resulted in 40 participants in the EW 
condition and 38 in the DP condition. This analysis showed significant symptom reduction 
regardless of treatment condition (F(1, 76) = 60.59, p < .001; Partial Eta2 = .444, r = .67, d = 
1.81).  In addition, the reduction in PTSD symptom score by the DP participants was 
significantly larger than that of the EW condition (F(1, 76) = 4.79, p = .032; Partial Eta2 = .059, 
r = .24, d = 0.50).  
When the repeated measure ANOVA effects were examined by condition, the EW 
condition showed Partial Eta2 = .328, r = .57, and d = 1.39. For the DP condition, Partial Eta2 = 
.529, r = .73,  and d = 2.12. These were similar to the effect sizes reported in the ITT analysis 
(dEW = 1.31, dDP = 2.12). Mean symptom point reductions were also roughly the same as in the 
ITT analysis (EW = 11.99; DP = 18.96). Both analyses suggest sizable reductions in reported 
symptom distress, with notably stronger effects demonstrated by the DP condition.  
Discussion of the primary outcome analyses. The main hypothesis of this study was that 
the DP condition would result in larger PTSD symptom reduction than the EW condition. 
Results showed that as a whole, participants in both conditions improved by a mean of at least 12 
points on the measure of PTSD symptoms utilized, and maintained gains reported at 14-days-
post-intervention for another two weeks. These findings also suggest that on average, 
participants in the DP condition improved by an additional mean of nearly 7 points in symptom 
reduction. Given the ubiquity of traumatic events and the likelihood of PTSD symptoms limiting 
functionality in the general population, this evidence suggests that these two low-cost treatments, 
which can be administered in under two hours and require minimal therapist training, could be 
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made available in numerous settings such as short-term primary care inpatient units and high 
school and college counseling centers.  
However, as a cautionary note, the EW results should not be expected to generalize if 
reduced to the advice of, “try journaling”. Rather, generalization is predicated on the same 
detailed protocols being read aloud as well as provided in writing to patients; protocol 
administrators interacting with warmth; and sessions being timed and separated by breaks.  
In addition to overall PTSD symptoms, this study also involved secondary analyses of the 
impact of these treatments on the frequency and intensity of PTSD symptoms; potential effects 
for individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD; other symptoms such as depression and 
physical illness; and on attitudes and processes theorized to influence PTSD symptoms. 
Secondary analyses. PTSD symptom frequency and severity. Mixed effect analyses were 
also conducted for the frequency and intensity subscales of the MPSS-SR. As with the total 
MPSS-SR scale, Model 2 (i.e., allowing for random intercepts) showed the best fit for both 
subscales. Regarding frequency of PTSD symptoms from pre-test to 30-day post, results suggest 
with 95% confidence that participants in the DP condition saw significant reductions of between 
3.75 and 15.43 points (b = -9.12; t(229.39) = 6.99, p < .001). For the EW condition, results 
showed a significant (t(232.10) = 3.43, p = .001) difference from the DP condition of 4.09 fewer 
points of improvement, with 95% confidence that reductions in PTSD symptom frequency were 
between 0.30 and 7.13 points fewer than those in the DP condition.  
Regarding severity of PTSD symptoms from pre-test to 30-day post, results suggest with 
95% confidence that participants in the DP condition saw significant reductions of between 3.48 
and 18.23 points (b = -10.17; t(228.83) = 6.35, p < .001). For the EW condition, results showed a 
non-significant (t(227.47) = -1.31, p = .192) difference from the DP condition of 2.26 fewer 
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points of symptom reduction, with 95% confidence that changes in PTSD symptom severity 
were between 6.69 points of less symptom reduction to 4.14 points of greater symptom reduction 
than those in the DP condition. 
PTSD Cut-Off Scores. The MPSS-SR has been demonstrated to predict PTSD diagnoses 
with 93% accuracy in a community sample using a cut-off score of 46 (Falsetti et al., 1993). In 
the present study, that cut-off score was used to classify individuals at baseline and post (Table 
12). Chi-square analyses showed no significant differences between treatment conditions at pre-
test χ2 (1, N = 86) = 0.45, p = .500 nor at final classification χ2 (5, N = 84) = 2.70, p = .747.  
Table 12 also summarizes mean symptom changes between baseline and 30-day follow-
up. In terms of symptom changes, those who no longer met PTSD cut-off score at post showed 
mean symptom reductions of between 19 and 36 points. The next largest improvements (M∆ = -
19) were seen by those whose symptoms decreased but whose baseline scores had not been 
severe enough to meet the cut-off criterion. Showing a different pattern, those who met the 
PTSD cut-off score at both pre- and final post also showed mean reductions in symptom scores 
but of an average reduction of only 5-10 points. Similar reductions were found in the control 
group of a treatment study with women with comorbid PTSD and panic disorder (7-11 points; 
Falsetti, Resnick, & Davis, 2008), suggesting these individuals may not have benefitted very 
much from either intervention.  
Among those not initially meeting the PTSD cut-off score, one person showed potential 
reclassification at post. However, her trauma would not have met DSM-5 criteria; it was the 
disturbing experience of abandonment by her mother. The increase in symptoms may be 
indicative that this type of traumatic experience is less amenable to treatment by EW. Lastly, 
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both treatment conditions showed comparable numbers of participants whose symptom scores 
ended close to their baseline, and of increases in symptom scores.  
Table 12. Participants Categorized by Pre-Test PTSD Classification at Pre-Test and Post, with 
Mean Score Differences from Pre-Test to 30-Day Follow-Up. 
 EW DP 
Met PTSD Cut-Off at Pre-Test 17 14 
1. Retained PTSD Classification 7 (M∆ = -9.71, SD = 20.13) 
4 
(M∆ = -12.75, SD = 10.78) 
2. Lost PTSD Classification 10 (M∆ = -19.50, SD = 8.82) 
10 
(M∆ = -35.70, SD = 17.30) 
3. Gained PTSD Classification 1 (M∆ = 23.00) 0 
Did Not Meet PTSD Cut-Off at 
Pre-Test 26 29 
4. No Changes in Symptoms 4 (M∆ = -0.75, SD = 0.96) 
6 
(M∆ = -0.83, SD = 0.98) 
5. Increased in Symptoms 6 (M∆ = 7.83, SD = 2.64) 
4 
(M∆ = 6.75, SD = 2.36) 
6. Decreased in Symptoms 15 (M∆ = -19.07, SD = 9.26) 
17 
(M∆ = -19.88, SD = 8.41) 
 
Discussion of secondary PTSD symptom score analyses. There was no hypothesis about 
the effects of either treatment on symptom frequency or severity. These results showed that the 
DP intervention reduced the frequency of PTSD symptoms to a significantly better degree than 
the EW condition, and that the significant reductions both groups showed in symptom severity 
were not significantly different based on treatment condition. This suggests the DP condition 
may be enacting different or additional processes than the EW condition which affect frequency. 
Of course, the MPSS-SR is a self-report measure, so the change may be better described as a 
reduction in perceived frequency. This distinction is offered because the development of the DP 
sought to reduce the perception of thoughts and reminders about the trauma as dangerous or 
harmful, and to thereby reduce avoidance and suppression of them. It may be that the reduction 
in factual or perceived frequency was associated with a greater willingness to experience 
reminders and a reduction in (hyper)vigilance towards them.  
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The finding that the two treatments had comparable effects on perceived severity of 
symptoms could be interpreted as evidence for habituation, which is generally defined as 
decreasing levels of arousal in response to a given stimulus. Of course, there would also be 
habituation present if the reduction in frequency of symptoms were due to reductions in 
perceiving or registering trauma-related stimuli but this cannot be known from self-reports.  
The results regarding PTSD cut-off scores were mixed. Clearly the DP group saw greater 
symptom reductions regardless of whether their symptoms fell below the cut-off score. Yet the 
percentages of loss of PTSD classification were not large enough to consider the DP a stand-
alone treatment. In addition, the gains from EW and its greater ease of implementation may 
make it more recommendable in many settings. This would particularly be the case if analyses 
could better discriminate processes that distinguished the much-improved groups from those that 
reported only marginal improvement, no change, or worsening of symptoms. Potential process 
variables will be explored in analyses below after the analyses of depression and physical illness 
symptoms.   
Depression. This study hypothesized that the DP condition would be associated with 
greater decreases in depressive symptoms than the EW condition. First, it should be noted that 
the baseline scores for depression in this sample were only in the mild range; scores in the 0-4 
range indicate normal functioning, 5-6 suggest mild depression, and 7-10 suggest moderate 
depression (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Thus, not much change was anticipated. 
As in the primary outcome analyses, SES and treatment duration were entered as 
covariates to control for their effects, and the same mean-centered auxiliary variables as above 
(except with baseline PTSD scores entered in place of baseline depression scores) were entered 
as covariates to improve the MLE process. Using a fixed effects model yielded a CAIC of 761.01 
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(Model 1). By allowing the intercept to vary (Model 2), this significantly improved the model to 
a CAIC of 734.12 (χ2(1, N = 86) = 26.898, p < .001). The addition of a random effects per 
assessment interval did not improve the model (Model 3 CAIC = 740.833, which is a worse fit 
than the previous, although a significantly better fit than the only fixed effects model). Thus 
Model 2 effects are reported, which includes fixed and random effects.  
A graphical depiction of symptom score trajectories are presented in Figure 5, with 
marginal means per interval per condition summarized in Table 13 (mean scores are adjusted by 
the covariates of SES, duration of treatment, total PTSD symptoms, thought suppression, 
anxiety, rumination, acceptance, stress, and physical symptoms). The EW condition did not show 
significant or stable change, while the DP condition showed a significant decrease in depression 
scores that continued to decrease at 30 days.  
Figure 5. Estimated Trajectories of Depressive Symptom Scores (DASS-21) as a Function of 
Treatment Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed). 
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Table 13. Estimated Depression Outcomes as a Function of Treatment Group in the Intent-to-
treat Sample (Untransformed). 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
5.03 
(0.53) 
4.06 to 
6.10 
5.81 
(0.58) 
4.75 to 
6.97 
5.03 
(0.53) 
4.06 to 
6.10 
5.81 
(0.58) 
4.75 to 
6.97 
5.03 
(0.53) 
4.06 to 
6.10 
5.81 
(0.58) 
4.75 to 
6.97 Depressive Symptoms 
(DASS-21) Post 
(SE) 
95% CI 
5.65 
(0.55) 
4.62 to 
6.76 
4.65 
(0.55) 
3.65 to 
5.75 
4.00 
(0.52) 
3.05 to 
5.06 
3.29 
(0.51) 
2.37 to 
4.32 
4.35 
(0.55) 
3.36 to 
5.46 
2.83 
(0.48) 
1.95 to 
3.81 
(d) 0.32 -0.55 -0.53 -1.21 -0.35 -1.47 
Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = 0.62 
t116 = 1.04, 
P = .299 
B = -1.17 
t224 = -
1.82, P = 
.070 
B = -1.03 
t119 = -
1.75, P = 
.083 
B = -2.53 
t229 = -
4.03, P < 
.001 
B = -0.69 
t119 = -
1.14, P = 
.256 
B = -3.00 
t229 = -
4.84, P < 
.001 
(d) 0.44 0.38 0.60 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx Groups LMM 
t222 = 2.02,  
P = .045 
t227 = 1.72,  
P = .086 
t227 = 2.73,  
P = .007 
 
Mean scores are adjusted by the covariates of pre-test SES, total PTSD symptoms, thought 
suppression, anxiety, rumination, acceptance, stress, physical symptoms, and duration of 
treatment. 
 
Fixed effects. Significance test results for fixed effects are summarized in Table 14, and 
estimates of fixed effects are reported in Table 15. Even with allowing for random intercepts, the 
variables of rumination, stress, and alexithymia at pre-test showed significant effects on 
predicting depression scores, suggesting these variables may play a role in maintaining or 
decreasing depression symptoms. The finding that time interval was significant, and that the 
interaction of time and condition were significant, are easy to interpret. The result that condition 
alone was not a significant predictor of depression was misleading; given the above patterns of 
rise and fall, it is not surprising that the grand means (i.e., mean of all assessment intervals) were 
not found to be significantly different. Post-hoc analyses with Bonferroni corrections showed 
that reductions in symptoms between baseline and the immediate and 30-day posts were clearly 
much larger for the DP condition. 
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Table 14. Significance of Model 2 Fixed Effects on Depression. 
Variable df F  p 
Covariates    
   Rumination (1, 88.28) 16.22 < .001 
   Stress (1, 86.77) 5.74 .019 
   Alexithymia (1, 92.24) 3.85 .053 
   SES (1, 90.06) 1.62 .207 
   Total PTSD Symptoms (1, 88.32) 0.78 .381 
   Thought Suppression (1, 87.10) 0.07 .799 
   Anxiety (1, 88.85) 2.43 .123 
   Acceptance (1, 91.66) 2.07 .154 
   Physical Symptoms (1, 84.21) 1.48 .227 
Treatment Duration (1, 89.36) 0.51 .477 
Assessment Intervals (Time) (3, 226.13) 9.97 < .001 
Condition (1, 83.64 ) 1.58 .213 
Time*Condition (3, 225.68) 2.76 .043 
 
Table 15. Model 2 Fixed Effect Estimates for Depression.  
 
Unstan-
dardized 
Estimate  
(b) 
SE 
Lower 
95% 
CI 
Upper 
95% 
CI 
df t p 
Intercepta 
(Baseline for DP 
Condition) 
5.87 0.58 4.80 7.03 231.61 24.26 < .001 
Covariates        
   Mean SES 0.18 0.14 -1.16 1.66 90.06 1.27 .207 
   Total PTSD Sympt. 0.02 0.02 -1.09 1.21 88.32 0.88 .381 
   Thought Suppression 0.08 0.31 -1.55 1.92 87.10 0.26 .799 
   Anxiety 0.87 0.59 -1.28 3.37 88.85 1.56 .123 
   Stress 1.43 0.64 -0.86 4.09 86.77 2.40 .019 
   Acceptance 1.19 0.88 -1.46 4.37 91.66 1.44 .154 
   Physical Symptoms -0.30 0.24 -1.78 1.37 84.21 -1.22 .227 
   Alexithymia 1.10 0.59 -1.08 3.63 92.24 1.96 .053 
   Rumination 1.70 0.45 -0.30 3.96 88.28 4.03 < .001 
   Treatment Duration -0.02 0.02 -1.12 1.19 89.36 -0.71 .477 
Assessment Intervalb        
  Immediate Post -1.17 0.63 -3.17 1.27 224.00 -1.82 .070 
  14-Day Post -2.53 0.58 -4.29 -0.32 228.77 -4.03 < .001 
  30-Day Post -3.00 0.55 -4.66 -0.89 229.00 -4.84 < .001 
EW Conditiona  -0.78 0.78 -3.07 2.03 224.47 -1.00 .032 
EW x Intervalc        
 EW Immed. Postc 1.99 1.08 -1.03 5.63 221.97 2.02 .045 
 EW 14-Day Postc  1.78 1.13 -1.29 5.52 226.36 1.72 .086 
 EW 30-Day Postc  2.95 1.21 -0.37 6.94 226.85 2.73 .007 
 
aThe intercept in the SPSS output represents the baseline score for the DP condition. To calculate 
the intercept for the EW condition, simply add the beta coefficient for the EW Condition (i.e., 
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5.87 – 0.78 = 5.09). bThese per-assessment coefficients can be added to the intercept to calculate 
values for the DP condition at each assessment interval. cThese values represent the difference in 
EW effect sizes for that assessment interval as compared to the DP condition at the same 
interval. 
 
In terms of effect size reported in confidence intervals, from pre-test to 30-day post per 
condition, these results suggest with 95% confidence that participants in the DP condition saw 
depression symptoms significantly reduce by as little as 0.89 to as much as 4.66 points (b = 3.00; 
t(229.00) = 4.84, p < .001). For the EW condition results show a significant difference of 2.95 
fewer points of improvement, with 95% confidence that changes in depression symptoms 
showed between 6.94 fewer points of reduction to 0.37 more reduction than the DP condition.  
Random effects. In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant 
differences were significant (see Model 2 selection results above). The variance in the location of 
individual intercepts was b = 0.81 (SE = 0.21; 95% CI = 6.36 to 7.22; Wald Z = 3.95, p < .001). 
That beta equals the total variance around the intercept, so the square root (standard deviation, 
i.e., 0.90) delineates the 68% confidence interval, and the double of that (i.e., 1.80) offers a 95% 
confidence interval. This suggests that with a mean intercept of 5.87 at baseline, individual 
intercepts varied by +/- 1.80.  In addition, throughout the other assessment periods, scores varied 
by b = 1.78 (SE = 0.18; 95% CI = 7.34 to 8.05; Wald Z = 10.47, p < .001). This variance 
translates to a 95% confidence interval of individual scores being +/- 2.67 points from the 
regression line. 
 Discussion of findings regarding depression. These findings suggest that the EW 
condition had only a marginal impact on depression while the DP condition achieved a larger 
and sustained reduction in depression. This difference also suggests that the mechanism by 
which each intervention achieved reductions in PTSD symptoms may have differed since 
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depression is often comorbid with PTSD. Or it may be that the DP condition simply had the 
added benefit of reducing depressive symptoms in addition to symptoms of PTSD.  
Physical illness symptoms. This study hypothesized that the DP condition would be 
associated with greater decreases in physical symptoms than the EW condition. This hypothesis 
was not supported. As in the primary outcome analyses, mean-centered auxiliary variables and 
SES were entered as covariates to improve the MLE process. Using a fixed effects model yielded 
a CAIC of 1084.95 (Model 1). By allowing the intercept to vary (Model 2), this significantly 
improved the model to a CAIC of 959.99 (χ2  (1, N = 86) = 124.96, p < .001). The addition of a 
random effects per assessment interval did not improve the model (Model 3 CAIC = 966.71), 
although offered a significantly better fit than the only fixed effects model. Thus Model 2 effects 
are reported, which includes fixed and random effects.  
A graphical depiction of symptom score changes are presented in Figure 6, with marginal 
means per interval per condition summarized in Table 16. (Mean scores are adjusted by the 
covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, thought suppression, anxiety, rumination, acceptance, 
stress, physical symptoms, and duration of treatment.) The largest difference was reported 
between pre-test and 14-day post, with a loss of some of that improvement by the 30-day mark. 
For both conditions, differences at each of the three post-tests were significantly lower than 
baseline, and levels of symptom reduction between conditions were not significantly different 
from each other. 
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Figure 6. Estimated Trajectories of the Physical Symptom (PILL) Scores as a Function of 
Treatment Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed) 
  
 
Table 16. Estimated Physical Symptom (PILL) Outcomes as a Function of Treatment Group in 
the Intent-to-treat Sample (untransformed). 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
120.64 
(4.00) 
112.89 to 
128.62 
121.43 
(4.15) 
113.43 to 
129.69 
120.64 
(4.00) 
112.89 to 
128.62 
121.43 
(4.15) 
113.43 to 
129.69 
120.64 
(4.00) 
112.89 to 
128.62 
121.43 
(4.15) 
113.43 to 
129.69 Physical Symptoms 
(PILL) Post 
(SE) 
95% CI 
112.89 
(3.87) 
105.40 to 
120.64 
116.14 
(4.15) 
108.14 to 
124.42 
105.48 
(3.94) 
97.90 to 
113.32 
105.83 
(4.11) 
97.94 to 
114.00  
109.06 
(4.02) 
101.33 to 
117.09 
110.15 
(4.19) 
102.12 to 
118.49 
(d) -0.64 -0.53 -1.20 -1.53 -0.91 -1.12 Effect 
Size 
Within Tx 
Group 
LMM 
B = -7.72 
t115 = -2.09, 
P = .038 
B = -5.16 
t106 = -1.68, 
P = .097 
B = -15.22 
t117 = -3.92, 
P < .001 
B = -15.52 
t107 = -4.91, 
P < .001 
B = -11.77 
t117 = -2.97, 
P = .004 
B = -11.39 
t107 = -3.58, 
P = .001 
(d) -0.11 0.02 -0.02 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx 
Groups 
LMM t221 = -0.52,  P = .606 
t224 = 0.08,  
P = .938 
t224 = -0.07,  
P = .946 
 
Mean scores are adjusted by the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, depression, anxiety, 
rumination, acceptance, stress, physical symptoms, and duration of treatment. 
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Significance results are summarized in Table 17, with coefficients provided in Table 18. 
Overall, both conditions showed statistically significant, comparable improvements (of 
approximately 15 points at 14-days and lessening to 11 points of reduction at 30-days). These 
results do not appear to offer much clinical significance. However, it may be worth noting that 
even after allowing for random effects, pre-test PTSD scores, depression, anxiety, and 
rumination were significant in predicting physical symptoms throughout and with rather large 
effect sizes.  
Table 17. Significance of fixed effects predicting physical symptoms (PILL). 
Variable df F  p 
Covariates    
   Total PTSD Symptoms (1, 87.94) 5.30 .024 
   Depression (1, 87.55) 9.53 .003 
   Anxiety (1, 87.25) 11.61 .001 
   Rumination (1, 87.22) 4.54 .036 
   Stress (1, 87.52) 1.51 .223 
   Alexithymia (1, 88.90) 0.02 .887 
   SES (1, 89.51) 0.49 .487 
   Thought Suppression (1, 87.81) 0.82 .369 
   Acceptance (1, 90.54) 0.09 .765 
Treatment Duration (1, 87.10) 0.41 .526 
Assessment Intervals (Time) (3, 223.07) 13.82 < .001 
Condition (1, 85.69 ) 0.08 .784 
Time*Condition (3, 222.91) 0.13 .940 
 
aThe intercept in the SPSS output represents the baseline score for the DP condition. bThese per-
assessment coefficients can be added to the intercept to calculate values for the DP condition at 
each assessment interval. cThese values represent the difference in EW effect sizes for that 
assessment interval as compared to the DP condition at the same interval. 
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Table 18. Model 2 Fixed Effect Estimates for Physical Illness Symptoms (PILL). 
 Unstan-
dardized 
Estimate (b) 
SE Lower Upper df t p 
Intercepta  
(Baseline for DP 
Condition) 
121.50 4.13 113.53 129.73 148.373 59.769 < .001 
Covariates        
   Mean SES 0.83 1.19 -9.44 11.55 89.50 0.70 .487 
   Total PTSD Sympt. 0.34 0.15 -7.92 8.88 87.94 2.30 .024 
   Thought Suppression -2.31 2.56 -15.05 11.13 87.80 -0.91 .369 
   Depression -13.63 4.33 -29.18 3.12 87.55 -3.09 .003 
   Anxiety 15.85 4.84 -1.69 34.58 87.25 3.41 .001 
   Stress 6.52 5.44 -11.78 26.23 87.52 1.23 .223 
   Acceptance -2.01 6.78 -22.40 20.25 90.54 -0.30 .765 
   Alexithymia -0.65 4.63 -17.23 17.14 88.90 -0.14 .887 
   Rumination 7.71 3.70 -7.47 23.83 87.22 2.13 .036 
   Treatment Duration 0.12 0.18 -8.21 8.73 87.10 0.64 .526 
Assessment Interval        
  Immediate Post -5.29 3.55 -19.69 10.05 222.971 -1.48 .139 
  14-Day Post -15.60 3.56 -29.64 -0.58 224.799 -4.27 < .001 
  30-Day Post -11.28 3.63 -25.60 4.03 224.882 -3.06 .003 
EW Conditiona  -0.79 5.96 -19.69 19.72 144.177 -0.13 0.894 
EW x Intervalc        
 EW Immed. Postc -2.54 4.95 -19.55 15.77 221.494 -0.52 .606 
 EW 14-Day Postc  0.41 5.31 -17.36 19.57 223.863 0.08 .938 
 EW 30-Day Postc  -0.36 5.32 -18.11 18.80 223.55 -0.07 .946 
 
 In terms of effect size reported in confidence intervals, from pre-test to 30-day follow-up 
per condition, these results suggest with 95% confidence that participants in the DP condition 
saw physical symptoms increase by up to 4.21 points or decrease by as many as 27.81 points. For 
the EW condition results showed a non-significant mean difference of 0.34 more symptom 
reduction; the 95% confidence interval suggests changes in physical symptoms ranged from 
increasing by 17.01 points more than the DP condition to improving by 19.15 points more than 
the DP condition.  
In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant differences 
were significant (as suggested by the significantly better fit of Model 2). The variance in the 
location of individual intercepts was b = 11.4 (SE = 1.09; 95% CI = 119.42 to 123.72; Wald Z = 
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10.48, p < .001). That beta equals the total variance around the intercept, so the square root 
(standard deviation, i.e., 3.38) delineates the 68% confidence interval, and the double of that 
(i.e., 6.75) offers a 95% confidence interval around the intercept.  In addition, throughout the 
other assessment periods, individuals’ scores varied by b = 18.24 (SE = 3.44; 95% CI = 112.88 
to 136.64; Wald Z = 5.54, p < .001). This variance translates to a 95% confidence interval of 
individual scores being +/- 8.54 units from the regression line.  
Discussion of physical symptom findings. The significant mean reductions in physical 
symptoms suggest both conditions affected physical symptoms to a similar degree. However, 
despite statistical significance, the loss of only 10 points on a scale with values endorsed ranging 
from 54 to 241 does not suggest much clinically relevant improvement. However, time of year 
might have predicted worsening of symptoms. Nearly one third of the sample participated in late 
fall (October/November); physical symptoms could be expected to increase due to reductions in 
temperature. In addition, nearly two-thirds participated in early spring (March/April), a period 
with increases in airborne allergens. Nevertheless, more than 30 years of EW research provide 
evidence of improvements in physical health being associated with confronting and expressing 
traumatic memories and the results of this study are congruent. 
Process variables and potential mediators. The present study measured several attitudes 
and behaviors theorized by PTSD researchers to exacerbate (e.g., thought suppression) or reduce 
(e.g., cognitive acceptance) PTSD symptoms. It also assessed two in-session processes: 
participant changes in levels of distress as often measured during exposure exercises (Barlow, 
2008), and changes in use of positive and negative emotion words since researchers have found 
them to be associated with symptom change (Pennebaker, 1997). However, to build support for 
the theorized interactions between such proposed mediating variables and outcomes, several 
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criteria must be satisfactorily addressed. Statistical support may be helpful at a later point but 
that is beyond the scope of this study; the current analyses are focused on meeting theoretical 
criteria for drawing conclusions regarding potentially overlapping processes (e.g., mediation).  
Among criteria for establishing a mediator of therapeutic change, researchers (see 
Kazdin, 2007) have theorized that several requirements must be met. One is the demonstration of 
strong associations between a proposed mechanism and therapeutic change, and between both 
and a particular intervention. By assessing changes in PTSD symptoms and several behaviors 
and attitudes, at various time points, within two treatment conditions, the present study was 
designed to demonstrate the hypothesized relationships if they were present.  
A second criterion for demonstrating mediation is ‘specificity’, whereby the method of 
study isolates mediators such that other potential mechanisms can be ruled out (Kazdin, 2007). 
The use of two interventions, only one of which explicitly targeted several attitudes and 
behaviors, was designed to allow observations of common effects of both treatments as well as 
differences in relationships between changes in the proposed mediator variables and changes in 
PTSD symptoms.  
A third criterion is replication across various conditions can build evidence of 
consistency (Kazdin, 2007). While the present study cannot offer replication of its own findings, 
some features of the study could provide evidence of consistency across differing contexts. 
Specifically, the sample was not limited to a single category of trauma such as sexual assault. By 
allowing for several types of trauma, some generalization is already present in the sample. 
Next, direct manipulation of the proposed mediator, and demonstration of an impact on 
outcome, help build a causal argument (Kazdin, 2007). One intervention (DP) in the present 
study attempted direct manipulation of various proposed mediators by treatment components that 
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encouraged changes such as greater cognitive acceptance of the trauma. The DP condition also 
provided word lists to counter alexithymia, prompted identification and challenging of 
depressing cognitions, elicited specific sensory cues related to the trauma, and more. However, 
even if participants reported changes in levels of acceptance and alexithymia, that would not 
“prove” that the intervention itself was responsible, or that the components believed by the 
researchers to effect those changes were the effective ingredients. However, to build evidence of 
those conclusions the present study incorporated a comparison condition that did not explicitly 
target those changes.  
Changes in mediators have also been theorized to need to occur prior to changes in 
outcomes; not establishing this precedence is considered a weakness of many studies (Kazdin, 
2007). The present study assessed several potential mediators at four time-points over the space 
of more than 30 days, and additional mediators within each in-person intervention session. These 
temporally rooted assessments may help in building arguments for temporal precedence of 
changes involved in symptom reduction.  
Lastly, mediators have been theorized to operate according to a dose-response 
relationship (Kazdin, 2007). The present study offered at least one method of examining varied 
dosages and outcomes that could increase the plausibility and coherence of the proposed 
mechanisms and relationships. Specifically, the tracking of SUDS in session allowed for the 
possibility of distinct patterns to emerge that may have differed in relation to levels of PTSD 
symptom change. In other words, it may be that particular patterns of SUDS result from greater 
engagement with traumatic memories while others could be indicative of avoidance, suppression, 
dissociation, or otherwise less engagement. Pattern differences by themselves would not be 
interpretable but in association with changes in other measures, and if congruent with predictions 
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supported by theory, they may provide additional evidence for a proposed mechanism of change. 
Changes in proposed mediators will first be examined by intervention condition. 
Thought suppression/avoidance. The hypothesis that the DP condition would show 
greater reductions in thought suppression was supported. First, the best-fitting model had to be 
identified. As in the primary outcome analyses, auxiliary variables and SES were entered as 
covariates to improve the MLE process. Mean-centered pre-test total PTSD symptoms was 
entered in place of the thought avoidance variable, which now was entered as the outcome 
variable. Using a fixed effects model (Model 1) yielded a CAIC of 1005.696. By allowing the 
intercept to vary (Model 2), this significantly improved the model to a CAIC of  945.612 (χ2(1, N 
= 86) = 60.084, p < .001). The addition of a random effects per assessment interval (Model 3) 
did not improve the model (CAIC = 952.335, which is a worse fit than the previous). Changing 
the covariance structure to autoregressive (Model 4), which is the expected structure for repeated 
measures, was also a worse fit (CAIC = 954.899). Lastly, exploring an unstructured covariance 
structure (Model 5) also provided a worse fit (CAIC = 993.148). Thus Model 2 effects are 
reported, which includes fixed and random effects.  
Figure 7 illustrates the Model 2 levels of thought suppression per condition per 
assessment interval. As can be seen, an interaction occurs between condition and assessment 
interval. Mean scores and comparative tests are reported in Table 19. 
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Figure 7. Estimated Trajectories of the Thought Suppression (WBSI) Scores as a Function of 
Treatment Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed). 
 
 
Table 19. Marginal Mean WBSI (Thought Suppression) Scores Per Assessment Interval 
(Untransformed). 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baselin
e 
(SE) 
95% CI 
57.90 
(1.35) 
55.19 to 
60.43 
60.74 
(1.28) 
58.17 to 
63.13 
57.90 
(1.35) 
55.19 to 
60.43 
60.74 
(1.28) 
58.17 to 
63.13 
57.90 
(1.35) 
55.19 to 
60.43 
60.74 
(1.28) 
58.17 to 
63.13 Thought Suppress. 
(WBSI) Post 
(SE) 
95% CI 
59.03 
(1.31) 
56.39 to 
61.47 
55.43 
(1.53) 
52.36 to 
58.30 
54.93 
(1.55) 
51.83 to 
57.83 
50.99 
(1.77) 
47.44 to 
54.31 
54.46 
(1.59) 
51.27 to 
57.43 
51.86 
(1.59) 
48.38 to 
55.12 
(d) 0.26 -1.13 -1.10 -1.88 -0.70 -1.74 Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = 1.11 
t116 = 0.84  
P = .402 
B = -5.12 
t106 = -3.61 
P < .001 
B = -2.94 
t119 = -2.00 
P = .048 
B = -9.43 
t108 = -6.02 
P < .001 
B = -3.45 
t119 = -2.28 
P = .024 
B = -8.66 
T108 = -5.58 
P < .001 
(d) -0.71 -0.67 -0.54 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx Groups LMM 
t223 = -3.26, 
P = .001 
t227 = -3.08, 
P = .002 
t226 = -2.49, 
P = .013 
 
Mean scores are adjusted by the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, anxiety, rumination, 
acceptance, depression, stress, physical symptoms, and duration of treatment. 
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Fixed effects. Significance results for fixed effects are summarized in Table 20, and 
estimates are provided in Table 21. Significant covariates in predicting thought suppression were 
pre-test PTSD symptoms and alexithymia, even after allowing for random participant factors 
(i.e., varied intercepts). In addition, time interval was significant, and the interaction of time and 
condition, but condition alone was not. Of course, significant differences in grand means are not 
surprising given the higher baseline of the DP condition.  
However, the difference between a mean of 9-points reduction achieved and maintained 
by the DP condition, in contrast to the 3-point reduction by the EW condition was significant 
t(226.45) = -2.49, p = .013. With effect sizes understood in confidence intervals, results suggest 
with 95% confidence that participants in the DP condition saw thought suppression reduce by as 
few as 2.75 points or as many as 15.81 points (b = 8.83) at 30-day follow-up. For the EW 
condition, this mean effect was 5.34 points less, with 95% confidence that changes in thought 
suppression ranged from decreasing by 1.49 more than the DP condition to decreasing by 9.04 
fewer points than the DP condition.  
Table 20. Significance of Fixed Effects Predicting Thought Suppression (WBSI). 
Variable df F  p 
Covariates    
   Total PTSD Symptoms (1, 87.29) 9.81 .002 
   Alexithymia (1, 90.91) 7.40 .008 
   SES (1, 88.85) .456 .501 
   Stress (1, 85.72) 0.34 .562 
   Depression (1, 85.75) .052 .820 
   Anxiety (1, 87.64) 0.02 .884 
   Acceptance (1, 91.49) 0.88 .352 
   Physical Symptoms (1, 83.67) 2.28 .135 
   Rumination (1, 86.86) 0.56 .456 
Treatment Duration (1, 87.81) 1.40 .240 
Assessment Intervals (Time) (3, 225.76) 16.18 < .001 
Condition (1, 84.78 ) 1.05 .308 
Time*Condition (3, 225.51) 4.71 .003 
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Table 21. Fixed Effect Estimates for Thought Suppression (WBSI) in Model 2.  
 Unstandardized 
Estimate  (b) SE Lower Upper df t p 
Intercept  
(Baseline for DP 
Condition) 
60.93 1.27 63.28 58.37 225.92 28.154 < .001 
Covariates        
   Mean SES -0.23 0.34 2.75 -3.53 88.85 0.68 .501 
   Total PTSD Sympt. 0.13 0.04 2.54 -2.51 87.29 -3.13 .002 
   Depression -0.31 1.41 4.47 -5.98 85.75 0.23 .820 
   Anxiety 0.20 1.38 4.87 -5.36 87.64 -0.15 .884 
   Stress 0.84 1.45 5.57 -4.85 85.72 -0.58 562 
   Acceptance -1.83 2.08 4.13 -9.09 91.49 0.94 .352 
   Physical Symptoms 0.93 0.61 4.28 -2.88 83.67 -1.51 .135 
   Alexithymia 3.21 1.14 7.18 -1.58 90.91 -2.72 .008 
   Rumination 0.75 1.01 4.78 -3.94 86.86 -0.75 .456 
   Treatment Duration -0.06 0.05 2.39 -2.73 87.81 1.18 .240 
Assessment Interval        
   Immediate Post -5.28 1.57 0.18 -11.59 225.13 3.69 < .001 
   14-Day Post -9.70 1.81 -3.50 -16.80 228.14 6.13 < .001 
   30-Day Post -8.83 1.78 -2.75 -15.81 228.20 5.64 < .001 
EW Condition  -2.83 1.99 3.08 -9.91 186.94 1.52 .130 
Condition*Interval        
   EW Immediate Post 5.34 1.52 9.59 -0.11 223.13 -3.26 .001 
   EW 14-Day Post 5.32 1.60 9.69 -0.33 226.64 -3.08 .002 
   EW 30-Day Post 4.43 1.69 9.04 -1.49 226.45 -2.49 .013 
  
 In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant differences 
were significant. The variance in the location of individual intercepts was b = 4.77 (SE = 1.05; 
95% CI = 44.75 to 48.98; Wald Z = 4.79, p < .001). That figure equals the total variance around 
the intercept, so the square root (standard deviation, i.e., 2.18) delineates the 68% confidence 
interval, and the double of that (i.e., 4.36) offers a 95% confidence interval. This suggests that 
with a mean intercept of 60.92, individuals vary by +/- 4.36 of that. In addition, throughout the 
other assessments, scores vary with a total variance of b = 5.87 (SE = .59; 95% CI = 44.94 to 
47.27; Wald Z = 10.51, p < .001). This variance converts to a 95% confidence interval of scores 
being +/- 4.85 units from the regression line.  
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 Discussion of thought suppression. These findings support the hypothesis that DP would 
predict greater reductions in thought suppression. The patterns suggest two observations 
regarding processes involved. First, in the EW condition, participants reported an increase in 
thought avoidance at immediate post, which stands in contrast to the immediate decrease 
reported in the DP condition. Nevertheless, significant reductions under both conditions at 14- 
and 30-days post also suggest both conditions achieved one or more similar process outcomes, 
such as habituation to or acceptance of undesirable thoughts and memories. The significant 
reductions of thought suppression under both conditions may be associated with the significant 
reductions in severity of PTSD symptoms under both conditions; and the significant differences 
in levels of reduction of thought suppression may be related to significant differences between 
conditions in reduction of frequency of PTSD symptoms. While these parallel patterns of change 
in thought suppression and PTSD symptoms could be coincidental, the theory-congruent results 
suggest otherwise.  
Cognitive acceptance. The hypothesis that the DP condition would show greater 
increases in cognitive acceptance of the trauma was supported, albeit not to an obviously 
clinically relevant degree. Results may also be somewhat muted due to baselines for each group 
that were above the mid-point on this 7-point scale, suggesting at least some acceptance at 
baseline. For statistical analyses, the best-fitting model had to first be identified. As in the 
primary outcome analyses, auxiliary variables and SES were entered as covariates to improve the 
MLE process. Mean-centered pre-test total PTSD symptoms was entered in place of the 
acceptance variable, which now was entered as the outcome variable. Using a fixed effects 
model (Model 1) yielded a CAIC of 388.50. By allowing the intercept to vary (Model 2), this 
significantly improved the model to a CAIC of  281.82 (χ2(1, N = 86) = 106.68, p < .001). The 
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addition of a random effects per assessment interval (Model 3) did not improve the model (CAIC 
= 288.54) although Model 3 fit significantly better than Model 1. Thus Model 2 effects are 
reported, which includes fixed and random effects. Figure 8 illustrates the Model 2 levels of 
acceptance per condition per assessment interval. As can be seen, the DP condition achieves an 
increase in acceptance whereas in the EW condition acceptance remains stable. Mean scores are 
reported in Table 22. 
Figure 8. Estimated Trajectories of the Cognitive Acceptance (CPOTS) Scores as a Function of 
Treatment Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed). 
 
 
3.91	   4.08	   4.20	   4.19	  4.04	  
4.46	   4.93	   5.07	  
0	  1	  
2	  3	  
4	  5	  
6	  
Pre-Test Immediate 
Post 
14-Day Post 30-Day Post 
Cognitive Acceptance (CPOTS) EW	   DP	  
	  110  
Table 22. Marginal Mean Acceptance (CPOTS) Scores and Significant Differences Per 
Assessment Interval (Untransformed). 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
3.91 
(0.24) 
3.43 to 
4.36 
4.04 
(0.24) 
3.55 to 
4.49 
3.91 
(0.24) 
3.43 to 
4.36 
4.04 
(0.24) 
3.55 to 
4.49 
3.91 
(0.24) 
3.43 to 
4.36 
4.04 
(0.24) 
3.55 to 
4.49 
PTSD 
Symptoms 
(MPSS-
SR) Post (SE) 
95% CI 
4.08 
(0.23) 
3.62 to 
4.53 
4.46 
(0.23) 
3.99 to 
4.90 
4.20 
(0.24) 
3.72 to 
4.66 
4.93 
(0.23) 
4.48 to 
5.36 
4.19 
(0.25) 
3.71 to 
4.65 
5.07 
(0.22) 
4.63 to 
5.48 
(d) 0.23 0.78 0.40 1.57 0.34 1.82 Effect 
Size 
Within Tx 
Group 
LMM 
B = 0.17 
t114 = 0.75, 
P = .455 
B = 0.45 
t104 = 2.49, 
P = .014 
B = 0.33 
t117 = 1.32, 
P < .190 
B = 0.93 
t105 = 5.04, 
P < .001 
B = 0.28 
t117 = 1.10, 
P = .273 
B = 1.06 
t105 = 5.83, 
P < .001 
(d) -0.19 -0.46 -0.57 
Effect 
Size 
Between 
Tx 
Groups 
LMM t219 = -0.89,  P = .374 
t222 = -2.11,  
P = .036 
t221 = -2.63,  
P = .009 
 
Mean scores are adjusted by the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, anxiety, thought 
suppression rumination, depression, stress, physical symptoms, and duration of treatment. 
 
Fixed effects. Significance tests for fixed effects are summarized in Table 23, with 
estimates provided in Table 24. After allowing random effects for participants, no covariates 
were significant in predicting acceptance. However, assessment interval, and the interaction of 
that with condition were significant; condition also approached significance. For the DP 
condition, the mean difference from baseline to 30-day post was an increase in acceptance by 
1.04 points (out of 7; 95% CI = 0.19 to 1.77). The effect for EW was a mean of 0.87 fewer points 
of increase than the DP condition (95% CI = 2.15 fewer points of increase to 0.26 more points of 
increase). 
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Table 23. Significance of Fixed Effects Predicting Acceptance (CPOTS). 
Variable df F p 
Covariates    
   SES 1, 87.03 0.04 .848 
   PTSD Symptoms 1, 85.63 0.86 .355 
   Thought Suppression 1, 84.87 0.97 .328 
   Depression 1, 83.27 1.95 .167 
   Stress 1, 84.23 0.04 .849 
   Rumination 1, 84.10 0.01 .980 
   Physical Symptoms 1, 81.70 0.77 .384 
   Anxiety 1, 84.34 0.18 .672 
   Alexithymia 1, 85.67 0.52 .475 
Treatment Duration 1, 84.92 0.49 .487 
Assessment Intervals (Time) 3, 220.64 8.37 .000 
Condition 1, 82.84 3.64 .060 
Time*Condition 3, 220.45 2.86 .038 
 
Table 24. Fixed Effect Estimates for Acceptance (CPOTS) In Model 2.  
 Unstandardized 
Estimate  (b) SE 
95% CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper df t p 
Intercept  
(Baseline for DP 
Condition) 
4.03 0.24 4.49 3.55 178.43 27.01 < .001 
Covariates        
   SES 0.01 0.07 0.59 -0.61 87.03 -0.19 .848 
   PTSD Symptoms -0.01 0.01 0.46 -0.51 85.63 0.93 .355 
   Thought Suppression -0.15 0.15 0.60 -0.97 84.87 0.98 .328 
   Depression -0.39 0.29 0.61 -1.53 83.27 1.40 .167 
   Stress 0.06 0.31 1.05 -1.08 84.23 -0.19 .849 
   Rumination 0.01 0.21 0.84 -0.93 84.10 -0.03 .98 
   Physical Symptoms -0.11 0.13 0.59 -0.89 81.70 0.88 .384 
   Anxiety 0.12 0.28 1.05 -0.95 84.34 -0.43 .672 
   Alexithymia -0.19 0.27 0.76 -1.27 85.67 0.72 .475 
   Treatment Duration -0.01 0.01 0.47 -0.51 84.92 0.70 .487 
Assessment Interval        
   Immediate Post 0.42 0.21 1.22 -0.47 220.56 -2.01 0.045 
   14-Day Post 0.90 0.20 1.65 0.04 222.61 -4.21 < .001 
   30-Day Post 1.04 0.20 1.77 0.19 222.53 -4.91 < .001 
EW Condition  -0.12 0.35 0.96 -1.37 146.06 0.36 0.722 
Condition*Interval        
   EW Immediate Post -0.27 0.31 0.75 -1.43 218.909 -0.89 0.374 
   EW 14-Day Post -0.69 0.35 0.41 -1.95 221.493 -2.11 0.036 
   EW 30-Day Post -0.87 0.36 0.26 -2.15 221.102 -2.63 0.009 
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 In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant differences 
were significant. The variance in the location of individual intercepts was b = -0.29 (SE = 0.06; 
95% CI = 4.64 to 6.13; Wald Z = 5.34, p < .001). That figure equals the total variance around the 
intercept; the square root (standard deviation, i.e., 0.54) delineates the 68% confidence interval, 
and the double of that (i.e., 1.08) offers a 95% confidence interval. This suggests that around the 
intercept, individuals randomly varied by +/- 1.08 points. In addition, throughout the other 
assessments, scores varied with a total variance of b = -0.20 (SE = 0.02; 95% CI = 4.27 to 5.77; 
Wald Z = 10.42, p < .001). This variance converts to a 95% confidence interval of scores being 
+/- 0.89 units from the regression line. 
 Discussion of cognitive acceptance. The hypothesis that the DP condition would be 
associated with greater increases in cognitive acceptance of the trauma was supported; a 
significant increase compared to baseline was seen at each post-assessment, with continued 
growth even at 30-day follow-up. The EW condition did not show significant changes in 
acceptance at any interval. While this construct may appear to simply be the opposite of thought 
suppression, it may be offering something distinct. As with thought suppression, the parallel with 
significant differences between conditions on PTSD symptoms may be related with the increases 
in acceptance. And given the specificity of the relationship with only one treatment condition, 
this suggests the DP intervention succeeded (albeit minimally) in altering participants’ 
acceptance of their trauma. 
Rumination. The hypothesis that the DP condition would show greater reductions in 
rumination was supported. First, the best-fitting model had to be identified. As in the primary 
outcome analyses, auxiliary variables and SES were entered as covariates to improve the MLE 
process. Mean-centered baseline PTSD symptoms was entered in place of the rumination 
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variable, which now was entered as the outcome variable. Using a fixed effects model (Model 1) 
yielded a CAIC of 812.96. By allowing the intercept to vary (Model 2), this significantly 
improved the model to a CAIC of  745.18 (χ2(1, N = 86) = 67.78, p < .001). The addition of a 
random effects per assessment interval (Model 3) did not improve the model (CAIC = 751.90, 
which is a worse fit than Model 2). Thus Model 2 effects are reported, which includes fixed and 
random effects. Figure 9 illustrates the Model 2 levels of rumination per condition per 
assessment interval. As can be seen, an interaction occurs between condition and assessment 
interval. Mean scores are reported in Table 25. 
Figure 9. Estimated Trajectories of the Rumination (RRS) Scores as a Function of Treatment 
Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed). 
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Table 25. Marginal Mean RRS (Rumination) Scores Per Assessment Interval (Untransformed).  
 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
51.16 
(1.69) 
47.90 to 
54.53 
52.33 
(1.77) 
48.94 to 
55.85 
51.16 
(1.69) 
47.90 to 
54.53 
52.33 
(1.77) 
48.94 to 
55.85 
51.16 
(1.69) 
47.90 to 
54.53 
52.33 
(1.77) 
48.94 to 
55.85 Rumination 
(RRS) Post 
(SE) 
95% CI 
51.55 
(1.70) 
48.27 to 
54.92 
48.82 
(1.77) 
45.43 to 
52.32 
50.34 
(1.79) 
46.90 to 
53.89 
45.76 
(1.78) 
42.35 to 
49.31 
49.28 
(1.79) 
45.87 to 
52.83 
46.83 
(1.82) 
43.36 to 
50.45 
(d) 0.08 -0.59 -0.17 -1.07 -0.36 -0.89 Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = 0.39 
t116 = 0.25, 
P = .805 
B = -3.57 
t104 = -1.90 
P = .061 
B = -0.95 
t118 = -0.57 
P = .573 
B = -6.67 
t105 = -3.43 
P = .001 
B = -2.00 
t117 = -1.19 
P = .238 
B = -5.61 
t105 = -2.84 
P < .001 
(d) 0.34 0.50 0.31 Effect Size 
Between Tx 
Groups LMM 
t220 = 1.63,  
P = .105 
t223 = 2.30,  
P = .022 
t223 = 1.43,  
P = .154 
 
Mean scores are adjusted by the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, anxiety, thought 
suppression, acceptance, depression, stress, physical symptoms, and duration of treatment. 
 
Fixed effects. Significance tests for fixed effects are summarized in Table 26. Significant 
covariates in predicting rumination were pre-test total PTSD symptoms and depression, even 
after allowing for random participant factors (i.e., intercepts). In addition, assessment interval 
was significant, suggesting participants in both conditions improved, but the overall means by 
condition, and the interaction of time and condition, were not significant. In terms of effect size 
(Table 27), the DP condition showed a significant enduring reduction in rumination (b = -5.51; 
95% CI = -1.52 to -12.07). The EW condition showed a smaller mean reduction by 3.82 points 
(95% CI = 13.07 less reduction to 4.75 more reduction) than the DP condition, but this difference 
was not significant. However, at 14-days, the EW condition showed a significantly smaller 
reduction in rumination by 6.14 points (95% CI ranging from 15.51 points of less reduction to 
2.55 points of more reduction than the DP condition). 
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Table 26. Significance of Fixed Effects Predicting Rumination (RRS). 
Variable df F p 
Covariates    
   1. SES 1, 87.80 0.56 .456 
   2.Total PTSD Symptoms 1, 86.55 9.21 .003 
   3. Thought suppression 1, 86.06 1.36 .247 
   4. Depression 1, 84.98 10.03 .002 
   5. Stress 1, 85.68 0.03 .870 
   6. Acceptance 1, 89.76 0.05 .827 
   7. Physical Symptoms 1, 82.40 1.53 .219 
   8. Anxiety 1, 86.31 0.36 .552 
   9. Alexithymia 1, 88.14 0.75 .388 
Treatment Duration 1, 86.96 0.19 .662 
Assessment Intervals (Time) 3, 222.23 4.09 .007 
Condition 1, 83.71 1.19 .278 
Time x Condition 3, 222.03 1.93 .126 
 
Table 27. Fixed Effect Estimates for Rumination (RRS) In Model 2.  
 Unstandardized 
Estimate  (b) SE Lower Upper df t p 
Intercept  
(Baseline for DP 
Condition) 
52.59 1.76 49.20 56.09 178.62 61.36 < .001 
Covariates        
   1. SES -0.35 0.47 -4.63 4.10 87.80 -.075 .456 
   2.Total PTSD  
      Symptoms 0.17 0.06 -3.33 3.80 86.55 3.04 .003 
   3. Thought 
suppression -1.21 1.04 -6.52 4.39 86.06 -1.17 .247 
   4. Depression 5.87 1.92 -1.31 13.52 84.98 3.17 .002 
   5. Stress -0.35 2.15 -7.75 7.60 85.68 -0.16 .87 
   6. Acceptance 0.60 2.76 -7.93 9.85 89.76 0.22 .827 
   7. Physical Symptoms 1.10 0.90 -4.03 6.49 82.40 1.24 .219 
   8. Anxiety 1.16 1.97 -5.96 8.77 86.31 0.60 .552 
   9. Alexithymia -1.59 1.84 -8.38 5.66 88.14 -0.87 .388 
   Treatment Duration -0.03 0.07 -3.56 3.62 86.96 -0.44 .662 
Assessment Interval        
   Immediate Post -3.53 1.74 -10.03 3.42 221.75 -2.02 .045 
   14-Day Post -6.59 1.77 -13.04 0.32 224.60 -3.64 < .001 
   30-Day Post -5.51 1.81 -12.07 1.52 224.60 -3.00 .003 
EW Condition  -1.18 2.51 -9.15 7.45 172.49 -0.47 .636 
Condition*Interval        
   EW Immediate Post 4.06 2.57 -4.20 12.96 219.75 1.63 .105 
   EW 14-Day Post 6.14 2.77 -2.55 15.51 223.45 2.30 .022 
   EW 30-Day Post 3.82 2.74 -4.75 13.07 222.83 1.43 .154 
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 In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant differences 
were significant as shown by the model selection analysis above. The variance in the location of 
individual intercepts was b = 4.70 (SE = 0.81; 95% CI = 49.67 to 52.92; Wald Z = 4.92, p < 
.001). That figure equals the total variance around the intercept, so the square root (standard 
deviation, i.e., 2.17) delineates the 68% confidence interval, and the double of that (i.e., 4.34) 
offers a 95% confidence interval. In addition, throughout the other assessments, scores varied 
with a total variance of b = 4.50 (SE = .40; 95% CI = 50.45 to 52.04; Wald Z = 10.43, p < .001). 
This variance converts to a 95% confidence interval of scores being +/- 4.24 units from the 
regression line.  
 Discussion of rumination. These findings support the hypothesis that the DP condition 
would achieve greater reduction in rumination than the EW condition. In the EW condition, 
participants reported higher rumination at immediate post, followed by a reduction that never 
achieved a significant difference from baseline. In the DP condition, participants reported 
immediate decline in rumination (marginally significant), followed by significant decreases at 
14-days, and largely maintained at 30 days. These results suggest that the DP condition was at 
least somewhat effective in its goal of manipulating this behavior. In addition, congruent with 
theory, these significantly different effects on rumination may have played a role in the 
significantly lower post-treatment PTSD and depressive symptom scores associated with the DP 
condition.  
Alexithymia. The hypothesis that the DP condition would show greater reductions in 
alexithymia was modestly supported. First, the best-fitting model had to be identified. As in the 
primary outcome analyses, auxiliary variables and SES were entered as covariates to improve the 
MLE process. Mean-centered baseline total PTSD symptoms was entered in place of the 
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alexithymia variable, which now was entered as the outcome variable. Using a fixed effects 
model (Model 1) yielded a CAIC of 732.54. By allowing the intercept to vary (Model 2), this 
significantly improved the model to a CAIC of  586.56 (χ2  (1, N = 86) = 145.98, p < .001). The 
addition of a random effects per assessment interval (Model 3) did not improve the model (CAIC 
= 593.28, which is a worse fit than Model 2). Thus Model 2 effects are reported, which includes 
fixed and random effects.  
Figure 10 illustrates the Model 2 levels of alexithymia per condition per assessment 
interval, with mean scores reported in Table 28. As can be seen, while improvements were small 
overall, an interaction occurred between condition and assessment interval whereby participants 
in the EW condition lost the small initial gains in their ability to identify and describe emotions, 
while gains increased at each assessment interval for the DP condition.  
Figure 10. Estimated Trajectories of the Alexithymia (TAS-20) Scores as a Function of Treatment 
Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed).  
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Table 28. Marginal Mean TAS-20 (Alexithymia) Scores Per Assessment Interval 
(Untransformed). 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
56.56 
(1.54) 
53.57 to 
59.64 
53.97 
(1.57) 
50.94 to 
57.08 
56.56 
(1.54) 
53.57 to 
59.64 
53.97 
(1.57) 
50.94 to 
57.08 
56.56 
(1.54) 
53.57 to 
59.64 
53.97 
(1.57) 
50.94 to 
57.08 
PTSD 
Symptoms 
(MPSS-
SR) Post (SE) 
95% CI 
55.12 
(1.52) 
52.16 to 
58.14 
52.57 
(1.58) 
49.52 to 
55.70 
57.08 
(1.61) 
53.97 to 
60.29 
51.49 
(1.61) 
48.39 to 
54.70 
55.07 
(1.60) 
51.97 to 
58.26 
49.94 
(1.58) 
46.89 to 
53.10 
(d) -0.38 -0.33 0.13 -0.55 -0.36 -0.90 Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = -1.45 
t116 = -1.25, 
P = .213 
B = -1.38 
t105 = -1.04, 
P = .302 
B = 0.54 
t117 = 0.43, 
P = .665 
B = -2.44 
t106 = -1.76, 
P = .081 
B = -1.48 
t118 = -1.18, 
P = .239 
B = -3.95 
t106 = -2.87, 
P = .005 
(d) -.01 0.36 0.31 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx Groups LMM 
t221 = -0.02,  
P = .988 
t223 = 1.63,  
P = .104 
t223 = 1.41,  
P = .159 
 
Mean scores are adjusted by the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, anxiety, thought sfsdf 
suppression, acceptance, depression, stress, physical symptoms, and duration of treatment. 
 
Fixed effects. Significance tests for fixed effects are summarized in Table 29. Only 
anxiety showed a significant effect (marginally) in predicting alexithymia, even after allowing 
for random participant factors (i.e., intercepts). In addition, assessment interval was significant, 
as was condition, but the interaction effect of time and condition was not significant.  
Table 29. Significance of Fixed Effects Predicting Alexithymia (TAS-20). 
Variable df F p 
Covariates    
   1. SES 1, 87.54 0.37 .541 
   2.Total PTSD Symptoms 1, 86.13 0.01 .979 
   3. Thought suppression 1, 86.31 2.36 .128 
   4. Depression 1, 85.67 0.87 .355 
   5. Stress 1, 85.62 0.33 .568 
   6. Acceptance 1, 88.12 0.67 .417 
   7. Physical Symptoms 1, 83.64 0.17 .680 
   8. Anxiety 1, 85.32 3.58 .062 
   9. Rumination 1, 85.52 0.01 .981 
Treatment Duration 1, 85.44 0.27 .606 
Assessment Intervals (Time) 3, 222.24 3.06 .029 
Condition 1, 85.11 4.11 .046 
Time x Condition 3, 222.20 1.55 .202 
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Fixed effects. Estimates of fixed effects are summarized in Table 30. The reduction in 
symptoms from baseline to final post was only significant for the DP condition. In terms of 
effect size, in the combined model the DP condition showed a significant improvement of b = -
4.02 (95% CI = -9.35 to 1.60) at 30-days follow-up. In contrast, although the EW condition 
showed initial decrease in alexithymia at immediate post, it then showed a rise at 14 days, and 
only a slight reduction at 30 days. EW reduction at 30 days was not significant and was 2.66 
points less reduction than that of the DP condition (95% CI showed a range between 9.75 fewer 
points of reduction to 4.02 more points of reduction than the DP condition). 
Table 30. Fixed Effect Estimates for Alexithymia (TAS-20) in Model 2.  
 Unstandardized 
Estimate  (b) SE 
95% CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper df t p 
Intercept  
(Baseline for 
DP Condition) 
54.08 1.55 51.07 57.17 137.53 71.37 < .001 
Covariates        
   SES 0.28 0.46 -3.62 4.33 87.54 0.61 .541 
   Total PTSD 
Symptoms 0.00 0.06 -3.12 3.21 86.13 -0.03 .979 
   Thought    
   suppression -1.48 0.96 -6.27 3.54 86.31 -1.53 .128 
   Depression 1.74 1.90 -4.90 8.78 85.67 0.93 .355 
   Stress -1.17 2.05 -8.00 6.12 85.62 -0.57 .568 
   Acceptance 2.14 2.68 -5.93 10.82 88.12 0.82 .417 
   Physical  
   Symptoms 0.36 0.88 -4.34 5.27 83.64 0.41 .680 
   Anxiety 3.47 1.88 -3.18 10.52 85.32 1.89 .062 
   Rumination 0.03 1.41 -5.66 6.04 85.52 0.02 .981 
   Treatment  
   Duration 0.04 0.07 -3.11 3.27 85.44 0.52 .606 
Assessment Interval       
   Imm. Post -1.39 1.27 -6.74 4.24 222.36 -1.10 .273 
   14-Day Post -2.47 1.32 -7.89 3.24 223.87 -1.87 .063 
   30-Day Post -4.02 1.30 -9.35 1.60 223.92 -3.07 .002 
EW Condition  2.60 2.29 -4.75 10.45 134.83 1.16 .247 
Condition*Interval       
   EW Immed.  
   Post -0.03 1.76 -6.33 6.66 221.01 -0.02 .988 
   EW 14-Day  
   Post 3.05 1.91 -3.62 10.13 222.84 1.63 .104 
   EW 30-Day  
   Post 2.66 1.92 -4.02 9.75 222.86 1.41 .159 
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 In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant differences 
were significant. The variance in the location of individual intercepts was b = 1.21 (SE = 0.23; 
95% CI = 4.63 to 10.61; Wald Z = 5.67, p < .001). That figure equals the total variance around 
the intercept; the square root (standard deviation, i.e., 1.10) delineates the 68% confidence 
interval, and the double of that (i.e., 2.20) offers a 95% confidence interval. In addition, 
throughout the other assessments, scores varied with a total variance of b = 0.58 (SE = .06; 95% 
CI = 3.58 to 5.81; Wald Z = 10.48, p < .001). This variance converts to a 95% confidence 
interval of scores being +/- 1.52 units from the regression line.  
 Discussion of alexithymia. These findings were partially supportive of the hypothesis that 
the DP condition would show greater reduction in alexithymia. The continued improvement over 
time suggests the DP condition may have helped participants to identify and describe their 
emotions in ways formerly inaccessible to them, in a sustained manner. While the effect size 
may seem small, it may be worthwhile to consider that alexithymia is generally theorized about 
and assessed as a trait rather than as a skill deficit. For this reason the TAS-20 was not designed 
to monitor change over time. Perhaps a modified version or a new instrument could be designed 
to better help individuals identify limitations and changes regarding their facility for identifying 
and expressing emotions. Once again, the significant difference in reduction of alexithymia 
shown only by the DP condition may be related to the significantly lower final PTSD symptom 
scores demonstrated by the DP condition as compared to the EW condition. 
Loneliness. Peer loneliness. The hypothesis that the DP condition would show 
significantly greater reduction in social loneliness than the EW condition was not supported. 
First, the best-fitting model had to be identified. As in the primary outcome analyses, the same 
mean-centered auxiliary variables as above and SES were entered as covariates to improve the 
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MLE process. Using a fixed effects model (Model 1) yielded a CAIC of 204.76. By allowing the 
intercept to vary (Model 2), this significantly improved the model to a CAIC of  87.04 (χ2  (1, N 
= 86) = 117.72, p < .001). The addition of a random effects per assessment interval (Model 3) 
did not improve the model (CAIC = 93.76, a worse fit than Model 2). Thus Model 2 effects are 
reported, which includes fixed and random effects.  
A graphical depiction of social loneliness score changes is presented in Figure 11, with 
marginal means per interval per condition summarized in Table 31. (Mean scores are adjusted by 
the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, thought suppression, depression, anxiety, stress, 
rumination, acceptance, physical symptoms, alexithymia, and duration of treatment.) It should be 
noted that on this 7-point scale, scores below a 4 are indicative of very little loneliness. The only 
significant difference was an increase in loneliness reported by the EW participants at 14-days 
post. This differed significantly from baseline as well as from the DP condition at 14 days which 
slowed a slight non-significant decrease in loneliness as compared to baseline.  
Figure 11. Estimated Trajectories of the Social Loneliness (SELSA-S) Scores as a Function of 
Treatment Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed) 
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Table 31. Marginal Mean Peer Loneliness (SELSA-S) Scores Per Assessment Interval 
(Untransformed). 
 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
2.90 
(0.17) 
2.58 to 
3.24 
2.85 
(0.17) 
2.52 to 
3.20 
2.90 
(0.17) 
2.58 to 
3.24 
2.85 
(0.17) 
2.52 to 
3.20 
2.90 
(0.17) 
2.58 to 
3.24 
2.85 
(0.17) 
2.52 to 
3.20 Peer/Social Loneliness 
(SELSA-S) Post 
(SE) 
95% CI 
3.07 
(0.17) 
2.74 to 
3.41 
2.73 
(0.18) 
2.40 to 
3.08 
3.20 
(0.18) 
2.85 to 
3.57 
2.66 
(0.18) 
2.32 to 
3.02 
3.10 
(0.18) 
2.75 to 
3.46 
2.69 
(0.18) 
2.34 to 
3.05 
(d) 0.38 0.23 0.63 -0.34 0.41 -0.30 Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = 0.17 
t114 = 1.24, 
P = .217 
B = -0.12 
t106 = -0.73, 
P = .465 
B = 0.30 
t115 = 2.05, 
P = .043 
B = -0.18 
t108 = -1.10, 
P = .275 
B = 0.20 
t115 = 1.35, 
P = .180 
B = -0.16 
t108 = -0.96, 
P = .341 
(d) 0.30 0.48 0.35 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx Groups LMM 
t220 = 1.38,  
P = .169 
t222 = 2.19,  
P = .030 
t222 = 1.62,  
P = .108 
 
Fixed effects. Significance tests for fixed effects are reported in Table 32, with effect 
sizes and comparisons reported in Table 33. The covariates of depression, anxiety, and stress 
symptoms, as well as cognitive acceptance, were significant predictors of peer loneliness. In 
terms of omnibus F tests, there were no significant effects associated with assessment interval, 
treatment condition, or their interaction. Nevertheless, when groups were analyzed 
independently, the EW condition showed a significant temporary increase in loneliness that was 
no longer present at 30-days.   
	  123  
 
Table 32. Significance of Fixed Effects Predicting Social Loneliness (SESLA-S). 
Variable df F p 
Covariates    
   SES 1, 88.56 0.03 .868 
   Total PTSD Symptoms 1, 86.98 0.07 .795 
   Thought suppression 1, 86.54 2.34 .130 
   Depression 1, 85.64 11.09 .001 
   Anxiety 1, 86.59 8.50 .005 
   Stress 1, 86.29 10.49 .002 
   Acceptance 1, 89.69 4.89 .030 
   Physical Symptoms 1, 83.57 0.35 .557 
   Alexithymia 1, 88.01 0.62 .432 
   Rumination 1, 86.77 0.09 .767 
Treatment Duration 1, 87.14 0.28 .596 
Assessment Intervals (Time) 3, 221.35 0.07 .976 
Condition 1, 84.78 2.39 .126 
Time x Condition 3, 221.19 1.78 .152 
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Table 33. Fixed Effect Estimates for Peer Loneliness (SELSA-S) in Model 2.  
 Unstandardized 
Estimate  (b) SE 
95% CI 
Lower 
95% CI 
Upper df t p 
Intercept  
(Baseline for 
DP Condition) 
2.88 0.17 2.55 3.23 148.60 45.26 < .001 
Covariates        
   SES -0.01 0.05 -0.43 0.44 88.56 -0.17 .868 
   Total PTSD 
Symptoms 0.00 0.01 -0.34 0.36 86.98 0.26 .795 
   Thought 
suppression 0.17 0.11 -0.38 0.75 86.54 1.53 .130 
   Depression 0.71 0.22 -0.07 1.55 85.64 3.33 .001 
   Anxiety 0.61 0.22 -0.15 1.44 86.59 2.92 .005 
   Stress -0.69 0.21 -1.36 0.06 86.29 -3.24 .002 
   Acceptance 0.65 0.31 -0.27 1.67 89.69 2.21 .030 
   Physical 
Symptoms -0.06 0.09 -0.56 0.48 83.57 -0.59 .557 
   Alexithymia 0.15 0.20 -0.55 0.92 88.01 0.79 .432 
   Rumination -0.04 0.15 -0.66 0.62 86.77 -0.30 .767 
   Treatment 
Duration 0.00 0.01 -0.35 0.36 87.14 -0.53 .596 
Assessment 
Interval        
   Immediate 
Post -0.12 0.15 -0.72 0.53 221.19 -0.81 .420 
   14-Day Post -0.19 0.16 -0.80 0.47 223.28 -1.21 .229 
   30-Day Post -0.17 0.16 -0.78 -1.88 223.31 -1.05 .297 
EW Condition  0.05 0.25 -0.74 0.92 144.27 0.19 .847 
Condition*Inter
val        
   EW 
Immediate Post 0.29 0.22 -0.45 1.11 219.69 1.38 .169 
   EW 14-Day 
Post 0.50 0.24 -0.29 1.36 222.23 2.19 .030 
   EW 30-Day 
Post 0.37 0.24 -0.41 1.22 221.88 1.62 .108 
  
 Random effects. In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant 
differences were significant. The variance in the location of individual intercepts was b = 0.18 
(SE = 0.03; 95% CI = 0.13 to 0.26; Wald Z = 5.47, p < .001). That figure equals the total 
variance around the intercept; the square root (standard deviation, i.e., 0.42) delineates the 68% 
confidence interval, and the double of that (i.e., 0.84) offers a 95% confidence interval or 
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potential distance from the intercept based on individual differences. In addition, throughout the 
other assessments, scores varied with a total variance of b = 0.12 (SE = .01; 95% CI = 0.10 to 
0.14; Wald Z = 10.44, p < .001). This variance converts to a 95% confidence interval of scores 
being +/- 0.69 units from the regression line.  
 Discussion of peer loneliness. Neither condition showed high peer loneliness at baseline 
or throughout, and neither succeeded in significantly decreasing scores from baseline. The EW 
condition showed a slight significant increase at 14 days but this was not maintained at 30 days. 
The DP condition showed a slight decrease in loneliness but this was not significant. To 
understand the increase in loneliness for the EW condition, it may have been influenced by 
difficulty talking to others about their traumatic experience. However, there may also have been 
a confound since participants were asked not to discuss the study with friends (i.e., potential 
participants) to preserve the study integrity. Given that the DP condition included a brief 
component promoting social interaction, this component may require further study and 
modification. 
Family loneliness. The hypothesis that the DP condition would show greater reductions 
in social loneliness than the EW condition was not supported. First, the best-fitting model had to 
be identified. As in the primary outcome analyses, the same mean-centered auxiliary variables as 
above and SES were entered as covariates to improve the MLE process. Using a fixed effects 
model (Model 1) yielded a CAIC of 275.50. By allowing the intercept to vary (Model 2), this 
significantly improved the model to a CAIC of  146.10 (χ2(1, N = 86) = 129.40, p < .001). The 
addition of a random effects per assessment interval (Model 3) did not improve the model (CAIC 
= 152.82, which is a worse fit than Model 2). Thus Model 2 effects are reported, which includes 
fixed and random effects.  
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A graphical depiction of social loneliness score changes is presented in Figure 12, with 
marginal means per interval per condition summarized in Table 34. (Mean scores are adjusted by 
the covariates of SES, total PTSD symptoms, thought suppression, depression, anxiety, stress, 
rumination, acceptance, physical symptoms, alexithymia, and duration of treatment.) Baseline 
scores were very low and post-assessment scores did not vary much for either condition.  
Figure 12. Estimated Trajectories of the Family Loneliness (SELSA-S) Scores as a Function of 
Treatment Group in the Intent-to-Treat Sample (Untransformed) 
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Table 34. Marginal Mean Family Loneliness (SELSA-S) Scores Per Assessment Interval 
(Untransformed). 
 
  24-Hour Post 14-Day Post 30-Day Follow-Up 
  EW DP EW DP EW DP 
Baseline 
(SE) 
95% CI 
2.20 
(0.17) 
1.87 to 
2.54 
2.38 
(0.18) 
2.03 to 
2.74 
2.20 
(0.17) 
1.87 to 
2.54 
2.38 
(0.18) 
2.03 to 
2.74 
2.20 
(0.17) 
1.87 to 
2.54 
2.38 
(0.18) 
2.03 to 
2.74 Peer/Social Loneliness 
(SELSA-S) Post 
(SE) 
95% CI 
2.34 
(0.17) 
2.00 to 
2.69 
2.39 
(0.19) 
2.04 to 
2.77 
2.30 
(0.18) 
1.95 to 
2.66 
2.33 
(0.19) 
1.97 to 
2.72 
2.25 
(0.18) 
1.91 to 
2.62 
2.40 
(0.19) 
2.03 to 
2.79 
(d) 0.31 0.03 0.21 -0.08 0.11 0.05 Effect Size 
Within Tx 
Group LMM 
B = 0.14 
t116 = 1.02, 
P = .310 
B = 0.02 
t105 = 0.11, 
P = .911 
B = 0.10 
t118 = 0.70, 
P = .484 
B = -0.04 
t106 = -0.26, 
P = .795 
B = 0.05 
t117 = 0.37, 
P = .714 
B = 0.03 
t106 = 0.17, 
P = .865 
(d) 0.13 0.14 0.04 Effect Size 
Between 
Tx Groups LMM 
t221 = 0.60,  
P = .547 
t223 = 0.65,  
P = .172 
t223 = 0.17,  
P = .864 
 
Fixed effects. Significance tests for fixed effects are reported in Table 35, with estimates  
reported in Table 36. The covariates of depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms were significant 
predictors of family loneliness. There were no significant effects associated with assessment 
interval, treatment condition, or their interaction.  
Table 35. Significance of Fixed Effects Predicting Family Loneliness (SESLA-S). 
Variable df F p 
Covariates    
   SES 1, 89.49 0.99 .323 
   Total PTSD Symptoms 1, 87.93 0.01 .980 
   Thought suppression 1, 87.51 0.15 .704 
   Depression 1, 86.65 5.63 .020 
   Anxiety 1, 87.54 5.17 .025 
   Stress 1, 87.28 5.77 .018 
   Acceptance 1, 90.56 1.50 .224 
   Physical Symptoms 1, 84.66 1.58 .212 
   Alexithymia 1, 88.90 0.60 .441 
   Rumination 1, 87.72 0.24 .629 
Treatment Duration 1, 88.08 0.02 .901 
Assessment Intervals (Time) 3, 222.14 0.18 .909 
Condition 1, 85.83 0.22 .637 
Time x Condition 3, 221.98 0.20 .897 
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Table 36. Fixed Effect Estimates for Family Loneliness (SELSA-S) in Model 2.  
 Unstandardize
d 
Estimate  (b) 
SE 95% CI Lower 
95% CI 
Upper df t p 
Intercept  
(Baseline for DP 
Condition) 
2.40 0.18 2.06 2.77 146.15 37.93 < .001 
Covariates        
   SES -0.05 0.05 -0.49 0.42 89.49 -0.99 .323 
   Total PTSD 
Symptoms 0.00 0.01 -0.36 0.38 87.93 0.03 .980 
   Thought 
suppression 0.04 0.12 -0.52 0.65 87.51 0.38 .704 
   Depression 0.53 0.23 -0.27 1.41 86.65 2.37 .020 
   Anxiety 0.50 0.23 -0.29 1.37 87.54 2.27 .025 
   Stress -0.54 0.22 -1.24 0.26 87.28 -2.40 .018 
   Acceptance 0.37 0.32 -0.56 1.43 90.56 1.22 .224 
   Physical 
Symptoms 0.13 0.10 -0.41 0.71 84.66 1.26 .212 
   Alexithymia 0.16 0.21 -0.57 0.98 88.90 0.77 .441 
   Rumination -0.08 0.16 -0.71 0.62 87.72 -0.49 .629 
   Treatment 
Duration 0.00 0.01 -0.36 0.38 88.08 -0.13 .901 
Assessment 
Interval        
   Immediate Post 0.01 0.16 -0.62 0.71 222.02 0.09 .931 
   14-Day Post -0.05 0.16 -0.68 0.66 223.99 -0.28 .781 
   30-Day Post 0.02 0.17 -0.63 0.73 224.01 0.10 .923 
EW Condition  -0.18 0.26 -0.97 0.71 142.06 -0.72 .474 
Condition*Interval        
   EW Immediate 
Post 0.13 0.22 -0.62 0.96 220.58 0.60 .547 
   EW 14-Day Post 0.15 0.24 -0.62 1.01 222.98 0.65 .519 
   EW 30-Day Post 0.04 0.23 -0.72 0.90 222.65 0.17 .864 
  
Random effects. In addition to these fixed estimates, the random effects due to participant 
differences were significant. The variance in the location of individual intercepts was b = 0.17 
(SE = 0.03; 95% CI = 0.12 to 0.24; Wald Z = 5.47, p < .001). That figure equals the total 
variance around the intercept; the square root (standard deviation, i.e., 0.35) delineates the 68% 
confidence interval, and the double of that (i.e., 0.70) offers a 95% confidence interval or 
potential distance from the intercept based on individual differences. In addition, throughout the 
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other assessments, scores varied with a total variance of b = 0.11 (SE = .01; 95% CI = 0.09 to 
0.13; Wald Z = 10.44, p < .001). This variance converts to a 95% confidence interval of scores 
being +/- 0.66 units from the regression line.  
 Discussion of family loneliness. The mean family loneliness scores at baseline were very 
low. Neither condition had much impact on reports of loneliness; thus, the hypothesis that the DP 
condition would show greater reductions was not supported. Given that social withdrawal and 
interpersonal difficulties are significant symptoms associated with trauma, the component of the 
DP that addresses relationships with family and friends requires testing with samples reporting 
higher baselines of social and family loneliness. 
In-Session Differences  
Two methods were implemented to assess processes that might differ between conditions 
and participants within the in-person session. These were subjective units of distress (SUDS), 
rated by participants at various points during the intervention, and changes in negativity and 
positivity from early in the intervention to later in the intervention.  
Distress levels in session. During both interventions, participant SUDS were assessed 
numerous times. In the EW condition, ratings were requested five times per writing period, with 
the final ones per section assessing peak distress during that period. In the DP condition, SUDS 
were taken at the beginning and end of each section, with end SUDS assessing peak distress 
during that section. Figure 13 illustrates mean SUDS score trajectories per condition. For visual 
comparison the break periods were lined up between conditions (periods 9 and 16). These 
analyses were examined based on the treatment condition participants actually received, rather 
than as randomized (affecting one participant). They include the individual who only received 
half the DP intervention (total N = 86, 43 in each condition).  
	  130  
 
Figure 13. Estimated Trajectories of the Observed SUDS Scores as a Function of Treatment 
Group.  
   
 
Note: Periods 9 and 16 mark the beginning of a new intervention period after a break. SUDS in 
the EW condition were taken approximately every 7 minutes, with final SUDS per section 
assessing the highest levels during that section. SUDS in the DP condition were taken at the 
beginning and end of each section, with the latter rating the peak level for that section. 
 
Since the relationships between time and SUDS scores were not linear, linear statistical 
methods were not implemented. However, several observations can be made without statistical 
analyses. First, in both conditions participants arrived to the intervention with similar baseline 
arousal. A difference between conditions is then seen after 5-7 minutes of intervention whereby 
those in the DP condition reported a decrease in SUDS while those in the EW condition reported 
an increase. For the DP condition, this occurred at the close of Step 1, which provided 
psychoeducation and three demonstrations of autonomic responding to cognitions.  
	  131  
Next, leading up to the first break, the EW condition showed a continuous increase in 
arousal while the DP condition showed two peaks with some alleviation between them. Given 
the superior results for PTSD associated with the DP condition, particularly regarding frequency 
of symptoms, it may be that reaching peak distress levels twice in the first 20-30 minutes was 
beneficial.  
Upon return from the first break, both conditions showed reductions in distress; the EW 
participants remained above their baseline while the DP participants dropped below their 
baseline score. During the second intervention period, both conditions showed increasing arousal 
until a peak just before the break. However, for the DP condition there were three incremental 
peaks with some relief between them.  
After the second break, EW participants returned to baseline and DP participants returned 
to their previous sub-baseline score. During the third intervention period, the DP condition 
showed a rapid return to peak distress level, followed by gradual decline to a sub-baseline score. 
In contrast, the EW condition showed an increase in distress that was maintained through the 
end, with participants leaving the intervention more distressed than when they began the 
intervention, and than those completing the DP condition.  
Despite the final level of distress in the EW condition, the declining peak arousals in the 
presence of presumably the same stimuli (i.e., trauma memories) suggest the EW participants 
experienced habituation. In addition, given the significant effect of the EW intervention on 
reducing PTSD symptoms, and the congruence of these results with similar findings by Sloan et 
al. (2005), these results support the present study hypothesis and previous theorization that EW 
achieves its beneficial results, at least in part, by exposure and habituation.  
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For the DP condition, evidence of habituation is less clear. The peak distress level in the 
third section was higher than those in the middle section. However, the decline in SUDS from 
period 20 to 21 (intervention Step 10), which occurred while participants were confronted with 
the exact same stimuli as during the very first peak (fourth SUDS rating, intervention Step 2), 
suggests habituation to those stimuli. At Steps 2 and 10, participants were asked to endorse 
emotions triggered by consideration of the trauma. Thus participants appear to have experienced 
habituation to negative emotion words, which in Step 2 were cues for high arousal. In addition to 
that indication of habituation, the subsequent declines may be indicative of a broader habituation 
to trauma memories or cues. In addition to examining SUDS trajectories themselves, they were 
also considered in reference to patterns of change in PTSD symptoms. 
Comparisons of SUDS patterns based on changes in PTSD symptom changes. As 
discussed above, the MPSS-SR has been demonstrated to predict PTSD diagnoses with 93% 
accuracy using the cut-off score of 46 (Falsetti et al., 1993). In the present study, a cut-off score 
of 46 yielded the groups in Table 12 (above). Final classifications were based on participants’ 
30-day posts unless only the 14-day post or immediate post was completed. Chi-square analyses 
showed no significant differences between conditions at pre-test χ2 (1, N = 86) = 0.45, p = .500 
nor at final classification χ2 (5, N = 84) = 2.70, p = .747. 
To reduce the overlap between similar levels of change regardless of diagnosis, four 
groups were then identified based on logical symptom change intervals summarized in Table 37. 
A graphic of trajectories showing PTSD symptom levels per interval per treatment condition is 
provided in Figure 14.  
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Table 37. Groups Based on PTSD Symptom Change Ranges 
Category PTSD Symptom Change Range EW DP 
Great Improvement/Would 
Have Lost PTSD Diagnosis 
15 or more points of 
reduction in symptoms 23 23 
Some Improvement but Might 
Have Retained PTSD Diagnosis 
5-14.99 points of 
symptom reduction 7 6 
No Change in PTSD Symptoms Less than +/-5 points of change in symptoms. 6 8 
Worsened PTSD Symptoms 5 or more points of increase in symptoms 7 4 
 
Figure 14. PTSD Symptom Trajectories Based on Grouping by Overall Outcome and Condition 
   
 As can be seen, in both treatment conditions those who would go on to benefit the most 
(blue line) reported that improvements occurred at immediate-post and 14 days, with a 
	  134  
subsequent maintenance of those reductions. Those who showed moderate improvement (green) 
in both treatment conditions did not show much change at immediate post, reported a large 
reduction at 14 days, and then experienced a sizable loss in gains, particularly in the EW 
condition. This suggests that something occurred before the 30-day assessment to increase PTSD 
symptoms. Perhaps engaging in the assessment itself contributed to that outcome, which would 
be evidence of lack of habituation.  
In both conditions, those who would show no overall change in PTSD symptoms 
(orange) showed patterns of immediate worsening of symptoms followed by return to baseline at 
14 or 30 days. Since the immediate post assessed the two weeks prior to the in-person session, it 
may be that reactions such as anxiety regarding the upcoming intervention triggered an increase 
PTSD symptoms, which no longer occurred with simply filling out assessments, perhaps due to 
achieving some degree of resolution. Lastly, the group that would report worse symptoms at final 
post (purple) showed different patterns based on treatment condition. In the EW condition, 
similar to the no-change group these individuals reported worsening of symptoms at immediate 
post, but then continued worsening at 14 and 30 days. This may be indicative of fear of the 
intervention itself followed by on-going lack of resolution. In the DP condition, the worsened 
symptom group reported no changes at immediate post and even 14 days, followed by a late 
increase in symptoms at 30-day follow-up. The sudden increase may be unrelated to the 
intervention; alternatively it may reflect a phenomenon such as a behavioral change or the 
depletion of a resource that formerly suppressed these symptoms.  
 To examine for significant group differences at baseline, a 4 (PTSD symptom change 
categories) x 1 (baseline PTSD symptom scores) ANOVA was conducted within each condition. 
There were no significant differences at baseline in the EW condition. Results showed the 
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assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated (Levene Statistic (3, 37) = 5.03, p = .005) 
for the DP condition; thus, the Games-Howell correction was applied to post-hoc analyses. In the 
DP condition, the Great Improvement group significantly differed by a mean of 18.81 points (SE 
= 5.92; 95% CI = 2.43 to 35.18; p = .020) in baseline PTSD scores from the No Change group; 
and by 27.69 points (SE = 5.32; 95% CI = 12.67 to 42.70; p = .001) from the Worsened group. 
This suggests those in the DP condition whose scores later showed no change or worsened 
symptoms began the study with significantly fewer PTSD symptoms than those who benefitted 
from the intervention. One conclusion could be to avoid treating PTSD symptoms below a 
minimal threshold, but other evidence of interfering factors should be considered first. Next, 
these four patterns of symptom change were used to explore differences in SUDS trajectory 
patterns.  
SUDS patterns in the EW condition. In the EW condition (Figure 15 below), those who 
benefitted most (blue) showed a pattern of three declining peaks over the course of the 
intervention, suggesting high engagement with their trauma followed by decreased sensitivity per 
subsequent writing period. The next most improved group (green) showed a higher peak during 
the second writing period and increasing arousal at the end of the last writing period, suggesting 
habituation did not occur. In addition, the lower valleys after breaks, and the initial low peak in 
the third period may be indicative of conscious or unconscious efforts to disengage (e.g., through 
thought suppression, dissociation, or other avoidance), which is congruent with theory regarding 
safety behaviors as obstacles to habituation. The final peak suggests they left the intervention 
without resolution, and this was paralleled in their PTSD symptoms when they lost some of their 
treatment gains after 14 days. 
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Figure 15. Observed SUDS Levels in the EW Condition Based on Differences in PTSD Symptoms 
Between Pre-Test and Post. 
   
 
The SUDS pattern of the group that saw no reliable improvement (orange) showed earlier 
high arousal than two other groups, followed by a plateau from SUDS periods 4 to 6, deep 
valleys after breaks, delayed and jerky arousal in the middle writing period, and a lower peak 
than the Great Improvement group in the final writing period. This pattern may also be indicative 
of efforts to control or avoid arousal and a strong ability to disengage during breaks. The curve in 
the final section may only be mimicking habituation and simply show less engagement; the 
return to baseline PTSD symptoms at 14 and 30 days suggest that habituation was not achieved.  
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Finally, the EW group which reported Worse symptoms (purple) showed a pattern 
marked by the lowest peaks and an increasing peak at the end of the intervention. This pattern 
could be indicative of minimization of the trauma or lack of engagement, as well as difficulty 
avoiding or suppressing related thoughts at the end. Recall that this group reported worse PTSD 
symptoms at immediate post, 14-day post, and 30-day follow-up, suggesting that the exposure 
was insufficient to produce habituation.  
SUDS and PTSD symptom change patterns in the DP condition. In the DP condition 
(Figure 16 below), those whose PTSD symptoms improved the most (blue) showed two high and 
fairly equal peaks during the first part of the intervention, three lower and increasing peaks in the 
middle period, and a high peak followed by graduated declines in the third period, ending at 
lower arousal than when they began. The high peak in part three suggests lack of habituation; 
however, the absence of a peak at SUDS period 21 (during intervention Step 12), which repeats 
the stimuli from the first peak (Step 2 of the intervention, SUDS period 4), suggests habituation 
to emotions cued by the trauma. The large and reliable decreases in PTSD symptoms after the 
intervention suggest that broader habituation occurred as well.   
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Figure 16. Observed SUDS Levels in the DP Condition Based on Differences in PTSD Symptoms 
Between Pre-test and Post. 
   
 
Those who reported the next level of improvement (green) showed a similar pattern, 
differentiated by a higher first peak, an earlier highest peak in the middle section (when 
challenging maladaptive cognitions), and a lower peak in the final section (recalling the trauma). 
Unlike the three other groups, the high early peak in the middle section occurred during the 
cognitive challenging exercise, suggesting these individuals may have benefitted less due to 
maladaptive cognitions that were either more significant than in the other conditions or else not 
sufficiently addressed by the intervention. This theorized lack of cognitive resolution is 
congruent with the pattern of reduced PTSD symptoms at 14 days followed by significant loss of 
improvement at 30 days. Hence, the in-session SUDS suggest habituation but this was not 
reliably sustained. 
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The group that reported no reliable change (orange) showed a SUDS pattern 
characterized by very high arousal throughout, which increased in the third section, and with 
only minimal reductions during breaks. This pattern suggests they engaged with their trauma to a 
high degree, became emotionally dysregulated, and were unable to obtain relief even during 
breaks. This pattern suggests sensitization or increased responding to reminders of their trauma. 
Recall, however, that this group reported worse PTSD symptoms at immediate post, and a return 
to baseline at both subsequent assessments. This suggests that some time after the intervention 
they became habituated to reminders of the trauma, yet without experiencing resolution. Their 
sustained uncomfortable experience during the intervention may have reinforced the belief that 
avoidance of engagement is more effective than exposure. This raises questions about factors 
that can interfere with exposure leading to habituation. 
Lastly, the group that reported worse PTSD symptomatology at post (purple) showed the 
lowest peaks and valleys throughout the intervention and left the session with the same (lack of) 
distress as when they arrived. The first low peak (relative to others) may have been indicative of 
denial, minimization, or suppression of the effect of negative emotions associated with the 
trauma. Yet they did not deny negative emotions and endorsed as many as the other groups (that 
analysis is explored below). Since their PTSD symptoms later worsened, they either under-
reported arousal, successfully suppressed it, or perhaps dissociated their affect from their 
cognitions. As with the No Change group, the next peak was higher suggesting increasing 
acknowledgement of distress in the presence of negative cognitions about the trauma. 
Addressing maladaptive cognitions immediately after the break also showed a peak (albeit muted 
compared to the three other groups). The even lower peaks at SUDS periods 12 and 14 may be 
indicative of minimization or denial of anger, blame, shame, and guilt, and of distressing sensory 
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cues associated with the trauma. The final peak (during the recall of the trauma) is the lowest of 
all three groups. Given the outcome of worsened PTSD symptoms, and the pattern of low arousal 
during engagement with the trauma, there appears to be a relationship. However, at immediate 
post and 14 days, PTSD symptom reports remained at baseline. This may be indicative of 
delayed affective engagement with the trauma that would finally begin to occur after two weeks. 
Again, given the cognitive endorsement of many negative emotions related to the trauma, these 
individuals may not have intentionally blocked affective engagement. Other variables below may 
assist in determining attitudes toward such engagement. 
Discussion of SUDS patterns. These findings suggest that both conditions successfully 
triggered at least some emotional arousal, and participants who benefitted from the interventions 
most showed signs of habituation (i.e., less distress in the context of remembering their trauma) 
during the in-person session as well as afterwards. Those who improved to a moderate degree 
showed in-session habituation but an interruption or loss of habituation after 14 days, perhaps 
due to unresolved cognitive factors. Obstacles to in-session habituation were evident in those 
who saw no symptoms change or worsening of symptoms. These included affective under-
engagement as well as over-engagement. Deliberate and unintended factors could be involved, 
such as thought avoidance/suppression, rumination, dissociation, alexithymia, and efforts at 
acceptance that might be too ‘forced’ rather than ‘genuine’. To examine potentially conscious 
factors, trajectories of changes in thought suppression, acceptance, alexithymia, and rumination 
were next graphed according to the PTSD symptom change pattern groups. 
Combinations of processes. In-Session SUDS, PTSD symptom change, and thought 
suppression. Figure 17 illustrates the changes in thought suppression scores based on the groups 
of PTSD symptom change.  
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Figure 17. Changes in Thought Suppression (WBSI) Scores Based on PTSD Symptom Change by 
Condition 
    
 
As can be seen, in the EW condition the PTSD symptom increase group (purple), which 
also showed subdued SUDS during the intervention, was associated with the highest levels of 
thought suppression. This suggests there was intentional avoidance of engagement. In the DP 
condition, the group with worse symptomatology at 30 days endorsed low thought suppression 
immediately after the intervention, suggesting their subdued SUDS may have been due to a less 
deliberate behavior; perhaps dissociation or due to alexithymia. Nevertheless, there is an obvious 
relationship between their increasing thought suppression scores at 14- and 30-days and PTSD 
symptom scores at final post. Perhaps their ability to not engage was exhausted by that time and 
this led to thoughts becoming intrusive and conscious efforts to suppress them.  
In both treatment conditions, both groups that benefitted (blue, green) showed reductions 
in thought suppression, suggesting these reductions may have played a role in sustained lower 
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PSTD symptoms. In terms of dose-effect relationships, the unequal levels of reduction in thought 
suppression paralleled the unequal levels of reduction in PTSD symptoms between these groups. 
Lastly, the group that reported no overall change in PTSD symptoms also showed very little 
sustained change in thought suppression, and intermediate changes in both were parallel, 
suggesting a strong relationship between PTSD symptoms and active thought suppression. In the 
DP condition, this was the group that became very highly aroused for the duration of the 
intervention suggesting that, despite successful exposure, a desire to suppress the experience may 
have interfered with the ability to achieve habituation. This may be indicative of lacking 
acceptance not only of the trauma but perhaps of something like the intervention itself, or of the 
arousal triggered by it; something kept these emotions from dissipating below a fairly high 
baseline. 
In-Session SUDS, PTSD symptom change, and cognitive acceptance. Figure 18 illustrates 
the changes in cognitive acceptance scores based on the groups of PTSD symptom change.  
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Figure 18. Changes in Acceptance (CPOTS) Scores Based on PTSD Symptom Change by 
Condition 
   
 
 In the EW condition, those whose PTSD symptoms grew worse (purple), and whose 
SUDS appeared somewhat subdued, also reported low levels of acceptance before and after the 
intervention, which is congruent with theory regarding prolongation of PTSD symptoms. The 
EW group which reported no changes (oranges) in PTSD symptoms showed a pattern of increase 
and decrease in acceptance, as if trying to accept but without stable resolution. Lastly, the two 
groups who reported improvements in PTSD symptoms reported increases at 14 days but then 
were very divergent at 30 days; this may account for their difference in final PTSD symptoms. 
During the intervention their SUDS patterns were very similar, suggesting something more than 
exposure and arousal are necessary for greater symptom recovery, such as achieving cognitive 
acceptance. 
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In the DP condition, those whose PTSD symptoms worsened (and whose SUDS ratings 
were subdued relative to others) reported the greatest increases and highest final outcome score 
in acceptance. This supports the “sugarcoating” or trauma minimization theory of Honos-Webb 
et al. (2002), whereby cognitively endorsing ‘acceptance’ or ‘resolution’ of the trauma differs 
from actual achievement of those states. The two most improved groups also reported increases 
in acceptance, which is congruent with their SUDS patterns of arousal and habituation; however, 
exaggerated acceptance may also have been present in the less improved group. Lastly, the No 
Change group, whose SUDS ratings suggested high dysregulation during the intervention, 
reported unstable increases in acceptance, also possibly indicating a desire for acceptance which 
had not yet been achieved.  
Overall, it may be that efforts to prematurely endorse acceptance interfered with the 
habituation process, or that obstacles to ‘genuine’ acceptance overlapped with obstacles to 
habituation for those participants. It is noteworthy that the EW condition did not explicitly 
promote acceptance and changes on that indicator were quite varied. In contrast, the DP 
condition explicitly promoted acceptance throughout the intervention and all four groups 
reported increases. These reported increases may indicate a problem of demand characteristics 
whereby DP participants felt compelled to endorse greater acceptance than they had actually 
attained. The discrepancy between the conscious effort to achieve acceptance and genuinely 
experiencing it may also be illustrative of a finding by Wisco, Sloan, and Marx (2013); they 
reported that ‘positive reappraisal’ may have interfered with exposure and habituation. By saying 
a situation was “not as bad as it could have been”, victims may be avoiding acknowledgement of 
a loss and engaging in a ‘safety behavior’ that interferes with habituation.  
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In-Session SUDS, PTSD symptom change, alexithymia. Figure 19 illustrates the changes 
in alexithymia scores based on the groups of PTSD symptom change.  
Figure 19. Changes in Alexithymia (TAS-20) Scores Based on PTSD Symptom Change by 
Treatment Condition 
   
 
 Under both treatment conditions, the group that saw an increase in PTSD symptoms 
(purple) reported the highest levels of alexithymia, which is congruent with the observation that 
these individuals reported the lowest SUDS during the interventions. In the DP condition, while 
these individuals could endorse numerous negative emotions cognitively, they did not endorse 
very much actual arousal during the intervention. Thus, this scale (TAS-20) which assessed 
difficulty identifying and describing one’s feelings appears to have been accurately rated by this 
group. 
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 In the EW condition, those who showed no changes in PTSD symptoms (orange) 
reported the next highest alexithymia. In the DP condition, the non-improved group differed 
from that of the EW condition and other groups by their very high SUDS ratings; these 
individuals reported high arousal throughout, which is consistent with their lower alexithymia 
scores. Under both treatment conditions, the two groups that improved in PTSD symptoms (blue, 
green) showed at least marginal reductions in alexithymia, which were sustained. This suggests 
both interventions may have helped participants who benefitted to identify and describe their 
emotions. Yet the immediate increase in alexithymia reported by the two other groups, and the 
subsequent volatility in their scores, is difficult to interpret conclusively.   
In-Session SUDS, PTSD symptom change, and rumination. Figure 20 illustrates the 
changes in rumination scores based on the groups of PTSD symptom change.  
Figure 20. Changes in Rumination (RRS) Scores Based on PTSD Symptom Change by Condition 
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 Rumination patterns differed between conditions except among those who reported the 
most improvement in PTSD symptoms (blue); these latter individuals reported a sustained 
reduction in rumination. In the EW condition, the highest ruminators were also those whose 
PTSD symptoms were worse at 30 days (purple). In the DP condition, those who would report 
worse symptoms showed a temporary reduction in rumination but a return to baseline at 30 days. 
These patterns support the idea that resources consciously or unconsciously used to avoid high 
arousal during the intervention (such as dissociating or denying a current impact from past 
trauma) may have become exhausted at two or four weeks post, resulting in increases in intrusive 
thoughts, decreases in concentration, and other symptoms of PTSD that overlap with rumination. 
For those who reported a small improvement in PTSD symptoms at final post (green), 
rumination patterns differed by treatment condition. In the EW condition, rumination ended 
below baseline while in the DP condition it rose above baseline. The EW pattern showed a 
pattern akin to habituation whereby rumination was higher immediately after the intervention but 
then reduced at 14 days and fell even lower at 30 days, suggesting habituation to trauma 
memories. In the DP condition, immediate post showed a reduction in rumination from baseline, 
but the 14-day post and 30-day follow-up showed increases and ended above baseline; since this 
group did not improve as much as others, this pattern suggesting ruminative thoughts may have 
begun to interfere with recovery. 
Changes in negative expression during session. Under both conditions, change in 
expression of negative emotions was measured although in different ways. In the EW condition, 
the LIWC software (Pennebaker & Francis, 1999) was implemented to identify the percentage of 
words in the first and last written narratives that were negative emotion words. Similarly, in the 
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DP conditions, participants were shown a list of negative emotions at Step 2 and Step 12; the 
numbers endorsed at these steps were then converted to percentages for comparison with the EW 
condition. Mean percentages of negative words used are reported in Table 38 by intervention 
period for each condition and degree of PTSD symptom change. 
Table 38. Mean Percentage of Negative Words Based on Treatment Condition and PTSD 
Symptom Change Group.  
Treatment 
Condition 
Intervention 
Period 
Great 
Improvement 
Some 
Improvement No Change 
Worse 
Symptoms 
First Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
3.4% 
(2.6, -1.8 to 8.7) 
3.3% 
(4.6, -5.9 to 
12.6) 
3.6% 
(5.5, -7.3 to 
14.6) 
2.9% 
(4.6, -6.3 to 
12.2) 
Final Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
3.3% 
(1.4, -0.5 to 6.0) 
3.8% 
(2.5, -1.1 to 8.7) 
3.4% 
(2.9, -2.4 to 9.2) 
3.4% 
(2.5, -1.5 to 8.3) 
Expressive 
Writing 
Difference -0.1% 0.5% -0.2% 0.5% 
First Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
30.2% 
(2.6, 24.9 to 
35.4) 
33.2% 
(5.0, 23.2 to 
43.2) 
23.2% 
(4.3, 14.5 to 
31.8) 
32.0% 
(6.1, 19.8 to 
44.3) 
Final Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
7.7% 
(1.4, 4.9 to 10.4) 
7.3% 
(2.7, 2.0 to 12.6) 
9.1% 
(2.3, 4.6 to 13.7) 
16.2% 
(3.3, 9.7 to 22.7) 
Directive 
Protocol 
Difference -22.5% -25.9% -14.1% -15.8% 
 
A repeated measures 2 (conditions) x 2 (assessment intervals) x 4 (levels of PTSD 
symptom change) ANOVA suggested that changes in negativity differed significantly based on 
time (F(1, 73) = 43.54, p < .001, Partial Eta2 = 0.37); condition (F(1, 73) = 59.08, p < .001, 
Partial Eta2 = 0.45); and the interaction of time and treatment condition (F(1, 73) = 44.87, p < 
.001, Partial Eta2 = 0.38). However, the interaction of time, condition, and PTSD categories was 
not statistically significant (F(3, 73) = 0.89, p = .453, Partial Eta2 = 0.04).  
Changes in positivity during session. Mean percentages of negative words used are 
reported in Table 39 by intervention period and degree of PTSD symptom change. 
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Table 39. Mean Percentages of Positive Words Based on Intervention Period, Treatment 
Condition, and PTSD Symptom Change Group. 
Treatment 
Condition 
Intervention 
Period 
Great 
Improvement 
Some 
Improvement No Change 
Worse 
Symptoms 
First Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
2.2% 
(1.3, -0.1 to 4.0) 
2.6% 
(2.4, -2.2 to 7.3) 
2.1% 
(2.8, -3.5 to 7.7) 
2.8% 
(2.4, -2.0 to 7.5) 
Final Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
3.1% 
(1.9, -0.1 to 6.8) 
2.8% 
(3.3, -3.8 to 9.4) 
3.3% 
(3.3, -3.8 to 9.4) 
3.0% 
(3.3, -3.6 to 9.6) 
Expressive 
Writing 
Difference 0.9% 0.2% 1.2% 0.2% 
First Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
10.6% 
(1.3, 7.9 to 13.3) 
6.3% 
(2.6, 1.2 to 11.5) 
8.3% 
(2.2, 3.9 to 12.8) 
9.6% 
(3.2, 3.4 to 15.9) 
Final Period 
(SE, 95% CI) 
17.3% 
(1.9, 13.5 to 
21.0) 
10.8% 
(3.6, 3.6 to 18.0) 
9.9% 
(3.1, 3.7 to 16.1) 
10.0% 
(4.4, 1.2 to 18.8) 
Directive 
Protocol 
Difference 6.7% 4.5% 1.6% 0.4% 
 
A repeated measures 2 (conditions) x 2 (assessment intervals) x 4 (levels of PTSD 
symptom change) ANOVA suggested that changes in positivity differed significantly based on 
time (F(1, 73) = 6.38, p = .014, Partial Eta2 = 0.08) and treatment condition (F(1, 73) = 16.68, p 
< .001, Partial Eta2 = 0.19). The interaction of time, treatment condition, and PTSD change type 
was not significant (F(3, 73) = 1.10, p = .354). As can be seen, both conditions and all PTSD 
change categories showed increases in positivity at the end of the intervention. In the DP 
condition, while not statistically significant, those who improved most and those who reported a 
moderate improvement both endorsed 5% more positive words than those who did not improve 
or reported worsening of symptoms.  
 Discussion of negative and positive emotional expression. While extensive research by 
Pennebaker and colleagues suggests that symptom improvement is associated with reductions in 
negative and increases in positive expression, in the present study these relationship were not 
found statistically. However, in the DP condition the two subgroups whose PTSD symptoms had 
improved at final post showed a 75% reduction in endorsement of negative emotions as opposed 
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to only a 50% reduction among those whose PTSD symptoms grew worse or remained close to 
their baseline score. This provides further evidence for habituation as a mechanism of change. 
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DISCUSSION 
This study examined the effectiveness of two treatment protocols in reducing PTSD 
symptoms, depressive symptoms, and physical illness symptoms in a non-clinical sample. Both 
treatments showed clinically and statistically significant reductions in PTSD symptoms at 14-
days post-intervention which were largely maintained at 30-day follow-up. The DP condition 
showed significantly larger reduction in symptoms than the EW condition. Physical illness 
symptoms also saw significant reductions under both conditions, with no significant differences 
between conditions. Depressive symptom reductions were significant for the DP condition but 
not for the EW condition. It should be noted, however, that baseline depression scores were only 
in the mild range. 
 When PTSD symptom change was examined in terms of frequency and severity, the 
distinguishing factor between treatment conditions was in the frequency of symptoms. 
Statistically, both conditions had comparable effects on the severity of symptoms. This suggests 
both conditions reduced severity to a comparable degree, but that DP participants reported fewer 
occasions of symptoms such as intrusive thoughts or dreams, or being on edge and easily 
startled. Additional variables were assessed to help understand mechanisms that could help 
explain such differences. 
 The treatment conditions were also explored for differing outcomes in PTSD diagnostic 
classification and for overall symptom changes. Unlike the ITT analyses above, categorizations 
were based on actual intervention received and final known scores rather than means estimated 
for missing data. Both conditions began with a comparable number of participants who would 
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have met PTSD diagnostic criteria according to a validated symptom cut-off score, and both saw 
a high percentage of people who no longer met the cut-off score for PTSD, with a slightly higher 
success ratio for the DP condition. Among those whose symptom scores would have retained the 
PTSD classification, symptoms were reduced under both conditions, and in the DP condition the 
mean reduction was nearly twice as high than the EW condition. 
When considered regardless of PTSD cut-off scores at baseline, using last-known scores 
as the final post score, both conditions were evenly represented in these four groups: 53% of the 
sample showed a large reductions in symptoms; 15% reported a modest reduction in symptoms; 
16% reported no substantive change; and 13% reported a worsening of symptoms. Exploration of 
group baseline differences showed that in the DP condition the latter two groups had begun with 
significantly lower symptom scores than those who would improve the most. This would seem to 
support a philosophy of not providing trauma treatment to victims who present with minimal 
symptomatology. However, this baseline difference was not found in the EW condition, and the 
findings regarding arousal levels during the interventions suggest that affective non-engagement 
may have interfered with symptom reduction. If these obstacles can be identified and mitigated 
during active treatment, more people might benefit from treating their trauma symptoms rather 
than leaving them unaddressed.  
 Questions regarding mechanisms of change were anticipated by the present study and 
several variables were assessed to help answer them. Among them were in-session differences in 
patterns of arousal or distress (SUDS scores) throughout the intervention. These were further 
differentiated based on the outcomes in PTSD symptom change. In the EW condition, the most 
improved group showed a SUDS pattern suggestive of habituation (i.e., immediate increases in 
arousal at the beginning of writing periods and decreasing peak levels at subsequent writing 
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periods). The moderately improved and no-change groups showed plateaus before reaching peak 
arousal levels, suggesting avoidance, and peak patterns that were unclear regarding habituation. 
The group that reported worsening of symptoms showed the lowest peaks throughout, and 
increasing distress at the end of the intervention, which is also incongruent with habituation. 
Thus, while several groups may have demonstrated an in-session decrease in arousal in the 
presence of trauma memories, only the most improved group showed a pattern that suggests 
habituation. In addition, only the most improved group showed evidence of habituation in its 
pattern of follow-up assessments. The other groups appeared to move toward habituation and 
then showed signs of re-sensitization to trauma cues.  
 In the DP condition, the SUDS pattern for the most improved group could be indicative 
of habituation to emotions cued by the trauma; however, the protocol structure, which placed the 
full trauma narrative in the final section, may have obstructed better evidence for habituation. 
Nevertheless, the reduced PTSD symptoms at all follow-up assessments suggest that habituation 
did, in fact, occur.  
The group with modest improvement showed similar in-session arousal levels as the most 
improved group, distinguished only by greater arousal during the cognition challenging section. 
It may be that this group had more unresolved disturbing cognitions regarding their trauma. The 
no-change group was remarkable for its very high levels of arousal throughout, which suggested 
willingness to engage with their trauma but lack of achieving habituation despite the exposure. 
This highlighted important questions regarding the identification and removal of potential 
obstacles to trauma recovery; it may counterproductive to use exposure with individuals who 
lack resources to benefit from it.  
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Lastly, the group that reported worsening of symptoms may also have had barriers to 
habituation. Their in-session SUDS pattern was remarkable for very low peaks and also very low 
valleys after breaks, as if they were able to affectively disengage from their feelings or thoughts 
about the trauma despite cognitive acknowledgement of them. Yet it is also unclear whether the 
seeming lack of engagement was due to conscious efforts or other factors. An argument for 
conscious denial, minimization, or dismissal of the trauma and its impact would have been 
plausible if these individuals had endorsed significantly fewer negative emotion words than the 
improved group, but this was not the case. In fact, at the close of the DP intervention they 
endorsed many more negative emotions than the other groups. They also did not “gloss over” 
their trauma by endorsing more positive words than others. It seems more plausible that some 
level of dissociation occurred by which very negative cognitions simply did not cause much 
arousal during the intervention, but that such dissociation did not continue during subsequent 
weeks. This was supported by findings that in both conditions, the worsened-symptom group 
reported the highest levels of alexithymia. The DP condition was associated with a significant 
decrease in alexithymia overall, but the worsened-symptom group showed a substantive increase 
after 14 days. 
 Regarding the other factors assessed, individuals who reported being more prone to 
rumination and/or suppressing of unwanted thoughts, and/or less accepting of their trauma, 
generally showed less reduction in PTSD symptoms at 30 days post-intervention than those with 
lower rumination and thought suppression scores, and higher cognitive acceptance scores. 
However, self-reports on acceptance and rumination may not have been reliable. In the DP 
condition, those who reported least improvement or even increases in PTSD symptoms also 
endorsed increases in cognitive acceptance of their trauma at 30 days post-intervention. In 
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contrast, their first and last reports of thought suppression were both fairly high, and behaviorally 
their reports of distress during the intervention appeared rather subdued, suggesting difficulty 
achieving genuine acceptance of their trauma and allowing corresponding emotions to be 
experienced and achieve habituation.  
Regarding the DP’s designed intention to promote changes in thought suppression, 
acceptance, rumination, and alexithymia, the results suggest the DP condition yielded significant 
improvements in all four. However, the improvements were only significantly better than those 
of the EW condition for thought suppression and acceptance, and for rumination at 14 days but 
not at 30 days. In addition, regarding acceptance and rumination, the DP condition may have 
suffered demand effects. Some participants may have exaggerated their increases in acceptance 
and their reductions in rumination since these were promoted as healthy and desirable. 
Nevertheless, high levels of thought suppression, rumination, and alexithymia, and low levels of 
acceptance, were associated with PTSD symptom maintenance and deterioration, and the 
evidence shows that the DP condition succeeded to some degree in their manipulation.  
Overall, both treatments offer great potential in helping victims of trauma to reduce 
PTSD symptoms. The DP condition demonstrated additional effects associated with addressing 
potential barriers, and such techniques or treatment targets could be further improved or 
developed to reduce their influence during other trauma interventions. For example, expressive 
writing protocols could be written to include lists of emotion words, and psychoeducation about 
thought suppression and affective dissociation could be provided to improve the likelihood that 
participants not engage in safety behaviors that obstruct exposure and habituation.  
Lastly, this study offers strong initial support for the argument that in the space of as little 
as two hours, much can be done to reduce PTSD symptoms. This was true whether or not the 
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participant engaged with the therapist or primarily spent most of the time writing. As a personal 
observation, participants generally left these sessions remarking they were “exhausted”, with 
nothing more to write or say. That in itself may be a testimony to an additional benefit from 
massed rather than distributed exposure. 
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LIMITATIONS 
This study has several potential limitations:   
Therapist interaction. The DP and EW conditions were not equivalent in terms of 
therapist interaction. In both conditions, the therapist/researcher was present to answer questions 
and ensure adequate understanding of the protocol instructions. However, given the simplicity of 
EW instructions, few questions were asked. In the DP condition, the entire session involved 
therapist guidance, feedback, and prompting. This inequality in therapist interaction was justified 
because what was primarily being tested and compared in this study was the degree to which 
symptom change could be achieved in the same limited time provided by EW protocols.  
Assumptions. This study assumed the construct validity of PTSD, and that a large 
percentage of victims of trauma would have a history of physical illness complaints. It also 
assumed that cognitive and emotional avoidance would be associated with PTSD symptoms. In 
addition, this study assumed that the instruments utilized were valid, reliable measures of 
behaviors, psychological constructs, and psychopathologies such as PTSD.  
This study further assumed that a traumatic memory would have identifiable stimuli or 
“triggers”, and that trauma involves many of these features: intrusive thoughts/dreams of the 
event, psychological distress and physiological arousal caused by reminders of the event, 
avoidance of thoughts/places/reminders, restricted affect, foreboding about the future, irritability 
and outbursts of anger, hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating, being easily startled, and 
difficulty sleeping. This study assumed independence of groups and that participants would not 
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communicate with each other. A normal distribution of responses was also assumed, and data 
were transformed to better approximate normal distributions.   
Internal validity. Random assignment was used to minimize the impact of individual 
differences, yet this method assumes that differences were balanced by this process. 
Missing data/attrition. Several post-assessment scores were not completed by participants 
and estimation techniques were incorporated. Patterns for missingness were identified but 
mechanisms for missingness were impossible to determine conclusively, and thus some of the 
estimates may be biased by the estimation techniques.   
Testing effects and instrumentation. The hypotheses of this study assumed that prolonged 
exposure to assessment instruments themselves could foster habituation and cognitive processing 
and thereby alter symptom outcomes regardless of treatment condition. For this reason, 
assessment instruments were selected that minimized consideration of specific details or 
emotions related to the trauma. However, there may have been an effect from the contacting of 
participants at 14- and 30-day posts that may not be present when these treatments are 
administered outside the context of a study.  
External validity. There were several limitations to external validity or generalizability. 
First, this study was limited by not requiring participants to meet criteria for a PTSD diagnosis; 
only sufficient severity of symptoms was required to be able to assess for clinically significant 
changes. Thus, results may not generalize to individuals diagnosed with PTSD.  
Perhaps a greater threat to generalization of findings, participants might previously have: 
received treatment or talked to others about their trauma; engaged in “healthy” practices such as 
keeping a journal, meditating, or practicing mindfulness; experienced numerous traumas or a 
single event; and/or the trauma may have occurred recently or many years prior to this study 
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(i.e., maturation may differentiate subjects). Yet the allowance of these differences, and the 
randomization process, may also strengthen the generalizability of these results.  
Lastly, results from interventions with 18-24 year-old college students may not apply to 
people with alternative educational backgrounds, or to younger adolescents or older adults, or to 
ethnicities that differ from the studied sample. In addition, the setting of a university laboratory, 
the incentive of research credit and a possibly winning a $50 gift card, the presence of 
researchers, and the careful administration of, and adherence to, protocols may have influenced 
results. Different results may occur under less controlled conditions, without the presence of 
researchers, without course-credit or financial incentives, and in environments such as 
community mental health centers where other treatments may be offered concurrently.     
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Group A instructions 
Session 1, 2, & 3:  
On a scale of 0 to 100 (0=calm, 100=very bothered or distressed), how are you feeling right 
now? ____ 
 
For the next 30-35 minutes, I would like you to write your very deepest thoughts and feelings 
about the most disturbing or traumatic experience of your entire life. In your writing, I’d like you 
to really let go and explore your very deepest emotions and thoughts. You might tie this trauma 
to your childhood, your relationships with others, including parents, romantic partners, friends 
or relatives. You may also link this event to your past, your present or your future; or to who you 
have been, who you would like to be, or who you are now. After a break I will ask you to write 
for 25 minutes again, [and then a third time as well]. You may write about the same general 
issues or experiences during each writing session or choose different topics each time. Not 
everyone has had a single trauma but all of us have had major conflicts or stressors – and you 
can write about these as well. All of your writing will be completely confidential. Don’t worry 
about spelling, grammar or sentence structure. The only rule is that once you begin writing, you 
continue until the time is up. You may begin. 
 
(At 8, 16, and 24 minutes) 
Since the last time I asked, on a scale of 0 to 100 (0=calm, 100=very bothered or distressed), 
what has been your highest level of distress? ____ 
 
(After 30-35 minutes) 
We are now going to take a 10 minute break. However, before we do, I’d like to get a rating of how you 
felt during the writing. On a scale of 0 to 100 (0=calm, 100=very bothered or distressed), what was 
your highest level of distress during this exercise? ____ 
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 (Directive Protocol) 
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Participant ID:    
 
  
RATING SHEET FOR RESEARCHER WARMTH AND CLARITY, AND 
PARTICIPANT ENGAGEMENT 
 
Instructions: As you watch, rate the administrator, participant or both (white boxes): 
0 = Not at all/No 1 = Somewhat  2 = Very much/Yes 
 
 
During the first 5 minutes: 
 
The researcher… Warmth Clarity Reception 
     Greets the participant with warmth. 0    1    2   
     Makes eye contact. 0    1    2    
     Warmly asks if the participant is ready. 0    1    2   
     Presents the instructions clearly.   0    1    2  
Did the participant understand & engage?   0    1    2 
 
Part 2 
The researcher… Warmth Clarity Reception 
Warmly asks if the participant is ready. 0    1    2   
Presents the instructions clearly.   0    1    2  
Did the participant understand & engage?   0    1    2 
 
Part 3 
The researcher… Warmth Clarity Reception 
Warmly asks if the participant is ready. 0    1    2   
Presents the instructions clearly.   0    1    2  
Did the participant understand & engage?   0    1    2 
Researcher ends the session with warmth and concern. 0    1    2   
 
 
COLUMN TOTALS    
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CHECKLIST FOR GROUP B ADMINISTRATION 
 
What personal code did you enter on the online questionnaire?    (name of your 
first pet and the number of siblings you have (ex. Kitty4). If you never had a pet, use a 
favorite musician plus number of siblings (ex. BeastyBoys8).  Today’s Date:    
 
CHECKLIST FOR GROUP  B  ADMINISTRATION 
 
 ___Stopwatch ___Tissues! Consent    Comm.Resources    2 protocols  2 pens 
 
  √ The researcher… 
   Greets the participant with warmth. (eye contact) 
        Thanks them for coming. 
        Asks about needing the bathroom. 
        Asks about being OK to stay up to 2 hours. 
        Worried about car getting towed or other distractions? 
        Says there will be 3 sections and 2 breaks. 
        Obtains signed informed consent. 
   Warmly asks if the participant is ready. 
   Starts the timer. 
   Gives a copy of the packet. 
P1 SUDS  Take opening SUDS. 
Beg Hi  Reads page 1 aloud clearly.  
   Probes for understanding. 
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on this page. 
P2 SUDS   Take opening SUDS. Reads the 2nd page aloud clearly. 
Beg Hi ** “These tissues are here on purpose. It’s normal to get a little runny…” 
   After – THERAPIST READS THE CIRCLED EMOTIONS OUT LOUD. 
Say something like, “Have you ever identified so many different emotions? 
No wonder this experience has been so difficult.” 
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on this page. 
P3 SUDS  Take opening SUDS. 
Beg Hi  Reads the 3rd page aloud clearly. 
   AFTER – THERAPIST READS THEM ALOUD. 
“So despite all the negatives, you still found some positives. Had you 
considered that before?” 
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P4 SUDS  Take opening SUDS. 
Beg Hi  Reads the 4th page aloud clearly. 
   After- Read them ALOUD and say something like, “We’ll discuss some of 
these after the break.” 
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
  ** Stops at 30 minutes?  List actual duration: 
   Announces a break.  
   Instruct to disengage, walk, bathroom, call/text. 
  ** Times the break. 
   The break is no less than 4 minutes. 
   Warmly asks if the participant is ready. 
  **      Starts the timer. 
P5 SUDS  Take opening SUDS.     
Beg Hi  Reads the 5th page aloud clearly. 
   Make sure it’s something specific about the participant (“I” not “they”). 
It’s OK to mention something they wrote in Step 4. 
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  **      Starts the timer. 
P8 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 8th page aloud clearly. 
Clarify that there may be a gap between NOW and FUTURE. Help them to 
see negative feelings like a puppy at the door, instead of fighting to keep 
the door closed, let it come in. It will sniff you and probably leave soon. 
   
Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P9 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 9th page aloud clearly. 
   Make sure they included emotions and not just events.  
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P10 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 10th page aloud clearly. 
   Read their choices aloud. Acknowledge if fewer than before. 
Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P11 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 11th page aloud clearly. 
   Read their choices aloud. Acknowledge if more than before. 
Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P12 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 12th page aloud clearly. 
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
  ** Stops at 30 minutes?  List actual duration: 
   Explains/understands the intervention phase is complete & 3 posts must be 
done online: now, at 14 days, and 30 days. 
   Warmly assesses current well-being of participant. 
   Gives therapy resources form. 
  Y  N Should this participant be monitored to ensure safety? 
Please describe any other deviations from the protocol, or different metaphors used to 
explain concepts. 
   Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P6 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 6th page aloud clearly. 
Try to help them see the guilty person with pity, or at least as no more than 
children lacking in resources, skills, etc. to meet higher expectations. 
   
Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
P7 SUDS   Take opening SUDS.  
Beg Hi  Reads the 7th page aloud clearly. 
After – Mention that they should practice exposure at home.  Give the 
example of a bridge – escaping to feel comfortable doesn’t cure it.  
   
Asks for the highest SUDS reached on page. 
  ** Stops at 30 minutes?  List actual duration: 
   Announces a break.  
   Instruct to disengage, walk, bathroom, call/text. 
  ** Times the break. 
   The break is no less than 4 minutes. 
   Warmly asks if the participant is ready. 
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INVITATION 
 
Dear Student,  
 
Your name came up because on the Sona screener survey you indicated that in the past you 
witnessed or experienced things that, although fairly common, can be somewhat intrusive and 
difficult to forget or ignore. 
 
I am a graduate student at Ole Miss and I’m working on a study that is testing two brief ways of 
helping people become less affected by unpleasant or intrusive memories. They are all based on 
a series of writing exercises. We are looking for people to participate in this valuable research 
project. 
 
This study offers up to 4 hours of research credit. It requires filling out questionnaires once 
online before the in-person session (15-30 minutes each); an in-person session estimated at 100-
120 minutes; and three follow-up questionnaires (15-30 minutes each). You will also have two 
chances to win a $50 gift card to vendors like Target, Amazon, and Starbucks. This study has 
been reviewed by The University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board.  
 
If you wish to participate, please e-mail me back so I can send you a link to the first 
questionnaire and get started. Your participation will be kept completely confidential.  
 
If you are currently in treatment, YOU SHOULD FIRST talk to your 
therapist about whether or not participation in this study is consistent with 
your therapy goals. 
 
You can really help young scientists like me to better understand how to provide treatments that 
work for people. Do you have any questions? If so, e-mail me back or call me at 443-370-2606. 
 
Thank you! 
Fernando 
 
Fernando Alessandri, M.A. 
Graduate Student, Clinical Psychology  
University of Mississippi 
falessan@go.olemiss.edu 
443-370-2606 
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E-MAIL IF THEY ANSWER THEY WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE 
 
Dear [Name of Student],  
 
 Thank you for agreeing to participate in my study. Below you will find a link to the first 
questionnaire to get started.  
 
Please notify me when you complete that questionnaire. You will then receive a link so 
you can schedule your in-person session on Sona.  
 
[Qualtrics link for Time 1] 
 
Thank you again for your interest and participation! 
 
--Fernando 
 
Fernando Alessandri, M.A. 
Graduate Student, Clinical Psychology  
University of Mississippi 
falessan@go.olemiss.edu 
443-370-2606 
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Demographics 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer as best fits your situation. 
What is your biological sex? Male/ Female 
What is your age? 
What is your height (approximately)? 
What is your current weight (approximately)? 
Which of these best describes your racial/ethnic background?  
Black/African  White/Caucasian  Latino/Hispanic   Native American   Multiracial 
Asian    Other 
What is your marital status?  
Single/Never Married 
Single/Living with a Romantic Partner Married 
Divorced Widowed 
Prefer not to say 
Who do you currently live with? (check as many as apply) Alone 
Roommates 
Romantic partner 
Spouse 
Parent(s) 
My children or step-children Other relative(s) 
What is your religious background? 
How often do you participate in religious activity (including by yourself such as prayer)?  
Daily 
2-3 Times a Week 
Once a Week 
2-3 Times a Month Once a Month 
Less than Once a Month Never 
What is your sexual orientation?  
Rather not say 
Not sure  
Straight/Heterosexual  
LGBT/Homosexual 
What year of college are you in? 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Graduate Student 
What was your GPA before the start of this semester (rounded off)? 
Estimate your current semester GPA (or final GPA if no longer taking classes). 
How many bedrooms are in the place you grew up in? 
How many bathrooms are in the place you grew up in? 
What was the highest level of education your mother (or female guardian) received?  
Not applicable 
8th Grade 
Some High School 
High School Degree or GED  
 Some college 
Associate Degree Bachelor's Degree 
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Master's Degree 
Doctoral Degree 
What was the highest level of education your father (or male guardian) received?  
Not applicable 
8th Grade 
Some High School 
High School Degree or GED  
 Some college 
Associate Degree Bachelor's Degree 
Master's Degree 
Doctoral Degree 
Are you currently working in addition to going to school?  
No 
No, but looking for work. 
Yes, part-time 
Yes, full time (40 hours/week) 
Are you a member of a fraternity or sorority? Yes  No 
 
 
Health Behaviors 
 
The following questions are about behaviors related to health. As with the entire study, all 
answers will be confidential.  
If employed, in the past 30 days, how many days have you missed work due to illness? 
In the past 30 days, how many days have you missed classes due to illness? 
In the past 30 days, how many times have you received illness-related services at a health clinic 
or hospital? 
In the past 30 days, how many times have you received services at a counseling or psychological 
services center? 
In the past 30 days, how many times have you consulted with a religious figure about troubling 
issues in your life? 
In the past 14 days, how many times have you journaled or written a blog about troubling issues 
in your life? 
In the past 14 days, how many times have you talked to a friend or family member about 
troubling issues in your life? 
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Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic Languidness (PILL) 
 
On the following pages several common symptoms or bodily sensations are listed.  Most people 
have experienced most of them at one time or another.  We are currently interested in finding out 
how prevalent each symptom is among college students.  All data will be confidential. 
For all items, use the following scale: 
 
A = have never or almost never experienced the symptom 
B = less than 3 or 4 times per year 
C = every month or so 
D = every week or so 
E = more than once every week 
 
For example, if your eyes tend to water once every week or two, you would choose D for item #1. 
1.  Eyes water         _______ 
2. Itching or painful eyes       _______ 
3. Ringing in ears        _______ 
4. Temporary deafness or hard of hearing     _______ 
5. Lump in throat        _______ 
6. Choking sensations        _______ 
7. Sneezing spells        _______ 
8. Running nose         _______ 
9. Congested nose        _______ 
10. Bleeding nose         _______ 
11. Asthma or wheezing        _______ 
12. Coughing         _______ 
13. Out of breath         _______  
14. Swollen ankles        _______ 
15. Chest pains         _______ 
16. Racing heart         _______ 
17. Cold hands or feet even in hot weather     _______ 
18. Leg cramps         _______  
19. Insomnia         _______ 
20. Toothaches         _______ 
21. Upset stomach         _______ 
22. Indigestion         _______ 
23. Heartburn         _______ 
24. Severe pains or cramps in stomach      _______ 
25. Diarrhea         _______ 
26. Constipation         _______ 
27. Hemorrhoids         _______ 
28. Swollen joints         _______ 
29.  Stiff muscles         _______  
30. Back pains         _______ 
31. Sensitive or tender skin       _______  
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32. Face flushes         _______ 
33. Severe itching         _______ 
34. Skin breaks out in rash       _______ 
35. Acne or pimples on face       _______ 
36. Acne or pimples other than face      _______ 
37. Boils          _______ 
38. Sweat even in cold weather       _______ 
39. Strong reactions to insect bites      _______ 
40. Headaches         _______ 
41. Sensation of pressure in head       _______ 
42. Hot flashes         _______ 
43. Chills          _______  
44. Dizziness         _______ 
45. Feel faint         _______ 
46. Numbness or tingling in any part of body     _______ 
47. Twitching of eyelid        _______ 
48. Twitching other than eyelid       _______ 
49. Hands tremble or shake       _______ 
50. Stiff joints         _______ 
51. Sore muscles         _______ 
52. Sore throat         _______ 
53. Sunburn          _______ 
54. Nausea         _______ 
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Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale-21 Item Version (DASS-21) 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the 
statement applied to you over the past 7 days. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend 
too much time on any statement. 
 
The rating scale is as follows:  
0 - Did not apply to me at all - NEVER 
1 - Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time - SOMETIMES 
2 - Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time - OFTEN  
3 - Applied to me very much, or most of the time - ALMOST ALWAYS  
 
1.  I found it hard to wind down  0 1 2 3 
2.  I was aware of dryness of my mouth  0 1 2 3 
3.  I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all  0 1 2 3 
4.  I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)  0 1 2 3 
5.  I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things  0 1 2 3 
6.  I tended to over-react to situations  0 1 2 3 
7.  I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands)  0 1 2 3 
8.  I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy  0 1 2 3 
9.  I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of 
myself 
0 1 2 3 
10.  I felt that I had nothing to look forward to  0 1 2 3 
11.  I found myself getting agitated  0 1 2 3 
12.  I found it difficult to relax  0 1 2 3 
13.  I felt down-hearted and blue  0 1 2 3 
14.  I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was 
doing  
0 1 2 3 
15.  I felt I was close to panic  0 1 2 3 
16.  I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything  0 1 2 3 
17.  I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person  0 1 2 3 
18.  I felt that I was rather touchy  0 1 2 3 
19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (eg, 
sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)  0 1 2 3 
20  I felt scared without any good reason  0 1 2 3 
21  I felt that life was meaningless  0 1 2 3 
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 Social and Emotional Loneliness Scale for Adults-Short Version (SELSA-S) 
 
Please take a moment to think about your relationships over the last 2 weeks. Please circle the 
number that best reflects the degree to which each of the following statements describes your 
thoughts and feelings. 
 
Disagree                                                                               
Agree  
Strongly                                                                            
Strongly 
1. I feel alone when I am with my family. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel part of a group of friends. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I have a romantic partner with whom I 
share my most intimate thoughts and 
feelings.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. There is no one in my family I can 
depend on for support and 
encouragement, but I wish there was.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. My friends understand my motives and 
reasoning. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I have a romantic or marital partner who 
gives me the support and encouragement 
I need. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I don't have any friends who share my 
views, but I wish I did. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I feet close to my family. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I am able to depend on my friends for 
help.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. I wish I had a more satisfying romantic 
relationship. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11. I feet part of my family. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. My family really cares about me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13. I do not have any friends who understand 
me, but I wish I did.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. I have a romantic partner to whose 
happiness I contribute. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. I have an unmet need for a close romantic 
relationship.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the 
items below and indicate whether you almost never (1), sometimes (2), often (3), or almost 
always (4) think or do each one WHEN YOU FEEL DOWN, SAD, OR DEPRESSED.  
 
Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do.  
 
1.  Think about how alone you feel  1 2 3 4 
2.  Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this.”  1 2 3 4 
3.  Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  1 2 3 4 
4.  Think about how hard it is to concentrate  1 2 3 4 
5.  Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  1 2 3 4 
6.  Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel  1 2 3 4 
7.  Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  1 2 3 4 
8.  Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  1 2 3 4 
9.  Think “Why can’t I get going?”  1 2 3 4 
10.  Think “Why do I always react this way?”  1 2 3 4 
11.  Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  1 2 3 4 
12.  Write down what you are thinking and analyze it  1 2 3 4 
13.  Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  1 2 3 4 
14.  Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  1 2 3 4 
15.  Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  1 2 3 4 
16.  Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”  1 2 3 4 
17.  Think about how sad you feel  1 2 3 4 
18.  Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  1 2 3 4 
19.  Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  1 2 3 4 
20.  Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed  1 2 3 4 
21.  Go someplace alone to think about your feelings  1 2 3 4 
22.  Think about how angry you are with yourself  1 2 3 4 
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White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) 
 
This survey is about thoughts. There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond honestly 
to each of the items below. Be sure to answer every item by circling the appropriate letter beside 
each.  
A = Strongly disagree 
B = Disagree 
C = Neutral or don’t know  
D = Agree 
E = Strongly agree  
 
 A B C D E 
1. There are things I prefer not to think about.  
2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do.  
3. I have thoughts that I cannot stop.  
4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot erase.  
5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea.  
6. I wish I could stop thinking of certain things.  
7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could stop it.  
8. I always try to put problems out of mind.  
9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my head.  
10. There are things that I try not to think about.  
11. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking.  
12. I often do things to distract myself from my thoughts.  
13. I have thoughts that I try to avoid.  
14. There are many thoughts that I have that I don’t tell  
anyone.  
15. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from  
intruding on my mind.  
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Toronto Alexitymia Scale (TAS-20)  
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Disagree or Agree  
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly agree  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. I am often confused about what emotion I am feeling. 
2. It is difficult for me to find the right words for my feelings. 
3. I have physical sensations that even doctors don't understand. 
4. I am able to describe my feelings easily 
5. I prefer to analyze problems rather than just describe them. 
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I am sad, frightened, or angry. 
7. I find it hard to describe how I feel about people. 
8. I prefer to just let things happen rather than to understand why   
they turned out that way. 
9. I have feelings that I can't quite identify. 
10. Being in touch with emotions is essential. 
11. I am often puzzled by sensations in my body. 
12. People tell me to describe my feelings more. 
13. I don't know what's going on inside me. 
14. I often don't know why I am angry. 
15. I prefer talking to people about their daily activities rather than 
their feelings.  
16. I prefer to watch "light" entertainment shows rather than 
psychological dramas. 
17. It is difficult for me to reveal my innermost feelings, even to 
close friends. 
18. I can feel close to someone, even in moments of silence. 
19. I find examination of my feelings useful in solving personal 
problems. 
20. Looking for hidden meanings in movies or plays distracts from 
their enjoyment.  
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Cognitive Processing of Trauma Scale (CPOTS) 
 
Regarding your most disturbing/traumatic experience, please rate the extent to which you agree 
with each of the following statements using the following rating scale. 
1  strongly disagree 
2 moderately diasagree 
3  slightly disagree 
4  neither mainly agree nor disagree 
5  slightly agree 
6  moderately agree 
7  strongly agree 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1. There is ultimately more good than bad in this experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2. I have figured out how to cope. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3. I say to myself ‘this isn’t real.’ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4. I have moved on and left this event in the past. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 5. Overall, this event feels resolved for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6. I have come to terms with this experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7. I often think, ‘if only I had done something different.’ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. I blame myself for what happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9. I refuse to believe that this really happened to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10. I wish I could have handled this differently. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 11. Other people have had worse experiences than mine. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 12. I act as if this event never really happened. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 13. Even though my experience was difficult, I can think of ways that it could have been worse. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 14. My situation is not so bad compared to other peoples’ situations. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 15. I am able to find positive aspects of this experience. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 16. I have been able to find a ‘silver lining’ in this event. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 17. I pretend this didn’t really happen. 
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Modified PTSD Symptom Scale–Self Report (MPSS-SR) 
 
The purpose of this scale is to measure the frequency and severity of symptoms in the past two weeks.  For each 
symptom listed below, please write the frequency of the symptom to the left (0 – 3), and if the frequency is at least 
1, circle the number to the right to indicate the severity. 
 
 FREQUENCY   SEVERITY 
 
0 Not at all       0  Not at all distressing 
1 Once per week or less/ a little bit/once in a while   1 A little bit distressing 
2 2 or 4 times per week/ somewhat/half the time 2 Moderately distressing 
3 5 or more times per week/ very much/almost always  3 Quite a bit distressing 
  4 Extremely distressing 
 
FREQUENCY Regarding the most disturbing event in your life, in the 
past 30 days… 
SEVERITY 
0 1 2 3 1.  Have you had recurrent or intrusive / distressing thoughts or recollections about the event? 0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 2.  Have you been having recurrent bad dreams or nightmares about the event?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 
3.  Have you had the experience of suddenly reliving the 
event, flashbacks of it, acting or feeling as it were re-
occurring?  
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4.  Have you been intensely EMOTIONALLY upset when reminded of the event (includes anniversary reactions)?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 5.  Have you been having intense PHYSICAL reactions (e.g., sweaty, heart palpitations) when reminded of the event?     0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 6.  Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the event?    0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 7.  Have you persistently been making efforts to avoid activities, situations, or places that remind you of the event? 0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 8.  Are there any important aspects about the event that you still cannot recall?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 9.  Have you markedly lost interest in free time activities since the event?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 10. Have you felt detached or cut off from others around you since the event?   0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 
11. Have you felt that your ability to experience emotions is 
less (e.g., unable to have loving feelings, do you feel numb, 
can’t cry when sad, etc.)? 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 
12. Have you felt that any future plans or hopes have changed 
because of the event (e.g., no career, marriage, children, or 
long life)? 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 13. Have you been having persistent difficulty falling or staying asleep?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 14. Have you been continuously irritable or having outbursts of anger?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 15. Have you been having persistent difficulty concentrating? 0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 16. Are you overly alert (e.g., check to see who is around, etc.) since the event?  0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 17. Have you been jumpier, more easily startled, since the event?       0 1 2 3 4 
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Have the symptoms above significantly affected an important part of your life, such as your 
relationships with other people, your work or your ability to work, your school work, etc.? 
 YES     NO 
 
Have you ever received treatment or counseling for these symptoms? 
 YES     NO            
If NO, and you experienced some of the symptoms described above, please give some reasons 
you might have for not seeking treatment:        
  
 
 
Covariates - disclosures to others and recent occurrences of trauma 
 
How many years and months has it been since the event took place (or stopped taking place)? 
How many times have you EVER talked to each of these people about your most 
disturbing/traumatic experience?  
Family member 
Friend 
Acquaintance 
Religious Leader Counselor/Therapist 
Someone else 
Written about it in a journal, blog, etc. 
Have you experienced any additional disturbing/traumatic events since you began participation 
in this study?  
No 
Yes. Please indicate the kind of event that occurred. 
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Oversaw undergraduate tutors in the administration of a self-paced introductory psychology course.  
 Prepared and administered class and testing materials, managed a grades database, tutored students.  
 
Fortis College, New Carrollton, MD         
Psychology Instructor, Summer 2011 
Taught two introductory psychology courses. 
 
American University, Washington D.C.               
Adjunct Faculty, 2009-2010 
Writing for Visual Media (Fall 2009, 2010). 
Scripting the Short Film (Summer 2009, 2010). 
Screenwriting course for high school students (Summer 2009). 
 
John Paul the Great Catholic University, San Diego, CA        
Adjunct Professor, 2007 
Media Product Development (Spring 2007). 
 
VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE 
 
Tilden Study Center, Los Angeles, CA        
Assistant Director, April 1994-March 2008 
Co-founded The Ahead Leadership Program; recruited and trained successful college students and young 
professional men to serve as mentors for high school boys from the Los Angeles and Ventura area; program 
met biweekly and integrated boys from all SES levels, promoting ambition, achievement, and a spirit of 
service among all participants; graduates have gone on to college and vocational schools. 
Helped run workshops and summer camps for males ranging from fifth grade through high school, college, 
young professionals, and older men. 
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Founded and ran the One-On-One Tutoring Program at McKinley Elementary School in Santa Monica, 
CA; recruited students from UCLA to provide weekly tutoring to disadvantaged youth, mostly Latino; 
developed similar program at Resurrection School in East Los Angeles. 
 
Riverside Center, New York, NY                                                
Youth Leader, August 1991-May 1993 
Assisted with college prep programs for high school boys.  
Led camping and ski trips, and academic study weekends. 
Taught Sunday School classes at St. Charles Church in the Bronx. 
 
OTHER WORK EXPERIENCE 
 
Hero Pictures, Los Angeles, CA       
Vice President of Development, January 2007-December 2008 
Oversaw the review, purchase, and improvement of literary properties (books, screenplays, articles) for 
development as motion pictures and television shows; consulted with producers, agents, lawyers, and 
reviewed/drafted contracts; produced and edited a TV reality show pilot and promotional materials.   
Supervised 2 assistants and various interns. 
 
Once Upon A Time Films, Los Angeles, CA                           
Associate Producer, 2005-2006  
Played a lead role in the writing, production, and delivery of the film, Fighting the Odds: The Marilyn 
Gambrell Story for Lifetime Television. 
Manager of Development, 2004-2005 
Assistant to Stanley M. Brooks, 2003-2004 
Supported the development and production of 16 made-for-TV movies and mini-series including Broken 
Trail starring Robert Duvall and Thomas Hayden Church.  
 
Bernard Hodes Group, Los Angeles, CA  
Copywriter, October 1995-December 1998 
Wrote copy for internet, radio, and print advertising and collateral. 
Helped win new business (Hewlett Packard, Honda, Disney). 
Won a diversity award for a Honda ad. 
 
 
 
